


# Military Intelligence

January 1988  
PB 34-88-1 (TEST)



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**Features**

- 6 Current Applications of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign**  
Capt. Peter Adelman addresses the implications of Gen. Lee's offensive campaign through the Shenandoah Valley in light of the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine.
- 9 German Intelligence and Security in the Franco-German War**  
Maj. Arthur T. Coumbe takes up the areas of intelligence and security that gave the Germans a clear margin of superiority over the French.
- 13 Stalinism and the Militarization of Society**  
Maj. Mark W. Hays examines the totalitarian dictatorship of Stalin and the permanent militarization of Soviet society in this fourth and final installment on Stalinism.
- 17 U.S. Army Counterintelligence in CONUS—The World War I Experience**  
Dr. John P. Finnegan traces the beginnings of the Army's counterintelligence effort.
- 22 U.S. Army COMSEC in World War I**  
Mr. James L. Gilbert offers a comprehensive historical analysis of U.S. Army communications security during World War I.
- 26 Intelligence and Deception Factors in the Battles of El Alamein**  
SFC Milton Nodacker analyzes the contributions of intelligence and the extensive use of deception operations in the North African campaign of World War II.
- 30 The Military Intelligence Profession in the U.S. Army — Part II**  
Capt. Nathan E. McCauley explains the impact of the MI Corps on the U.S. Army in Part II of this analysis of the MI Profession.
- 33 Intelligence Exchange**  
Col. John H. Prokopowicz takes a hard look at combined services support in this informative essay.

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# Military Intelligence

## From the Home of Intelligence

Volume 14 Number 1 PB 34-88-1 (TEST) January 1988

### Departments

#### 34 An OPSEC Crusade

Capt. Karen Gerogolian presents a topic that needs constant attention.

#### 35 Equipment Identification Training

CWO 2 Dennis E. Renken describes a method of improving equipment identification skills.

#### 36 96B Skill Development

Capt. Deborah M. Stuart outlines a cohesive program to improve the skills of the intelligence analyst.

#### 38 OPFOR in the Defense

Capt. Justin L.C. Eldridge demonstrates the effectiveness of the OPFOR at the National Training Center.

#### 40 Command Sergeant Major/Sergeant Major Selection

Lt. Col. Patricia H. Jernigan shares her experiences as a member of the military intelligence panel on the 1987 CSM/SGM selection board.

#### 2 From the Commander

#### 3 From the CSM

#### 4 Behind the Lines

#### 5 Feedback

#### 46 USAICS Notes

#### 48 Language Notes

#### 50 Training Notes

#### 51 Officer Notes

#### 51 Professional Reader

#### 61 History of the 124th MI Battalion

### Staff

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
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# from the Commander

**Maj. Gen. Julius Parker Jr.**

The Army's theme for 1988 is "TRAINING," TRADOC's top priority. We at the Intelligence Center and School (ICS) train today's MI soldier for the MI missions of today and tomorrow. The challenge is to train for both missions without degrading either.

Before the modern era, with its rapid, revolutionary technological changes, soldiers normally trained in the methods of the "last war." Some trained using new technology for the "next war" and were victorious. But the leap in thinking, that leap in converting tractors to tanks, firecrackers to rifles, or the characteristics of electromagnetic waves to radars and radios, was small compared to the leap we must continually make if we, too, are to be victorious. And we cannot allow our people the ignominious option. Defeat would break the faith with past soldiers who kept their generations free.

To train our soldiers for the next war, our approach must be revolutionary. We must use the new technologies in the training of our soldiers. Our simulators are more and more sophisticated. Our video-embedded simulators will allow soldiers to train on the equipment they will use in war. But these are machines, very useful and necessary, but still machines.

To improve the human side of instruction, one of our goals is to increase the quality of the faculty. We are doing this by requiring that over half possess at least a master's degree. We will also increase the number of MI officers in the Technical Enrichment Program and, in so doing, establish ourselves as a high-technology branch for Reserve Officers' Training Corps and U.S. Military Academy graduates.

An example of a combination of man and machine is already in place, especially in corporate training programs. This is the use of satellite data links to bring the most advanced levels and best sources of expertise directly into the classroom. I believe we can use similar delivery systems, for instance, to have the expertise based at the National Cryptologic School in Washington, D.C., train our signals intelligence officers and NCOs on radio wave propagation or advanced signals analysis. Using satellite linking systems, the Intelligence Center and School could also present tactics instruction to its students direct from the Infantry and Armor Schools, while the Artillery School could provide fire support instruction. Other assigned personnel could receive

training towards advanced degrees on the same system. Now that the technology is here, it makes sense to seek and use the available training expertise, regardless of geographic location.

Another area where new technology can assist ICS in training the future MI officer is in the four IEW tasks of situation development, target development, electronic warfare and counterintelligence. I feel we can enhance and detail our programs with automated aids and embedded software training as we achieve breakthroughs in computer-based and computer-assisted instruction. These training packages, combined with small group instruction and scenario-driven IEW models, will stress unit and individual capabilities throughout the intelligence cycle.

ICS training must also accommodate the technological advances of the enemy. Our training must ready our soldiers to perform IEW tasks more effectively by exploiting the new technologies. At the same time, they must be able to comprehend and neutralize enemy capabilities. One exciting and crucial tool currently under development is the application of artificial intelligence to enhance our capability to perform the functions of the intelligence cycle.

Additionally, during the next 10 years, we will significantly improve current IMINT and SIGINT equipment, as well as develop new systems to support IEW operations. These include a meteorological sensor system, a common ground-based jammer, a heliborne common jammer and SIGINT system, and advanced Special Electronic Mission Aircraft. The future IEW unmanned aerial vehicle will permit the penetration of enemy areas with a high probability of mission success and no exposure of human life to hostile fire. To test our training and technology, ICS is also developing the Army's first realistic intelligence training exercise that will permit the evaluation of the capability of MI units to successfully encounter a postulated threat at various echelons of command.

Our new MI Training Center at Fort Huachuca will give us the resources in which we can match up our first-rate soldiers with state-of-the-art technology. This, combined with a professional faculty and challenging curricula, will produce the kind of MI Corps the Army must and will have. **Toujours en avant—Always Out Front!**



# from the CSM



## CSM Robert H. Retter

There hasn't been a great deal of good news for Military Intelligence (MI) enlisted soldiers recently in the area of promotions. Promotion is the primary indicator of successful career development and the principal means whereby both past performance and future potential are recognized. In addition to rank, promotion advances our pay grade which determines our standard of living. Any change in promotion rates, therefore, tends to have immediate far-reaching impact.

MI soldiers have usually benefited from extremely rapid promotions as measured by time in service. I recently compared the 1984 E7 selection list to the 1987 list. Although the difference has narrowed slightly, primary zone selectees in MI still enjoyed a one and a half year time in service advantage over the rest of the Army in 1987. This is a very general statistic. Clearly, the advantage does not apply in all grades or in every military occupational specialty. But it illustrates a critical point. MI soldiers in general have been promoted faster and paid at a higher rate for fewer years of service than the Army average. Obviously, with the promotion slowdown, these differences will begin to narrow. As a result, some MI soldiers will accumulate a bit more time in grade than they expected to under the earlier, faster rates. There are negative aspects to very rapid promotions, which I would like to point out.

Over time, and for a variety of reasons which are not unique to MI, the system has allowed us to continuously document requirements for higher grades and more people. Recently the system has been disciplined to work within the numbers and grades which can be expected to be funded by Congress. Now, when an increase in grade or numbers of people is required, a "bill payer" or trade-off must be supplied. Additionally, where the Army was overstructured, as in MI, the structure had to be brought in line or a bill payer identified. This restructuring is the basic reason for the promotion slowdown in MI.

Under the old structure we could not fill our higher grades by promotion alone. We had to "raid" other branches through reclassification schemes or the BEAR program. Our own soldiers were being promoted so fast that experience was way out of line with the rank on the sleeve. Because we needed more in the upper grades than the lower, we were forced to promote everyone eligible with very little testing of qualifications. Hard chargers gained no special recognition

over mediocre performers in terms of advancement. When we associated with other services or branches, our NCOs often had credibility problems working with their more experienced people.

There are other negative impacts of a rapid promotion rate. Some of you probably found yourselves in jobs for which you were ill-prepared by experience. The NCO Corps probably lost some important jobs to the officers over time. And, if we simply regrade the job you are doing to the next higher grade, what sense of increasing responsibility and authority results? These points will probably fall on deaf ears among those who only look for the pay raise. While I sincerely regret that MI soldiers serving today are forced to bear the burden, I think we are undergoing a necessary correction.

No promotion slowdown lasts forever. Just because a higher grade in your MOS appears "frozen" today does not mean it still will be when you are eligible. The current promotion situation in MI in no way suggests that your services are not important and valued by the Army or your country. Of course your next promotion is a factor in the decision process you and your family must use as you plan your future. I hope it is not the only thing you look at. I hope you will consider what I have said here as you consider the impact of the promotion slowdown on your personal career decision.

It is most important now that you continue to work on those areas of self improvement which will make you competitive for promotion. It is essential that you continue to counsel your soldiers on maintaining complete and accurate records and to work toward self improvement in civilian and military education. Promotion recommendations are still critically important. If your best soldiers are not on the list when the points fall, and they eventually will, they will miss the opportunity. When the promotion outlook begins to brighten, and it will, some will have used the time to enhance their performance. These soldiers will of course be recognized by promotion selection first. Some of you may use the temporary lack of promotion opportunity as an excuse to give up. You must not give up on your soldiers.

I will continue to scrutinize the MI enlisted structure to wring out every possible promotion opportunity consistent with mission accomplishment and DA policy. I trust that, despite the promotion setback, the enlisted members of the MI Corps will continue to perform with distinction.

# Behind the Lines

Samuel Johnson once stated, "Whatever is formed for long duration arrives slowly to its maturity." This apt quote summarizes the situation of the Military Intelligence Corps. Members of the new corps must train hard and long to persevere and succeed.

An integral part of training is the study of history and the application of lessons that have been learned. The intelligence professional cannot afford to ignore historical military events in his daily quest for excellence. In the words of George Santayana, "Those who do not remember the past are condemned to relive it."

This issue recalls the past by presenting a number of articles that address historical events. AirLand Battle concepts in the Civil War, intelligence and security in the Franco-German War, intelligence and deception in the Battles of El Alamein, and the militarization of Soviet society under Stalin are discussed at length. Two renowned historians provide input on early U.S. Army counterintelligence and communications security. Finally, a knowledgeable author gives an overview of the military intelligence profession. To summarize, Aldous Huxley challenges all with this quote, "That men do not learn very much from the lessons of history is the most important of all the lessons that history has to teach."

Learning from history is only one part of the multifaceted task of training, the Army's theme for 1988. Training in the intelligence community also encompasses security awareness, skill development and retention, and analysis of opposing forces tactics at all levels of conflict, to which other articles in this issue allude.

Potential adversaries incorporate tactics and doctrine shaped by diverse cultures, history and philosophies. The multidisciplinary intelligence professional must be aware of, expect and religiously study *all* potential scenarios, whether they originate in the Middle East, Central America or the Soviet Union. It is not an impossible task; the Military Intelligence Corps has the tools. We must execute; the alternative is defeat.

*William A. Brinkley*

Editor



Dear Editor:

I read Dr. Nicholas Dima's article, "Eastern Europe: An Area in Crisis," (*Military Intelligence*, June 1987) with great interest. This article contends that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are black and their future is blacker. What Dima doesn't seem to realize is that the Soviet Union has existed for 70 years, and the Eastern Europe communist bloc nations have existed for almost four decades. Here are some reasons for continued Soviet presence in Eastern Europe:

- Most of the European nations joined the Axis powers during World War II (Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania). Czechoslovakia was annexed, and Poland was divided between Germany and the Soviet Union.
- The German surrogate states were used as staging areas from which Germany launched her armies against the Soviet Union in June 1941.
- The Axis states of Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania were at war with the Soviet Union. In addition, the Axis surrogates furnished armed forces to support the Nazi armies' invasion and occupation of the Soviet Union.
- Russia has been attacked twice in this century by Germany and Eastern European allies. These invasions of Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union totally destroyed the economy and caused enormous casualties.
- Dima avoids discussing European impact on Western colonialism and how colonialism fueled world communist movements. Add the postwar collapse of Western European overseas possessions in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
- Another factor the article did not address was why, "At the end of World War II, the entire region was occupied by Soviet troops." The German army and their surrogate allies were driven across Eastern Europe by the Soviets. The Red Army paid a high price for expelling the Nazis and their Eastern European collaborators.
- Dima also ignored the East German revolt in June 1953 which was the first crack in the Soviet post-Stalin iron curtain, three years before the Polish riots of October 1956 and the Hungarian revolt in November 1956.

While I do agree with him on historical events and the very negative aspects of the regimes in Eastern Europe, they are not going to collapse internally. There

# feedback . . .

aren't any Eastern European movements, domestically or externally, that offer healthy alternatives to the present regimes.

In conclusion, Dima's article can be summed up in a sentence, "Essentially very little, if anything, of value came from the East." In the history of the Soviet Union, essentially very little, if anything, of value came from the West.

**Michael S. Evancevich**  
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Dear Editor:

After reading Michael Evancevich's letter to the editor of this same issue, it is apparent that he did not understand the purpose of my article which was to discern a possible pattern in post-war Eastern European events, to better understand the present, and to try to foresee future trends. I did not advocate the breaking of the Soviet dominion, though I confess I wish it would be replaced by more homogenous nation-states, capable of freely entering a European community type of relationship. Above all, I did not want to hurt anyone's feelings, but I cannot help it if it hurts to be or to feel Russian.

To be more specific, new events that have occurred since I finished the article point out a future scenario in Eastern Europe more pessimistic than I had anticipated. There were violent riots in Romania, the first defeat of the government in a popular referendum in Poland, runaway inflation in Yugoslavia, and a dangerously uncertain course in Hungary. On top of it all, the Soviet Army is badly hurting in Afghanistan, and the official and popular reaction to Gorbachev's domestic reforms is very mixed. Yet, what saddens me most about Evancevich's letter is the very nature of his arguments which, incidentally, do not differ from the official arguments advanced by Moscow.

Moscow, for example, stresses that its territory has been attacked twice in this century. Thus, in order to defend itself against the Nazis and other imperialists, the Soviet Union had no choice but to invade and occupy everything from Berlin to Kabul and possibly further. Nothing is mentioned about Russia partitioning Poland three times before the last Soviet-Nazi partition of 1939, which actually triggered World War II.

During World War II, some Eastern European countries cooperated with Germany, but they were forced to do so

by circumstances. Romania, for example, joined Germany and attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, but Mr. Evancevich, as well as Moscow itself, failed to mention that in June 1940 the Red armies invaded Romania and annexed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina which actually prompted that country to join Germany in the war.

I am well aware of the deep-seated Russian paranoia about foreign invasions, but in my opinion this has been caused by the Mongol/Tatar invasions of the past and has little to do with Europe. The Russians must do something and heal their souls of this no longer warranted fear.

Mr. Evancevich's allusion to Western colonialism could only be understood as a justification for the Russian "colonialism" from the three Baltic republics to Central Asia. Nevertheless, while the Western colonial empires gave up their holdings, the Russians continue to cling stubbornly to theirs. In one of his interviews, Anatoly Scharansky, the Soviet dissident who spent several years in prison and eventually was allowed to emigrate, pointed out that the Russian people lack a clear sense of identity. From their standpoint, it appears that Russia extends wherever the Tzarist or Red Armies have reached and established their strongholds. This makes it very difficult to reason with the Russians, because as Scharansky also said, they felt they had a moral duty to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968. Probably, the Russians had another moral duty to invade Afghanistan in 1979, and they will probably have another one to invade Persia and Baluchistan in the future.

In conclusion, I would like to turn around Evancevich's last remark. Paraphrasing me, he said that, "In the history of the Soviet Union, essentially very little, if anything, of value came from the West." I should ask then, why the Russians make such efforts to spy on us and steal everything from the West?

**Dr. Nicholas Dima**

Dear Editor:

I read Capt. Bill DeWitt's article on Special Forces Signals Intelligence in your June 1987 edition and wish to offer some comments regarding the equipment required for such operations. (I am responsible within the TRADOC Systems Manager-Ground Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Systems for man-portable SIGINT

(Continued on page 43)

# **Current Applications of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign**





by Capt. Peter Adelman

The Confederate campaign north through the Shenandoah Valley culminated in the Confederate Army's defeat at Gettysburg, Pa. Although the Confederate Army was ultimately defeated at Gettysburg, Lee had applied many of the principles of the modern AirLand Battle doctrine to his campaign. The South's military success prior to Gettysburg colored their perception of the Union's capabilities and deceived the Confederate leadership into believing that they could decisively engage the Union Army on Northern soil and win.

### The Battle of Brandy Station

To gain a better understanding of Lee's strategy and the perceptions of the Confederate forces, one must analyze certain battles prior to the Gettysburg defeat.

Lee began to move north into the Shenandoah Valley early in June 1863.<sup>1</sup> Lee knew that he had to carry the war north to the heartland of the Union to remove the direct threat to Richmond, defeat the Army of the Potomac and hopefully force the Union to sue for peace. One of the first actions in his drive north was the battle of Brandy Station. The Union forces in defense of Brandy Station initially repulsed the Confederate forces but withdrew from the field when overwhelmed. The fact that the Union retreated from established defensive positions when the enemy threatened is the key to understanding how the Confederate leadership saw the capabilities of the Union forces in this battle and the campaign in general.

### The Second Battle of Winchester

The second battle of Winchester reinforced the Southern perceptions of easy victory. Union Gen. George W. Cullum reported after a careful examination of the Winchester fortifications in November 1862 that they were "undefensible." Cullum felt that Winchester required no major fortifications and should have no major garrison "being merely an eye of the National Army looking up the Shenandoah Valley."<sup>2</sup>

Maj. Gen. R.H. Milroy's 2d Union Division, 8th Army Corps occupied Winchester in December 1862 with about 9,000 troops and remained in the area until the battle. The division included three brigades under Brig. Gen. W.L. Elliott, Col. William G. Ely and Col. A.T. McReynolds. On June 9, 1863, Con-

federate Gen. Jubal Early, with 30,000 men, pushed silently and swiftly northward through the Shenandoah Valley, while Lee seized and held the gaps in the Blue Ridge Mountains. The next day, Milroy telegraphed: "The enemy is probably approaching in some force. I am entirely ready for them: I can hold this place."<sup>3</sup> He received instructions on the 11th to pull out of Winchester and join forces with Gen. Kelley at Harper's Ferry. Milroy once again reported that he could hold Winchester and was authorized to remain there.<sup>4</sup> The stage was set.

On the morning of June 13th, Union cavalry patrols reported the enemy approaching in force. Lt. Gen. R.S. Ewell, 2d Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, marched directly to Winchester with two divisions commanded by Gens. Early and Edward Johnson. Early deployed a brigade south of Winchester and moved his main force to the northwestern side of the town to seize the outworks which commanded Fort Jackson, Winchester's main fort. Meanwhile, Johnson deployed to the east to divert attention from Early's maneuvers. Early was so successful that by the 14th he was able to surprise the outworks and force the Union to retreat to Fort Jackson. The Union force was gradually falling back into the main Winchester fortifications. On the night of the 13th, the city of Winchester was besieged. Milroy, determining that he was facing an overwhelming Confederate force and was about to be enveloped, recalled his forces to the main fortification. Croffut and Morris wrote that "This was his (Milroy's) opportunity to retreat under cover of blinding darkness and heavy thundershowers, but some fatuity detained him."<sup>5</sup>

On the second day of the battle, Union scouts found the enemy on all the roads surrounding Winchester. Skirmishes and small engagements slowly pushed the Union forces into their main fortifications where they were subjected to severe artillery bombardment.<sup>6</sup> Milroy and his brigade commanders agreed that the town was surrounded and that Lee could hurl his entire army against them. By the next morning, Lee would have at least 100 artillery pieces besieging the fortifications, and only one day's rations remained within the fort.

Milroy ordered a retreat from Winchester and the abandonment of all artillery and wagons. The cannons were

spiked, the wheels of the wagons were smashed and the excess ammunition was thrown into the cisterns. On June 15th, the Union forces retreated along the Martinsburg Turnpike.<sup>7</sup> Ewell anticipated the Union's retreat and moved Johnson's division to positions on the turnpike where they encountered Elliott's 1st Brigade. At first the Union forces successfully battled the Confederate forces but the Confederates had vast reinforcements. Milroy realized that the remainder of the Confederate force was moving toward his rear. In desperation, Milroy split his forces for the final retreat. McReynolds' 3rd Brigade, positioned in the rear of the column, took advantage of the fight to make an effort to reach Harper's Ferry. McReynolds and Milroy escaped with a few men but Ely, with no support, surrendered.<sup>8</sup>

The Valley of the Shenandoah was cleared of federal troops by June 17, 1863. Lee thus far had been completely successful; his army was exultant. He lost no time in availing himself of these advantages, and his subsequent march into Pennsylvania must be understood in this context. His advance was unimpeded until his force stumbled into the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg. Although Lee did not wish a decisive engagement with the Union at Gettysburg, the engagement was inevitable and he must have sensed victory. The Confederate leadership saw the Union Army take defensive positions at Gettysburg similar to those at Brandy Station and Winchester. Offensive actions had carried both Brandy Station and Winchester for the South. Why couldn't they win again?

### Implications of Offensive Actions

Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, delineates the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. The four basic tenets of initiative, agility, depth and synchronization may be analyzed in light of the South's valley campaign, both tactically and strategically.<sup>9</sup>

The very essence of the South's Shenandoah Valley campaign implies the virtues of the first fundamental principle, initiative. FM 100-5 defines initiative as: "Setting or changing the terms of the battle by action. It implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations." Offense, one of the nine principles of war, is necessary to any strategic, operational or tactical situation. *Initiative equals offensive* in today's

AirLand Battle doctrine. Initiative was displayed in the tactical sense when Johnson's division surprised the retreating Union Army on the Martinsburg Turnpike during the battle of Winchester.<sup>10</sup> Johnson's initiative never allowed the Federal forces to recover from the shock of his initial attack and featured the AirLand concepts of speed, audacity and violence of execution. He achieved the desired results of confusion that was caused by a fluid situation. This subsequently led to the Confederate exploitation of the battlefield.

The second fundamental principle, agility, "The ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy . . . is the first prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative." Again, agility was used extensively during the battle of Winchester. Johnson's division disengaged three of Milroy's four brigades and moved east to cut off the Union forces' only escape route. Johnson left his remaining brigade to hold the key terrain just east of Winchester.

On a broader scale, the concept of agility may also be seen in Lee's ability to raid Union territory, forcing the Union to react and giving his Confederate Army the advantage of the tactical defense when, as Lee expressed it, "They meet us."<sup>11</sup> Lee's plan, if successful, would have degraded the federal Army's freedom of action, reduced their flexibility and upset their coordination in future battles. Lee clearly demonstrated the imagination, boldness, foresight and decisiveness that all combat commanders require to successfully execute an operation like the march into Pennsylvania.

The third fundamental principle, depth, is defined as "the extension of operations in space, time and resources." This principle can be studied from a strategic perspective. Lee was carrying the war to the North in his Shenandoah Valley campaign in order to menace both Washington, D.C., and Baltimore, Md. Lee believed that if the federal Army was defeated in a pitched battle it would be forced to retreat across the Susquehanna River and give him control of Maryland and Western Pennsylvania and probably would cause the fall of Washington.<sup>12</sup>

The final AirLand Battle principle, synchronization, is defined as "the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point." The Confederate con-



cept of operations for the second battle of Winchester saw a synchronization of forces in their envelopment of the town, the strengthening of their positions and, at the same time, their withdrawal of sufficient forces to capture the bulk of the escaping Union division. Lee, acting in the manner of all great commanders, was able to coordinate the actions of his units to bring the entire weight of his forces to bear on the federals in a synchronized action. Anticipating the actions of his enemy, using his grasp of time-space relationships and understanding his own men, tactics and weapons, Lee was able to emerge as the victor once again.

### Perceptions

One of the key lessons in the Shenandoah Valley campaign was that offensive initiative was not enough to guarantee combat success on the battlefield. The importance of an effective defense cannot be underestimated. An established defense provides the tactical advantage to the defender. But, to defend in a vacuum and not to apply any of the supporting principles of war can have disastrous effects as the Union experienced at both Brandy Station and Winchester. The defender who occupies key terrain and employs his combat forces using sound tactical judgment will gain the edge over the aggressor force. The Union victory at Gettysburg amply demonstrated this principle. In this era of the AirLand Battle philosophy, combat technicians must not forget the lessons of both the Confederacy and the Union. We must not totally abandon the concept of the "active defense" for a purely offensive approach to U.S. Army employment

throughout the world.

In conclusion, Edwin B. Cottingham in his analysis of the Gettysburg campaign believed that: "Although Confederate successes in the lower valley (Shenandoah Valley) were another blow to the prestige of federal arms and a stimulus to Southern morale, they did not directly affect the power of the Army of the Potomac. They did eliminate, however, more than 7,000 Union troops from further service at a time when trained soldiers were at a premium. The North paid a heavy price for inept generalship."<sup>13</sup> Lee's generalship during the 1863 Shenandoah Valley campaign struck a severe blow to the Union forces, but the final chapter of Lee's "AirLand Battle" was his defeat. Both federal and Confederate actions during the Shenandoah Valley campaign proved the need for a wise blend and efficient application of modern AirLand Battle doctrine and active defense philosophy to ensure success on today's battlefield. ★

### Footnotes

1. *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (New York: The Century Company, 1891-95), vol. I, p. 263.
2. W.A. Croffut and John M. Morris, *The Military & Civil History of Connecticut During the War of 1861-65* (New York: Ledyard Bill, 1869), p. 350.
3. *Cyclopedia of Battles: The Union Army*, vol. 7, p. 947.
4. *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, p. 263.
5. Croffut and Morris, p. 351.
6. *Ibid*, p. 350.
7. *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, p. 264.
8. Croffut and Morris, p. 354.
9. For an in-depth analysis of the four basic tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine, see Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, 1986, pp. 15-18.
10. *Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, vol. I, Plate XLII (1891-95), p. 9.
11. Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, *How the North Won*, (University of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 398.
12. A.L. Long, *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee* (New Jersey: The Blue and Grey Press, 1886), p. 269.
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*Capt. Peter Adelman recently completed the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. He is currently assigned to the U.S. Army Resident Office, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md.*

# German Intelligence and Security in the Franco-German War



by Maj. Arthur T. Coumbe

The victory of the confederated German army in the Franco-German war of 1870-71 resulted in the unification of Germany under Prussia and the establishment of German preeminence on the European continent. It also bred a bitter Franco-German antagonism that shaped the course of Western diplomacy for the next half century. Much has been written about this war, which was the bloodiest European conflict between Waterloo and Sarajevo. Many reasons have been offered to explain why Germans triumphed so easily over an adversary who, before July 1870, had been considered the most formidable military power in the world.

Historians have cited the Prussian system of obligatory military service as a prime cause of the German victory. This system allowed the Germans to tap the manpower resources of the nation and create, for that era, an enormous army of over 1,000,000 men. Others have pointed to superior organization and management as key factors in Germany's success. General Staff officers meticulously planned every detail of mobilization and deployment, arranging everything from assembly areas and rail schedules down to what individual soldiers would carry in their backpacks. Writers have also drawn attention to how the Germans harnessed technology to war. They

mastered the use of the railroad and telegraph to achieve a superiority over their opponents and, by the introduction of Krupp's breech-loading, rifled, steel cannons, gained an important advantage in armaments as well. Many advance Germany's system of officer education as an explanation for its remarkable military achievement. The Prussian *Kriegsakademie* — which served as a prototype for the armies of other German states — was an institution that afforded Prussia the means to ensure a measure of doctrinal uniformity in the officer corps and to instruct staff officers in subjects essential for directing and administering a modern mass army. However, contemporaries



and recent historians have given less attention to the operational and tactical factors behind the German accomplishment.

France declared war on the North German Confederation on July 15, 1870, over complications arising from the Hohenzollern Candidature to the Spanish throne. The states of South Germany, which had signed offensive and defensive alliances with Prussia after their defeat in the Seven Weeks' War of 1866, immediately honored their treaty obligations and placed their armies under Prussian command. Both sides began to mobilize and deploy their armies, the Germans proceeding quickly and efficiently, the French rather haphazardly and ineptly.

French and German units clashed for the first time on August 1 at Saarbrücken, a German village situated on the Franco-German border. The battle was a small and, as it turned out, insignificant affair in which a French corps easily dispersed a single Prussian battalion. This "victory" excited the Parisian crowds and, temporarily at least, raised French hopes, convincing many that the road to Berlin would be an easy one. Soon thereafter, however, the Germans rudely destroyed any French illusions by administering a series of crushing defeats on the long-service, professional army of Napoleon III. It took the Germans only one month to sweep away an army that had been the military wonder of Europe. At the battle of Sedan, that portion of the Imperial Army not bottled up at Metz was surrounded and forced to surrender. Over 100,000 Frenchmen, among them Emperor Napoleon III himself, began a long trek into captivity in Germany.

Many observers thought that the war was over. Half of the French regular army had been captured and the other half sealed up within Metz. Two hundred thousand well-armed, well-equipped, and well-entrenched Germans provided no opportunity for escape. After their victory at Sedan, German military authorities dispatched the German Third Army and the Army of the Meuse to Paris. They hoped that the capture of the French capital would knock the French out of the war. When the two German armies arrived before Paris, the Third Army advanced around the southern reaches of the city while the Army of the Meuse skirted its northern areas. The two armies linked up to the west of Paris and the city was sur-

rounded.

As a result of these unprecedented military misfortunes, the dynasty of Napoleon III fell on September 4, 1870. A Government of National Defense quickly established itself in Paris and began to exercise power.

The war assumed a radically new character with the change in regime. A clash between two regular armies was transformed. The entire population became involved in one way or another in driving the invaders from French soil. The hastily-raised, hastily-trained formations of the Government of National Defense proved a tougher nut for the Germans to crack than the regular army of Napoleon III. Republican France doggedly resisted the Germans for five months. Only after Paris had been starved into submission did the Government of National Defense sue for peace.

The contribution of intelligence gathering and security efforts to German victory — especially in the weeks prior to the proclamation of the Government of National Defense — should not be discounted or underestimated. By knowing the whereabouts of the enemy and, at the same time, veiling their own movements and intentions, the Germans gained important, sometimes decisive, advantages over their opponents.

#### **German Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance**

The Prussian General Staff had a department devoted exclusively to studying French military organization and gathering militarily relevant topographical and geographic information about France. An extensive and efficient network of spies supplemented the work of the staff. Germany's staff officers thus went to war with a good appreciation of the enemy and terrain and a thorough knowledge of French rail lines, road systems, bridge capacities and choke points. The French, on the other hand, expended little effort in systematically studying the enemy or the area of operations. Moreover, French military authorities combined ignorance with arrogance. Because they felt so confident of victory, the French General Staff provided the army with plenty of maps of Germany but none of France — a disastrous mistake since virtually the entire war was fought on French soil. The French began the war, therefore, knowing less about the military aspects of their own country than the

Germans.

The German use of large cavalry formations also gave them a distinct edge in the field of operational intelligence. They used cavalry "masses" (up to division size) to perform a number of critical tasks: screening the movements of their army, protecting strategic points, destroying enemy telegraphic communications and seizing vital defiles in the enemy's rear. Even more importantly, however, they learned to use their cavalry to acquire what they termed "strategic" intelligence — today, we would probably refer to it as "operational" intelligence — about their opponents. Up until the battle of Worth (August 6, 1870) German cavalry reconnaissance was limited to bold forays by individual patrols. It was only after the battle of Worth that German authorities altered their mode of operation.<sup>1</sup> They started to send out mounted units far ahead of advancing infantry columns to gather information about the enemy and the terrain. Normally, mounted formations preceded the main body by a two to three-day advance march, which amounted to between 30 and 45 miles.<sup>2</sup>

One should not assume that the information gathered by huge cavalry "masses" met all the intelligence needs of the German leadership. At times, it was necessary to obtain information of a more precise character. The military historian Martin Von Crevel in **Command in War** has written about the need of commanders, both past and present, to supplement the intelligence gained through normal intelligence channels with information acquired by what he calls a "directed telescope." He maintains that information becomes less specific and less useful as it passes up the chain of command. Estimates become "sugar-coated" or distorted by many summaries. To protect against this danger, he contends that a commander needs an intelligence resource (a "directed telescope") that he can use to cut through the normal channels and obtain information of a less structured nature.<sup>3</sup> This will serve as a corrective and counterweight to information gathered in the regular way and help the commander get an accurate and timely picture of the situation.

In 1870, a responsible officer (or officers) thoroughly familiar with the methods and designs of a senior headquarters was sent out on a reconnaissance mission and instructed to ana-





lyze and report what he saw. Normally, a small detachment of cavalymen would accompany this officer.<sup>4</sup> Patrols of this type provided the "directed telescope" to senior German commanders, giving them detailed and up-to-date information about the current situation. Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen wrote, "In many, even in most, cases, a simple officer's patrol reconnoiters better and sees more than an entire squadron or even a stronger detachment of cavalry."<sup>5</sup> He gave two practical reasons why it could do this. First, a whole squadron is easily seen while it is easy for a small patrol to escape observation. Second, an entire squadron, even though sent out for the purpose of reconnaissance, is easily tempted to get caught up in a fight, thus betraying its presence and failing in its primary mission. An officer with an escort of four cavalry troops is not apt to compromise his position and thus fulfills his principal purpose—that of collecting intelligence.<sup>6</sup>

The Germans were also effective collectors of tactical intelligence. Tactical unit commanders tasked both infantry and cavalry patrols to acquire specific information about the dispositions and activities of enemy units in their immediate vicinity. Pitois Chretien in his *Histoire de la Guerre avec la Prusse* praised German military leaders for imparting to both their officers and noncommissioned officers the fundamentals of reconnaissance and patrolling before the war. He wrote that during the cam-

paign, the Germans routinely sent out "crawling patrols," composed of two to three infantrymen, to seek out information about the enemy and to conduct a detailed terrain reconnaissance to the immediate front. These patrols, he added, often stole up on their own outpost line to see if the sentinels were alert.<sup>7</sup> It is clear from his account that the author believed that this emphasis on patrolling paid huge dividends on the battlefield and permitted the Germans to gain specific and timely information about their enemy.

Surprisingly, cavalry patrols proved almost as effective as infantry patrols in gathering tactical intelligence about the enemy. German division commanders regularly utilized detachments from their organic cavalry to collect information about enemy positions to their front or to scout along the proposed route of march. German cavalry elements would ride up to villages slated to be attacked and bring back detailed information about enemy dispositions, obstacles and field fortifications.<sup>8</sup> Division cavalry reconnoitered the French town of Montmedy so competently and thoroughly that the German siege commander was able to commence operations as soon as he arrived on the scene.

#### German Security and Counterintelligence

Security and counterintelligence arrangements (*Sicherheitsdienst*) were

also key elements in the German military success of 1870. Throughout the war, German screening and security forces protected their army against surprise, observation and interference by the enemy and prevented the French from predicting German intentions. In fact, the Germans were so successful in this regard that French commanders at both the operational and tactical level often went into battle "blind."

In the operational sphere, the cavalry divisions rode far ahead of the advancing German armies, neutralizing French reconnaissance and security elements. Chretien tells of how "Prussian Uhlans" swarmed around the French and blinded them to the whereabouts of the Germans.<sup>9</sup>

Cavalry screens of the type conducted by the Germans had an additional benefit. By trailing the French closely and denying them intelligence, German horsemen sowed the seeds of fear, distrust and confusion. Wherever French units went, they found German cavalry observing them. The mere appearance of the Germans often had a great demoralizing effect on the French. Lack of information about what the Germans were doing only exacerbated the situation and gave rise to wild rumors that further undermined French discipline and *esprit*.

The efforts of the cavalry "masses" at the operational level made the job of German tactical security elements easier. Nevertheless, the German security measures on the tactical plane proved more than adequate in their own right. By the skillful emplacement of outposts and aggressive patrolling, the Germans made it extremely difficult for the French to collect any tactically useful information about German dispositions. German patrols linked outposts together so that no point on the perimeter was left unobserved. Outposts were positioned and manned according to the configuration of the terrain. If the terrain was densely wooded and dissected, the Germans placed their outposts relatively close to the main encampment. In such country, the security force would be predominately, if not exclusively, infantry. If the terrain was "open," they moved the outpost line farther out and attached more light cavalry to the security force. On hills, farms, the edges of woods or behind a source of water, the Germans would put out especially strong *avant-postes*, usually furnished with light artillery.

The purpose of the reinforcement was to slow down a surprise enemy attack and provide time for the main position to react. Moreover, the Germans would place sentinels on routes and paths leading into their positions while the cavalry kept watch along the roads. To further secure the main body against surprise, strong support elements occupied assembly areas halfway between the lines of *vedettes* and the main body. The support could engage any enemy surprise attack before it reached the cantonment.<sup>10</sup> The dearth of reports about German units falling prey to a surprise attack testifies to the effectiveness of German tactical security measures.

During the latter portion of the campaign, the Germans had to modify their intelligence and security operations, especially in regard to their cavalry. The French usually outnumbered the Germans, sometimes as much as three or four to one. To contain the extended wings of the enemy, the Germans turned to their cavalry. This meant, however, that there were fewer men available to perform intelligence and security functions. The harsh climatic conditions of the late fall and early winter also impeded reconnaissance efforts. The terrain was often inhospitable. Commanders found it necessary to attach infantrymen to cavalry detachments to assist in holding small outposts and in negotiating certain tracts of ground. In addition, French irregulars disrupted German reconnaissance and security plans by ambushing isolated patrols and outposts, sniping cavalymen and threatening the increasingly long lines of communications. To offset these severe handicaps, the Germans had one overriding advantage — a virtual monopoly on skilled horsemen. Most French cavalry units had disappeared with the empire.

#### French Intelligence and Security

One should not exaggerate the efficiency of the German intelligence and security services. They were no better than those of the Union Army during the American Civil War—and probably not as good. One reason why the Germans were able to contribute so much and appear so excellent was that the French performed so abysmally. French generals employed their cavalry according to outmoded precepts; they normally held their cavalry regiments in reserve, waiting for the opportune

moment to unleash them against the main body of the enemy. The introduction of breech-loading rifles made these traditional tactics suicidal. Few Frenchmen appreciated the intelligence and security potential of the mounted arm.<sup>11</sup> Adolf Borbstaedt wrote that as the German forces crossed the Moselle, the French cavalry performed its intelligence mission so "negligently" and so "imperfectly" that an entire German army approached to within four miles of the French encampment at Metz without being detected.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, the French leaders allowed German cavalry to roam about the theater of operations virtually unmolested (especially in the initial phase of the war). Under these circumstances, establishing an effective screen was not difficult.

The French were no more adept at intelligence and security at the tactical level. Evidence of their ineffectiveness surfaced in the first major engagement of the war. At the battle of Wissembourg, the French commander General Auguste Alexandre Ducrot had no concrete information about the move of the German army towards his position. This was due in part to the failure of Ducrot's superior to provide a light cavalry attachment and in part to the inadequacy and incapacity of the outpost and security system. The French made no dramatic improvements as the war progressed.

This brief study underlines the importance of German intelligence and security arrangements to the outcome of the Franco-German War. Heretofore, attention has been lavished on the excellence of prewar institutions and preparations to the neglect of operational and tactical factors. I do not mean to imply that if the German systems had been worse or the French system better, the ultimate outcome of the war could have been different. I am confident, however, that the Germans would have paid an even greater price for their triumph.

#### Contemporary Applications

There are also lessons in this case study that have a contemporary value. The most obvious one, of course, is that a fully integrated intelligence and security system, operating at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, gives an army an immense edge on the battlefield, especially if its opponent's system is inefficient. The Germans in 1870 attained a distinct superiority at

all three levels and were thus able to keep a reasonably close watch on the French while denying their enemies any insight into their own intentions.

Another important lesson involves von Crevel's "directed telescope." Anyone who has served as an intelligence officer in a division will recognize the need for a commander to supplement intelligence gained through normal intelligence channels with information of a more precise and timely nature. A modern version of the German "officer's patrol" might be one of the vehicles with which a commander can check the information he has received from the other sources. In this way he can attain a more accurate and balanced view of the threat he faces. Moreover, like the Germans, modern commanders should send on these patrols officers who know the intelligence system, are well-versed in operations and are thoroughly familiar with both the intentions and way of thinking of the commander. ★

#### Footnotes

1. Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, *Letters on Cavalry*, trans. N. L. Walford (London: Edward Stanford, 1889), pp. 15-16.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 94 and 139.
3. Martin von Crevel, *Command in War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 75.
4. Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, p. 191.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
7. Pitois Chretien, *Histoire de la Guerre avec la Prusse*, 4 vols. (Paris: Legrand, Toussell and Pomey, 1881), I:149-150.
8. Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, p. 44.
9. Chretien, p. 335.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 149-150.
11. Michael Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871* (London, Toronto, Sydney, New York: Granada, 1961), pp. 7-8.
12. Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, p. 54.

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# Stalinism and the Militarization of Society

by Maj. Mark W. Hays

Stalin had three goals when he gained complete control over the Party: Maintain the socialist political system, increase national power through industrialization and military buildup, and consolidate his hold over Russia. The Five Year Plan was the means to these ends.<sup>1</sup> Russia's industrialization followed a model different from that found in Western industrialization.<sup>2</sup> Although Soviet agriculture was not advanced prior to industrialization, the peasants provided the capital for industry through collectivization and confiscation. The Soviet banking system was poor, unreliable and undeveloped. Therefore, Rus-

sia could not follow the 19th century German model where an advanced banking system merged with industry to promote rapid industrialization.<sup>3</sup> While both the internal and international situations favored the takeover by Stalin, the international situation served as a catalyst. The Soviet Union would have to adopt the technical and military elements of the West to survive. Stalin warned of his goals for Russia: "Do you want our Socialist Fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop genuine Bolshevik tempo in building

up its Socialist system of economy. There is no other way. That is why Lenin said during the October Revolution: 'Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries.' We are 50 or a 100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in 10 years. Either we do it, or they crush us."<sup>4</sup>

The transformation of Russia into a militarized society reflected a long historical process. The military menace from abroad hardly represented anything new to the Russians. The immediate threat enabled the spirit of nationalism to surface and, to a degree, numb the pain of Stalin's totalitarian mea-



tures. That, in turn, allowed Stalin to keep the *Revolution from Above* going.

Russia, even though economically backward, had made military progress over the years. At the beginning of the 19th century, one European in seven was under Russian rule; at its end, one in four. When Stalin died, one in two was under Russian rule. Stalin made the marriage of military power and industry work efficiently.

There are some strengths in a totalitarian system: quick and decisive action by a leader unencumbered by a multi-party bureaucracy, increased national unity, greater chance for employment and with it national stability, and the psychological satisfaction of belonging to a privileged movement or party.<sup>5</sup> In Russia's case, breakneck industrialization and military buildup were supported because Stalin's totalitarian control allowed no dissent. The constant propaganda effort combined with the "sacred" task of modernization skillfully turned the attention of the masses to Mother Russia and its heroic leader, Stalin. Nationalism became the primary vehicle for militarization; consequently, the foreign enemy appeared more visible than the secret police.<sup>6</sup>

There are six traits of most totalitarian systems that fit the model of Russia during Stalin's revolution:

- The regime professes to a design or purpose for the world.
- The single mass party, which acknowledges the dictator, demands a high degree of conformity and allows no competition.
- The secret police are responsible only to the dictator and are not checked by legal, religious or social institutions.
- The minds of the people are controlled through terror, propaganda, the media and, in Russia's case, a genuine external threat.
- The regime has a highly developed and organized armed force responsible only to the dictator.
- The regime realigns or eliminates existing organizations or institutions which might compete with the dictator.<sup>7</sup>

The secret police, responsible for ensuring Stalin's revolution, changed names many times between the world wars from Okhrana to Cheka to OGPU to NKVD, but their job remained the same. They were responsible for the preservation of the revolutionary order as well as state security. State security,

militia, border guards, corrective labor camps and settlements, fire protection, Department of Civil Acts and the economic administration were subordinated to the secret police.<sup>8</sup>

The strength of the NKVD rose to 700,000 by 1941 and it was able to keep every individual under observation from birth to death. The NKVD emerged as the supreme check and balance of the Stalin government. Individuals who ran afoul of the secret police simply disappeared. Whenever any governmental group gained too much power or popular support, Stalin unleashed the NKVD against it.<sup>9</sup>

While the secret police steadily gained power, other traditional institutions were destroyed or rendered politically impotent. Scholars had worked relatively undisturbed before the end of the '20s because the government had more important tasks to worry about.<sup>10</sup> But with the coming of the industrialization drive, the many intellectual groups and societies lost all independence and were converted into official state organizations. Every higher educational institution required courses on Leninism and the history of the Party. Students were recruited into the Party or the *Komsomol* (Young Communist League). By 1934, the essential features of the Stalinist intellectual order emerged. The changes were achieved by a combination of moral and patriotic pressures, strong-arm methods and exploitation by the Party.<sup>11</sup>

Stalin carefully portrayed himself as the embodiment of Lenin. The industrial movement was unified into one effort directed by one man. "We all work," wrote the editors of a Soviet scientific journal, "as though we were at war." Everything became subordinate to the cause of national unity, survival and to the success of socialist construction.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, the dramatic achievements of the first Five Year Plan occurred at a time when the West was undergoing the depression and millions were jobless and hungry. Soviet propaganda, of course, trumpeted the superiority of the socialist system to its people.

There is some debate about the success of the first two Five Year Plans.<sup>13</sup> The goals may have been too optimistic and the claimed results are questionable. The agricultural section was, at first, decimated by collectivization, confiscation and terror. Consumer satisfaction was not the primary goal, so

the success of the first two Five Year Plans should not be confused with Western standards of success.

Heavy industry received most of the plan's emphasis and was the indicator of success for Stalin. Soviet industrial production grew from 250 percent to 450 percent between 1928 and 1940. The Gross National Product increased at approximately 12 percent per year.<sup>14</sup> Table 1 represents the growth in several sectors of heavy industry. Oil and steel production had increased almost four times and coal production almost six times by 1941. Prior to 1928, few automobiles were produced in Russia. By 1937, over 200,000 automobiles had been produced in the Ford plant at Gorky and the Amo plant in Moscow. Russia was first in Europe and second in the world in the production of trucks by 1937. The Dnieper Dam surpassed all the power generated in Russia prior to 1917.<sup>15</sup> The prewar production rates of military weapons are equally impressive. See Table 2.

The intensity of and dedication to the Five Year Plan captured the moment in Soviet history. "Complete the Five Year Plan in Four!" became the slogan. "To catch up with and outdistance America!" became the goal. Through it all, Stalin was able to develop a sense of national pride in achieving a mammoth goal against all odds. The rest of the world lagged in a depression, but Russia forged ahead.<sup>16</sup>

Stalin's *Revolution from Above* succeeded because he assumed total control of the political apparatus. The emphasis on heavy industry laid the foundation for the military buildup. Through political decisions, economic and scientific potential was translated into military power. Stalin's politics were the moving force in the radical change in the Red Army.<sup>17</sup> The Red Army became an important vehicle in educating the masses during the early years of the Soviet rule. Military service, with socialist political education, strengthened the commitment of young men to the new political order and helped to increase the solidarity of the state.<sup>20</sup> The government encouraged the closest possible ties between the army and the populace and no opportunity was missed for putting the Red Army in places of honor.<sup>21</sup> There was perhaps no other country in the world where the Army was so cherished and admired. The privileges granted to military personnel and their families were consid-



## Growth of Soviet Heavy Industry, 1913-1940

	1913	1921	1928	1940
Steel	4.2	.2	4.2	18.3 million metric tons
Coal	29.1	9.5	35.5	165.9 million metric tons
Oil	9.2	3.8	11.6	31.1 million metric tons
Cement	1.8	.1	1.9	5.7 million metric tons
Electricity	2.0	.5	5.0	48.3 billion kilowatt hours <sup>16</sup>

Table 1

## Yearly Average of Weapons Production

	1930-1931	1935-1937
Tanks	740	3,319
Aircraft	860	3,578
Artillery	1,911	5,020
Rifles	174,000	397,000 <sup>17</sup>

Table 2

erable. The government eased the repression of peasants who had relatives in the Red Army; soldiers knew they would return home and their families would still live in the same location and, more importantly, still be alive. Social insurance was given to military wives who were pregnant or had recently given birth. Preference was shown to family members in allotments of work and for training. They were permitted to look for their own jobs, while the rest of the populace were appointed to specific jobs. These privileges may seem insignificant but to a peasant they were decidedly worthwhile.<sup>22</sup>

The Communist Party was an army itself and could be mobilized on order of the Central Committee. Party members were the only civilians allowed to bear arms. Every Soviet leader served not only as a theorist of revolution and as a politician, but also as a military

leader capable of inspiring his men. The Soviet leaders all became heroes. Brezhnev, although only a political officer and noncombatant in World War II, became a battlefield hero after coming to power.

There was some military inheritance from earlier Russian society, but the differences are marked and the intensity and pervasiveness of Soviet militarism was much greater. Society in tsarist Russia was militarized to a degree unknown in the West outside of 18th century Prussia. A military career offered many gentlemen the only alternative to the civil service or life on a provincial estate. There existed a historic need through the centuries for a strong military due to Russia's vast, indefensible borders and the repeated invasions by her neighbors. However, the degree of and use of militarism in tsarist Russia was completely different compared to

the Soviet model. Soviet militarism spread throughout the entire society, reaching every community and every able-bodied man.

The Red Army had a threefold revolutionary role. Its first duty was to safeguard the authority of the Party. The Red Army helped consolidate the revolution and defended Russia during the period of the Russian Civil War. The second duty was to protect the "proletarian Fatherland" in the event of war. The third purpose, according to Stalin, was to "solidify the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country and to be made use of as a starting point for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries."<sup>23</sup> The Red Army became the *Armed Force of the World Revolution*.<sup>24</sup> Marshal Grechko said that the Party Central Committee was actually the genuine headquarters for directing the country's defense: choosing the axis of

main attack, developing military plans and operations and issuing orders for the coordination of the combat effort.<sup>25</sup> Gen. Voroshilov was reported to have said, "The foundation of all the foundations of the army is the Communist Party." Political commissars were assigned to all elements of the army. The secret service pervaded the entire military system and preserved the army's loyalty to the Party.<sup>26</sup>

A speech by Trotsky in 1924 revealed a plan to organize all Russia's peacetime industries from the standpoint of their utility and convertibility in time of war. This applied particularly to the chemical industry, which, while systematically organizing for chemical warfare, also developed chemicals for domestic use.<sup>27</sup> The *London Morning Post* reported in 1932 that the military buildup was working even though the overall economic plan had not worked.

The military budget was a key indicator of the consolidation of the military with the industrialization drive. The budget increased by 12.8 percent from 1927-28 to 1928-29. The Special State Money Reserve was believed to be a mobilization fund. Another reserve fund of 133 million rubles could also be used for military purposes. The annual appropriations for development of war industries in 1926-27 were 10.4 percent of the total outlay, excluding electrification. Many military expenditures were well camouflaged under other commissariats. The total military budget in 1928-29 was estimated to have been one billion rubles, one-eighth of the total state budget.<sup>28</sup>

Soviet militarization also reached into the social strata in a paramilitary form. The *Avtodor* was a public organization designed to further the construction of automobiles and roads. They trained drivers for the military and participated in army maneuvers. *Avtodor* published technical information on automobiles and maintained repair shops which were also used by the military.<sup>29</sup>

The *Osoaviachem* was a paramilitary organization created by Trotsky to promote interest among workers and peasants in scientific, technical and professional matters in the Red Army. By the eve of World War II it was believed to have 15 million members. *Osoaviachem* raised money to buy and construct airplanes and other military items and provided military training for the populace in general and for preinductees.<sup>30</sup> By 1935 the role and activities of the

*Osoaviachem* had expanded to provide marksmanship training to the *Pioneers*. The *Osoaviachem* ran an impressive training operation with aviation and parachute training areas. Airplane model competitions were all coordinated by *Osoaviachem*. More than a million model aircraft clubs trained young men as future pilots.

Military-patriotic education may have been the most important vehicle for the total militarization effort. It fostered loyalty to, and support for, the Party and the state. The linking of the Red Army with the people yielded positive results by raising the spirits and the fighting qualities of the army and by increasing the defense awareness and capability of the civilian population. The defense effort was unified. Nothing of this magnitude existed anywhere else in the world. A largely agrarian and uncontrolled countryside was brought together by Stalin through militarization. Nationalistic sentiment was strengthened through Stalin's programs and the Russian people were presented as one with the military and the government. ★

#### Footnotes

1. Robert V. Daniels, *Russia: The Roots of Confrontation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 216.
2. W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1971).
3. Under Bismark's Germany, a state-backed and well developed banking system merged with industry to promote industrialization in the second half of the 19th century. The German banking system was the catalyst for Germany's development of heavy industry which increased Germany's power immensely.
4. David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 6-7.
5. Robert Adams, *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1968), pp. 63-64.
6. Ibid, p. 66.
7. Ibid, pp. 49-51.
8. *U.S. Military Reports*. "History of NKVD" by Maj. Joseph A. Michela, Moscow (April 14, 1941), item 0316, roll 2.
9. Ibid.
10. Felix J. Oinas, "Folklore and Politics in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review*, 32 (1973), p. 45.
11. John Barber, "The Establishment of Intellectual Orthodoxy in the U.S.S.R.," *Past and Present* (Great Britain), 83 (1979), p. 141.

12. Ibid, pp. 147-150.

13. See: Daniels, *The Stalin Revolution*; Portal, *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*; and Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.*

14. Howard J. Sherman, *The Soviet Economy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), p. 58.

15. Harry Schwartz, *An Introduction to the Soviet Economy* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968), p. 21.

16. Anatole G. Mazour, *Russia, Tsarist and Communist* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1962), p. 664.

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
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An Army of four million men was created through the draft.

## **U.S. Army Counterintelligence in CONUS — The World War I Experience**

by Dr. John P. Finnegan

The U.S. Army entered World War I in April 1917 without a functioning intelligence organization and with no capabilities for counterintelligence operations. Under the circumstances, these were natural deficiencies. The Army in 1917 was essentially a constabulary of long-service, professional soldiers configured for peace, not for war. Much of its troop strength was dispersed throughout the American West, occupying posts the Army had manned for two generations. The War Department General Staff was deficiently organized, undermanned and too preoccupied with routine administration to give any priority to intelligence. Its lack of interest in the intelligence function reflected the attitudes of the rest of American society.

The Army, however, did possess an intelligence collection mechanism in its military attaches. The task of analyzing and disseminating their reports had originally been assigned to a separate division of the general staff. Successive reorganizations had eliminated this division, and after 1912 the supervision of intelligence gathering by the attaches

was perfunctorily carried out by a committee of the War College Division. In practice, the Army operated in an intelligence vacuum. Separate intelligence files were no longer maintained, and when the War College Division drew up its preparedness plans in 1915, it used prewar, open-source materials. If intelligence in general was neglected, counterintelligence was not even thought of as an Army function. The United States, after all, had not had to worry about problems of subversion and internal security since the Civil War.

World War I changed all of this. An Army of four million men was created through the draft. Half of this huge force was deployed in France; the organization of the general staff torn up by the roots; and a large Military Intelligence Division (MID) created. As part of this process, the Army discovered the need for an active program of counterintelligence.

### **The Beginnings**

The start of the Army's counterintelligence effort was modest. In May 1917,

after various bureaucratic maneuverings, Maj. Ralph Van Deman took charge of a newly constituted Military Intelligence Section organized within the War College Division. Van Deman, one of the few active Army officers with intelligence experience, had been pressing for the establishment of such an organization since 1916. His staff was small; just two officers and two clerks. The mission of the section, however, was large. In addition to developing policies and plans for Army intelligence activities, Van Deman's organization would collect intelligence from the attaches and would engage in "the supervision and control of such system of military espionage and counterespionage as shall be established . . . during the continuance of the present war." From the first, the concept was that, in intelligence matters, the general staff would act as an operating agency, actively exercising a centralized control.

The Military Intelligence Section immediately found itself confronted with major problems. The only asset it controlled was the attaché system. There were few precedents, no pool of intel-



ligence-trained personnel available and a complete lack of files. The War Department had never collected any counterintelligence information, and whatever positive intelligence had been gathered in the past had been merged into the central files of the War College Division. Van Deman turned to friendly foreign nations for advice. He borrowed from the British the term "military intelligence," which replaced the old U.S. Army phrase, "military information." He also adopted the British distinction between "positive" intelligence, which attempted to gain information on the enemy and "negative" intelligence, which sought to deny information to the enemy. He borrowed the term "counterespionage" from the French. Along with advice and terminology, the British and French supplied up-to-date intelligence. This included lists of suspects to be watched. Thus, Van Deman's section began the essential task of compiling the necessary counterintelligence data base.

It was not foreign advice that would ultimately shape the structure of U.S. military intelligence, however, but the imperatives of the times. By the fall of 1917, the section had begun to expand its personnel, develop greater organizational complexity and establish branch offices in major U.S. cities. To a large extent this was brought about by the growth of the section's counterintelligence operations. It concentrated its efforts on meeting the counterintelligence threat posed by the creation of a drafted citizen Army and the mobilization of a divided country.

### The Threat

The United States of 1917 confronted the Army with massive problems of internal security. It was still very much a nation of immigrants, many of whom were newly arrived. The small Regular Army contained a substantial number of foreign-born enlisted men, but military intelligence felt that the real problem lay with the vast new citizen forces that were taking shape. The draft act passed by Congress in 1917, granted few exemptions to anyone and impartially swept up both citizens and foreign nationals, including citizens of enemy countries.

Political ideologies as well as ethnic allegiances posed a threat to the Army and to the civilian mobilization program which supported it. The country was not united on the necessity for war.

Six senators and 50 representatives had voted against the declaration of war. The American Socialist Party was antiwar on principle. The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), an organization on the extreme fringe of the labor movement, was vehemently opposed to the war and had a long identification with acts of sabotage. Finally, the country in general had a tradition of hostility to superior authority, especially military authority.

There was also the threat of German Intelligence. Even before U.S. entry into the war, substantial evidence of a ruthless and efficient network of German spies and saboteurs existed. A German diplomat had been expelled for espionage. Munitions depots in California, New York and New Jersey had been blown up by saboteurs. A U.S. congressman had been investigated for his connections with a German front organization.

Against these perceived menaces from within, the country seemed almost defenseless. The Treasury Department had a Secret Service, but it was restricted by law to narrowly circumscribed duties. The Justice Department maintained a small Bureau of Investigation, composed of unarmed agents whose main experience had been in investigating cases of fraud against the government. A few major cities had organized police "bomb squads" to counter anarchist threats. The Army would have to deal with the threat of espionage, sabotage and subversion, both within its own ranks and from outside, almost on its own.

### The Counterintelligence Response

One of the first counterintelligence activities undertaken by the Military Intelligence Section was providing coverage to the civilian staff of the War Department. In June 1917, the section opened its first field office in Washington, D.C., using civilian investigators drawn from the ranks of the New York Police Department. They worked under the enigmatic name of the "Personnel Improvement Bureau." The group later expanded to embrace screening military personnel and applicants for government employment. In July, another field office was opened in New York City and staffed with former members of the New York Police Department's Neutrality and Bomb Squad. As the war went on, additional offices were opened in major cities and em-

barkation points.

By October, Van Deman's section had to confront the full impact of the draft upon the Army. The newly forming National Army and National Guard Divisions were, in the judgement of military intelligence, "infested" with German agents and sympathizers. Fortunately, a remedy was at hand. The Army had belatedly come to realize the importance of intelligence work, and the new unit Tables of Organization called for intelligence officers at every level. Such officers had to be found from among the civilian population because hardly any Regular Army officers had any intelligence background. The Adjutant General had already alerted departmental commanders to the need for 160 specially qualified men from the officer training camps to be commissioned and assigned as intelligence officers. It was to these "newly-minted" intelligence officers that military intelligence turned.

The counterespionage plan drawn up by the Military Intelligence Section was comprehensive. It envisaged the creation of a clandestine agent network extending to every Army installation and to every level of command from division down to company. Nets in each division would be managed by an assistant to the divisional intelligence officer. He would work through a system of anonymous collection managers known only to himself and to their own immediate superiors and subordinates within the net. At the bottom of this secret pyramid, there would be at least two "operators," mutually unknown to each other, submitting reports on every company. The division intelligence officer would serve as the link between "the secret and the known (intelligence) organization" and collect reports for submission to military intelligence in Washington. As a supplement to this secret intelligence system, all troops were publicly ordered to report on any suspicious activities through the normal chain of command.

Once the Army counterespionage system was in place, it produced a growing stream of incident reports. The Military Intelligence Section began a process of steady expansion. More and more officers were needed to collate reports and to conduct investigations. Van Deman obtained some of them by using an informal "old-boys" network to recommend qualified civilians for direct commissions. Others



were found by transferring men with special aptitudes out of other branches and detailing them to intelligence. Finally, enlisted men of the newly formed Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) were used for the first time to conduct investigations in CONUS.

### The Corps of Intelligence Police

Incentive for the creation of a corps of enlisted investigators had initially come from the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). Soon after arriving in Europe, Gen. John J. Pershing's intelligence officer, Maj. Dennis E. Nolan, had become concerned about the counterintelligence problem faced by an American Army operating 3,000 miles from home in the midst of a foreign population. Nolan submitted a request for intelligence personnel to the Adjutant General. He asked not only for 50 company-grade officers fluent in foreign languages, but for "fifty secret service men who had training in police work (and) who speak French fluently" to serve as sergeants. In response, the acting chief of staff authorized the creation of a 50-man Corps of Intelligence Police, whose members would serve with the "rank, pay, and allowances" of sergeants of infantry.

Recruiting the right people proved to be a problem. Van Deman's first thought was to turn to the ranks of the nation's private detective agencies. However, when he asked the heads of the three largest firms to provide him with the names of high-caliber men with both language ability and secret service training, he was told flatly, "There ain't no such animal." The War Department

was reduced to placing ads in local papers for French-speaking men willing to volunteer for a secret mission.

Fifty men were obtained by this campaign, but the background and language ability of this group was, to put it mildly, mixed. They were given a month's training as infantry and then sent to Europe with no intelligence training. Once in Europe, the group was screened by the French, who were amused by the Louisiana Cajun French of some, suspicious that others were French citizens who may have been evading their own conscription law and distrustful that others might be Belgian. The CIP agents who passed muster were then sent on to be trained by veteran Allied counterintelligence officers.

By the end of 1917, the Military Intelligence Section was finding it increasingly difficult to staff its growing headquarters and field offices with the accustomed mix of freshly commissioned reserve officers and civilian investigators. It seemed logical for the section to turn to the enlisted ranks to solve its personnel problems. In addition, it seemed more appropriate for investigations of soldiers to be handled by other soldiers. Civilian investigators continued to be employed and unpaid volunteers rendered important assistance throughout the war, but the introduction of the CIP meant that Army counterintelligence work was now professionalized.

This was a significant development. The bulk of CIP agents in World War I served with the AEF. Pershing found the organization so useful that he re-

quested 750 more agents, and although he was never able to secure this figure, there were 418 CIP men on duty with the AEF on Armistice Day. The use of the CIP in CONUS meant that when the expeditionary forces returned and were disbanded, counterintelligence work would not be dismissed as a wartime aberration but would remain as a permanent function of the Army.

### MI-3 and MI-4

By the end of 1917, the growing size of the Military Intelligence Section and increasingly diverse nature of its responsibilities dictated a greater degree of specialization within the organization. It was no longer possible for Van Deman and a small circle of assistants to deal interchangeably with both positive and negative intelligence. The whole operation had to be placed under a bureaucratic system. Van Deman divided up the section into eight separate, numbered functional subsections. Two of the subsections were explicitly concerned with counterintelligence: MI-3 which handled "counterespionage in the military service" and MI-4 which dealt with "counterespionage among the civilian population." Four of the other subsections, which performed administration, graphic, translation and cryptographic services, supported the counterintelligence effort in addition to assisting with positive collection.

The origins of MI-3 could be traced back to the implementation of the Army counterespionage program in November 1917. By Armistice Day, this group had expanded to form one of the largest single elements in the whole military



Corps of Intelligence Police - France 1918

intelligence structure. In the process of expansion, MI-3 subdivided into a number of subelements. The largest of these dealt with the problems of sedition and sabotage among the troops. Its officers, CIP agents and civilian detectives worked closely with the division and installation intelligence officers who supervised the clandestine counterespionage system. Other subelements served more specialized needs; dealing with counterintelligence problems presented by the many foreign-born draftees, administering the District of Columbia Field Office and overseeing programs which covered such sensitive arms as the Air Service and the Chemical Corps.

MI-4 handled a more indefinite task than MI-3. Subversion from within the ranks of the service could be detected and countered. The Army, after all, was a controlled population. The threats posed by hostile elements from the outside were less definable. To cope with these menaces, MI-4 also divided itself into a number of specialized subsections. The biggest of these concerned itself with the various types of threat which might arise from the activities of civilians living in the six geographic Army Departments. This element was concerned with the problems of labor unrest in the West, racial disturbances in the South and Southwest and foreign disaffection in the large cities of the East.

At one time or another, elements of MI-4 were involved in dealing with deportation cases, sabotage by elements of organized labor, enemy finance and trade, propaganda, liaison and counterespionage abroad. At times, MI-4 found itself engaging in activities that ventured far-afiel from normal Army concerns, as when it helped organize a labor union to combat the efforts of the IWW to unionize the loggers of the Pacific Northwest. The rationale for this was that the IWW was antiwar, and a continued supply of lumber was vital to the nation's aircraft industry.

In fighting subversion among the civilian population, MI-4 depended upon the cooperation of other agencies. It worked closely with the Department of Justice. In all cases of civilian subversion against the military it was the Justice Department which had power to arrest and prosecute. In addition, MI-4 found useful auxiliaries in two civilian groups, the Plant Protection Service and the American Protective League.

The Plant Protective Service was an organization of civilian undercover operatives formed at the request of the chief signal officer to protect the country's new aircraft industry. The service provided intelligence coverage to privately-owned plants working under government contracts. At first, the organization had no connection with military intelligence. The War Department soon realized the impracticality of having the Army run two competing counterintelligence operations and the service was initially transferred to MI-4. By 1918, the service was transferred to a new element of MI-3.

The American Protective League was a nationwide patriotic organization of civilian volunteers that had originally been organized to help the Justice Department catch spies. It soon began to assist local authorities in enforcing the draft act, and its activities brought it into a working relationship with MI-4. The league, which ultimately numbered 250,000 members, extended MI-4 and the Army into the civilian community.

### The Formation of MID

The military intelligence organization within the War Department continued to grow in size and importance, ultimately achieving the status of a full division of the general staff. Counterintelligence operations were placed under the centralized control of a newly formed Negative Branch, which then promptly began to assume additional intelligence-related functions.

Military intelligence had originally started out simply as a section of the War College Division. When the old War College Division was abolished, military intelligence attained the status of a branch, becoming part of a new Executive Division of the general staff. The change recognized the growing importance of military intelligence, although it by no means solved all of its problems.

In August 1918, as part of another overall Army reorganization, military intelligence became a division of the general staff. The achievement of divisional status was a goal for which Van Deman had fought all along. By the time the changeover came, however, Van Deman was on his way to a new assignment in France. It was Van Deman's replacement, Brig. Gen. Marlborough Churchill, who became the first chief of the MID.

### The Negative Branch

The creation of MID paved the way for an internal reorganization of military intelligence. The division consolidated all of its functions except its Administrative Section under new Positive and Negative Branches in order to achieve more centralized direction. MI-3 and MI-4 were brought together under the Negative Branch. After having secured control over all Army counterintelligence operations in CONUS, the Negative Branch then went on to absorb or create additional functions, some with only a dubious relevance to counterintelligence. In the process, Army counterintelligence became a part of a wider operations security (OPSEC) effort.

The Negative Branch extended the scope of its operations beyond CONUS in September 1918 when supervision of the counterintelligence operations conducted by the military attaches was transferred from the Positive Branch to MI-4. The same month, the Branch assumed control over MI-10, a growing military censorship organization. The assignment of MI-10 to the Negative Branch was in a sense logical; not only did censorship fulfill the negative function of denying information to the enemy, but military censors were in a good position to acquire information of counterintelligence value.

Certain activities of MI-10 ran far beyond censorship. The War Department had long been concerned about the turbulence of the continuing Mexican Revolution providing Germany with an opening for intrigue in the Western Hemisphere. MI-10 which was tasked with censoring the telegraph lines running across the Mexican border also inherited its own intercept service. The section assumed control over a line of mobile monitoring stations along the border, a fixed station in Maine and an undercover radio listening post in Mexico City. All these positions were targeted against German clandestine links operating between Mexico and the German Empire.

This was only the beginning of the expansion of the Negative Branch. The Branch rapidly acquired three new sections. One of these was MI-11 which was formed to exercise the passport control function previously shared jointly by MI-3 and MI-4. Another new section was MI-13 which was organized to investigate cases of graft and fraud against the Army. Dealing with

allegations of bribery was more properly a criminal investigation function than an intelligence function. The Army had no Criminal Investigation Division in World War I however, and the Quartermaster General, to whom the task had originally been assigned, had no trained investigators. Military intelligence stepped into the area by default.

The final addition to the Negative Branch was the Military Morale Section. Since it was the CIP that had initially reported instances of low morale among the troops, it somehow seemed appropriate for authorities to task the Negative Branch with the responsibility of solving the problem. After only two months under the MID, the Military Morale Section became a separate element of the general staff. The signing of the Armistice brought a final halt to the organization and physical expansion of the MID and its Negative Branch.

During the course of World War I, the Army counterintelligence and security organization grew from a zero base to an effort of large proportions. By Armistice Day, half of the officers and civilian employees assigned to MID were working in the Negative Branch. Their activities were supplemented by 250 CIP agents; by intelligence officers at every major cantonment, post and unit; by the civilian investigators of the Plant Protective Service and the volunteers of the American Protective League. Organizationally, negative intelligence dominated the Army intelligence community.

### Criticism and Conclusions

The size and scope of the general staff's involvement in counterintelligence has drawn its share of criticism. It was later charged that the Army's emphasis on counterespionage, its use of informers and civilian vigilantes, helped create an atmosphere of repression and conformity which inevitably led to the excesses of the Red Scare after the war. It was even questioned whether the effort was needed in the first place. As a former Army intelligence officer admitted after the war, the number of German agents at work in the United States was "not nearly so many as was generally supposed."

Given the commitment of most Americans to maintaining civil liberties even in wartime and their aversion to spying, such criticisms are inevitable. However, the Army's counterintelligence effort must be put in the context of the times.

In a sense, America's decision to enter World War I was a venture into the unknown. It was questionable as to whether a nation like the United States, with a long tradition of individualism and with large pockets of immigrants, could be successfully committed to a foreign war.

The Army counterintelligence effort in World War I was mounted to confront an unknown but credible domestic threat. The Army was forced to face this challenge in a vacuum. It had no experience in counterintelligence, no established organization and, initially, no support from agencies with expertise in the area. If the Army program ventured far-afield at times and made mistakes, this can be blamed on the unprecedented nature of the whole war experience.

The essential point is that the Army counterintelligence program *worked*. No case of espionage within the ranks of the AEF was ever discovered. At least in part, this reflected the fact that all Army personnel had been screened by counterintelligence before they were allowed to proceed overseas. The United States was not the nest of German agents and sympathizers that some had feared; but enemy agents did exist and some of them were apprehended. The calmness of the home front during the war owed something to the time and effort spent by many people, including the members of MID, in making sure it stayed quiet.

Army counterintelligence in World War I can be more justifiably criticized from the standpoint of organization and training. There was little coordination between the counterintelligence in CONUS and that of the AEF until the summer of 1918. The AEF's intelligence organization differed from its general staff counterpart both in organization and in priorities. Within CONUS, the final positioning of counterintelligence under the Negative Branch was not completely satisfactory. The branch came to include functions which fell outside counterintelligence or even OPSEC, and it still had to rely on support from the Positive Branch to meet counterintelligence needs in the fields of translation, graphics and cryptanalysis.

The creation of the CIP and its ultimate deployment in CONUS furnished Army counterintelligence with a useful instrument. The manner in which the corps had been set up, however, created

problems. Under Army regulations, CIP agents served with the rank and pay of sergeants of infantry. There was no possibility of promotion; a fact which did not set well with a highly educated and competent group of enlisted personnel. The very name of the corps was something of a liability. As the historians of the Army Counter Intelligence Corps would later point out, "It was a 'Corps' which was not a 'Corps.' It was a 'Counterintelligence' organization but called an 'Intelligence' organization and it was called 'Police' when it had no interest in crime, as such, and had no police powers." It would take enlisted counterintelligence personnel 25 more years to get out from under this misnomer.

Training was another problem area. The personnel assets of Army counterintelligence had to be created out of a civilian base within a short period of time. The formal counterintelligence training of reserve officers detailed to intelligence was skimpy. CIP agents were simply trained on the job. It was fortunate that the United States possessed a large enough reservoir of men with the appropriate skills for the Army to accomplish its counterintelligence mission.

As a result of World War I, the Army acquired a counterintelligence function and capability which it had never possessed before. The massive changes the Army faced at the war's end diminished the capability, but did not eliminate the function. The Negative Branch was abolished. But even during the lean years of the '20s and '30s, the Army continued to maintain a small cadre of CIP agents. When World War II broke out, the Army had the experience and the organizational base to meet the counterintelligence demands of this new and greater conflict. ★

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# U.S. Army COMSEC in World War I

by James L. Gilbert

At the time the United States entered World War I in April 1917, communications security (COMSEC) in the Army was synonymous with codes and ciphers. However, even by this narrow definition, the function was barely alive. COMSEC was the responsibility of the chief signal officer, but the prewar Signal Corps was more concerned with transmitting messages than with protecting them. The Army possessed no secure codes or ciphers, and according to a 1916 Army survey, there were only eight "cipher experts" in the whole officer corps. The Army Signal School at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., had begun in 1913 to offer a brief block of instruction on cryptology, using as its text a manual written by Capt. Parker Hitt after he found that there were no books printed on the subject in the United States.

The war changed this situation. In the continental United States, the newly created Military Intelligence Section (MIS) of the War Department General Staff (WDGS) quickly developed a cryptanalytical element for intelligence purposes. Once it was clear how much information could be learned from enemy sources through this means, MIS took over the function of creating codes for its own purposes. Since these

could also be used by the Army as a whole, MIS assumed *de facto* control of the entire cryptographic function at the War Department level. In France, however, the Signal Corps continued to direct the effort, and COMSEC acquired a wider dimension, as the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) not only devised sets of field codes on a wide scale, but turned to monitoring and the use of security guidelines to protect its communications.

## MI-8 and Army COMSEC

When MIS was set up, one of the first tasks facing Maj. Ralph Van Deman, its creator and first chief, was to find a suitable head for its proposed Cipher Bureau. All three of the Regular Army officers considered qualified for the post had already been assigned to the AEF (only one of them in a cryptologic capacity). Faced with this situation, Van Deman accepted the services of Herbert O. Yardley, a State Department code clerk who had displayed a remarkable "native intelligence" for the solution of codes and ciphers. Yardley and two assistants began the task of solving all enemy or suspected enemy codes collected by MIS and other government agencies.

Yardley's Cipher Bureau quickly grew in scope and size. In addition to per-

forming cryptanalysis, the bureau was tasked with solving secret inks and foreign shorthand systems, encoding MIS's own communications and compiling ciphers for use both by MIS and the whole War Department. The last step came about as the result of a minor crisis in U.S. COMSEC.

Van Deman received a paraphrase of a cablegram which stated: "The British Government considered the War Department's method of coding cablegrams was unsafe and a menace to secrecy." The British had learned that the Germans were reading classified message traffic that was being passed between Gen. John J. Pershing and Maj. Gen. Tasker Bliss in France and War Department headquarters in Washington. The chief of staff requested a prompt investigation of the matter and Yardley was placed in charge.

As Yardley later described the episode: "Upon investigation, I learned that a copy of the War Department code book had been stolen in Mexico during our punitive expedition in 1916 and that a photograph of this was reported to be in the hands of the German government. Furthermore, I discovered from actual tests that because of the technical construction of the code, it could be solved within a short time by the interceptors even though



they were not in possession of the book."

The code in question was the War Department Telegraph Code of 1915, a bulky, "one-part" administrative code designed primarily to save telegraph charges, not to safeguard messages. It was open to cryptanalytic attack, although a substitution table of encipherment was available for use with the code in transmitting classified messages.

To remedy the situation, Yardley secured a commission for a former State Department colleague, A. E. Prince. Prince immediately took charge of a subsection for compiling codes and ciphers. The unit compiled codes for the use of MIS itself as well as making its codes available to the rest of the War Department. Since MIS was the only center of cryptologic expertise in the Army, the chief signal officer tacitly surrendered his formal responsibilities in the area to the new element.

The task of securing the Army's communications through improved cryptography did not go smoothly. The Cipher Bureau was able to produce new encipherment tables for the 1915 Telegraph Code and to furnish replacement tables every two weeks. This provided the Telegraph Code with sufficient security to allow its continued use as a means of sending secret messages. However, it took until July 1918 for MI-8 (as the Cipher Bureau was now called) to produce Military Intelligence Code No. 5, its first effort. MI Code No. 5 was in two parts and its security could be further enhanced by using the super-encipherment tables already developed. Unfortunately, the code was promptly compromised by Army organizations outside of MI. By the time a replacement had been developed, the war was over.

Similar difficulties were encountered in generating special codes for geographic place-names. Maj. Gen. Bliss requested that such a code be prepared in June 1918, but by the time it had been distributed in October the battle lines had shifted and the place-names were no longer applicable. Belatedly, after the Armistice, MI-8 adopted a new method of preparing copy and was able to place a pocket code in the hands of military attaches in only two weeks.

### **Riverbank and Cryptologic Training**

Codes and ciphers alone would not provide the War Department with

COMSEC. The department needed personnel trained in their use. Army facilities for this training were lacking in 1917, and the Army had neither an adequate curriculum nor trained instructors. The Allies were not able to spare any of their COMSEC people to help. To fill the gap, Van Deman turned to the private sector. He accepted philanthropist George Fabyan's offer of the staff and facilities of Fabyan's Riverbank Laboratories.

Riverbank Laboratories was a private "think tank" located in the small town of Geneva, Ill. The facility housed a staff of scholars and scientists who carried out research in a number of diverse fields. As part of the war effort, Riverbank was able to make a significant contribution.

Dr. J. A. Powell, one of the Riverbank staff members, was sent to the Army Signal School where he attended the basic course in military cryptology. As soon as he returned to Riverbank, he and his colleagues implemented a vigorous cryptologic training program under War Department auspices. After completion of their training at Riverbank, officers were assigned to MI-8 or to the Radio Intelligence Section, AEF. In view of the critical shortfall of trained personnel, this was a welcomed contribution to Army COMSEC, even though most of the officers were deployed as cryptanalysts.

The unique relationship between Riverbank Laboratories and MI came to an end in April 1918. By that time, MI-8 had embarked upon its own training program, and the Riverbank connection was seen as less advantageous. Not only were the laboratories far from Washington and not subject to full War Department control, but Riverbank's two primary instructors had received Army commissions and were no longer available. As a substitute, MI-8 gave cryptologic training to a wide variety of intelligence connected personnel. It also provided COMSEC training to military attaches and their assistants.

### **COMSEC in the AEF**

At the War Department level, the COMSEC function was limited almost exclusively to codes and ciphers and was completely controlled by MI. This was not the case at AEF General Headquarters (GHQ) in France. The AEF was confronted with a different set of problems. It not only had to worry about the security of high-level com-

munications, but it had to be concerned with protecting the great amount of tactical communications. As a direct result of these factors, COMSEC came to mean more than just the compilation and use of codes and ciphers. The function itself would be split between the Signal Corps and the Radio Intelligence Section, G2 in France.

Because of the great distances involved and the wide latitude given Pershing, AEF GHQ was organized along very different lines than the WDGS in Washington. The AEF placed the code and cipher compilation function under its chief signal officer, who organized a small Code Compilation Section. The section's duties were to compile codes for the Army in the field, but there was no American experience or precedent to draw upon. The section had no connection with MI-8 back in Washington; it was entirely dependent upon its own resources and ingenuity.

The U.S. Army had entered the war with three authorized code and cipher systems, all of them unsatisfactory. The Telegraph Code was an insecure, administrative system designed for headquarters communications. The Signal Corps had devised a simple celluloid device called the "Army Cipher Disk," but this was simply a tool for accomplishing mono-alphabetic substitution. It offered essentially the same degree of security as the toy secret message rings found in breakfast cereal boxes. No evidence exists that the AEF ever tried to use it in the field. Finally, the Army had learned from the British how to use the Playfair hand cipher. However, the Playfair offered little security against determined cryptanalytic attack. In addition to these authorized means, unauthorized or locally improvised codes were being used which offered varying degrees of security, mostly none.

The British and the French were at first reluctant to disclose their code systems, but eventually agreed to supply reference copies of obsolete editions. With this meager data base, the section began its work. The initial effort was a failure. The first American Trench Code was a small, single-part code of some 1,600 words and phrases, designed to be used in conjunction with a complex system of super-encipherment. The code was distributed to regimental headquarters, but was never sent forward to the front lines for fear it might be captured. About 3,000 copies of a

smaller code were prepared for use on the firing line and distributed down to the company level.

What the AEF needed was a system that was "simple of operation, comprehensive enough to produce a good working vocabulary and changed entirely in its code equivalents at frequent intervals." The section achieved this by moving to a two-part code that could be used without any additional encipherment and by making provisions to replace codes approximately every two weeks. The result was that the burden of detail was shifted from the fighting troops at the front to the Code Compilation Section working in the rear area. In previous wars, it would have been impossible to produce and distribute replacement codes with sufficient speed to guarantee the security of the system, but the AEF had the technical and organizational capacity to satisfy the requirements.

The first Trench Code to be produced after the two-part principle had been adopted was the Potomac Code, a 47-page booklet containing approximately 1,800 words and phrases. It was issued in June 1918. During the next five months, the Code and Compilation Section created no less than 14 replacement codes. The Potomac Code, allotted to the First Army, was periodically replaced by succeeding codes of the "river" series. When the Second Army was fielded, the new formation was provided with a completely separate "lake" series. Beginning in September, all Trench Codes were supplemented with Emergency Codes containing 50 commonly used phrases that could be used on the front line.

In June 1918, the section put out a Staff Code to replace the old Telegraph Code. This code was the largest and most comprehensive codebook ever printed in the field. Finally, the section also produced a variety of miscellaneous codes, including the American Radio Service Codes and a telephone code for disguising the names of organizations and commanders. This was an achievement which was most noteworthy in terms of both quality and numbers, especially in comparison with what the other belligerents were accomplishing.

Compiling the codes was only part of the task. There was also the problem of printing a vast amount of material. The Code Compilation Section produced 80,000 numbered codes and pamphlets

during the 10 months it was active. The actual printing of the codes (in water-soluble ink for easy destruction in case of threatened capture) was carried out by the Adjutant General's Office, under the close supervision of the section. Army regulations stated that code distribution was a function of the Adjutant General's Office, but that office was not geared to handle the monumental task. As a result, the job of distributing AEF's codes was taken over by the Radio Intelligence Section, G2.

### Radio Intelligence Section

The Radio Intelligence Section was one of the five major staff elements within the AEF's G2 organization. Originally set up to handle signals intelligence (SIGINT), the section broadened its role under the pressure of events and ended up bearing large COMSEC responsibilities. It is indicative of the fragmented nature of Army intelligence in World War I that the Radio Intelligence Section, G2, AEF was not subordinated in any way to MI-8 in Washington. The contacts that grew up between the two organizations were for the most part informal, between officers who were personal acquaintances. Any influence exercised by MI-8 over the operations in France was due to the fact that some of the personnel in the Radio Intelligence Section had served in MI-8 or had been trained by it.

The Radio Intelligence Section rapidly developed an efficient organization for distributing codes to the AEF. The section adjutant receipted for the codes which he received from the Code Compilation Section, and then, with help from an enlisted assistant, carried out distribution. At first, the section attempted to distribute the codes directly to all users and to keep a central accounting of all obsolete or compromised books. The growing size of the AEF made this impracticable. Instead, distribution was made to separate Radio Intelligence Sections that were set up at the Field Army level.

The First, and later, Second Army Radio Intelligence Sections received bulk allotments of code books and then made further distribution to corps, divisions and below. Outdated or compromised books were retrieved in reverse order. This decentralized distribution system meant that there was no way of determining how many codes were in actual use at any one time, when they were put into service or

withdrawn, or who had actually issued the codes. The situation was further complicated by the existence of miscellaneous codes apart from the Trench Codes. U.S. troops serving in French sectors were provided with the French bilingual *Carnet Reduit*, and there were also special liaison and aircraft codes. Finally, some units persisted in making up their own codes. The most notable of these was the "baseball code" which used the names of famous ballplayers of the day.

It soon became apparent that compiling, printing and distributing codes was not the final solution to the COMSEC problem. As the head of the Code Compilation Section put it in his final report: "Although it may seem a paradox, the most striking feature of the use of the Trench Codes was the general inclination to avoid them whenever possible." The citizen Army found the use of codes to be a tedious impediment to easy communication. Indifference to the basic principles of COMSEC was endemic and occasionally was given positive encouragement by high levels of command. The situation was not helped by the fact that, under wartime conditions, officers responsible for encoding messages changed assignments too frequently for all to be familiar with the rules or the absolute necessity of following them.

### Security Service

AEF GHQ was all too keenly aware of the deficiencies in American security consciousness. As a result, it issued security guidelines even before the Trench Codes were ready for use. This was a new development in U.S. Army COMSEC. The booklet, which provided simple guidelines on how to prepare messages in regular or enciphered code, the Playfair system and plain language, also contained injunctions on COMSEC. A preliminary note to the "instructions" warned code officers that it was expressly prohibited for them to use plain language in the same message with code or cipher; to repeat a message in any code or cipher other than that in which it was first sent; to repeat a code or cipher message in plain language; or to repeat a plain language message in code or cipher. The AEF also took steps to warn personnel against loose talk on the telephone.

To enforce these guidelines, the Radio Intelligence Section, G2 introduced another innovation in U.S. Army

COMSEC. It created a Security Service, consisting of control officers in the Radio Intelligence Sections of GHQ and each Field Army together with Signal Corps monitoring assets in the field. The Security Service was designed to make sure that the AEF actually made use of the COMSEC tools it had been provided.

The Radio Section of the Signal Corps had already established a network of intercept stations along the front to collect SIGINT for the Radio Intelligence Section. Once the Security Service concept was implemented, the Signal Corps established a number of forward intercept installations with the sole responsibility of monitoring American radio communications for COMSEC violations. These stations intercepted all radio messages sent within the AEF and transmitted them to the control officers. The control officers noted all violations and sent out letters of reprimand to the offenders. In addition to monitoring transmission violations, the control officers looked for weaknesses in the codes themselves and checked to make sure the same code was not used for an extended period of time. This information was fed back to the Code Compilation Section to help it in its work. The operations of the Security Service and the Code Compilation Section thus became complementary.

The control officers also exercised a similar jurisdiction over messages transmitted by telephone and what was known as "T.P.S."—ground telegraph. Here was the real weak point of the AEF's COMSEC. Even as early as 1918, telephoning was the American way of doing business. The intricate network of trenches along the front lines was crisscrossed with extensive field telephone systems, supplemented by ground telegraph installations. The field telephone systems used only a single wire to connect headsets; the other part of the circuit went through the ground. Experience proved that telephone conversations within American lines could be intercepted by the enemy through the use of vacuum tube amplifiers. Since telephone conversations were in plain language, the heavy American reliance on this instrument posed a gigantic COMSEC problem.

In order to find out what the enemy might learn about the AEF's troop movements and logistics by telephone intercept, the Signal Corps' Radio Ser-

vice established listening stations to pick up all telephone and T.P.S. communications sent in the clear. At least one such post was assigned to every U.S. division in line. The post forwarded daily reports to the division commander and to the control officer. In addition, the control officers had stenographic assistants monitor long-distance calls placed through the switchboards of GHQ and the Field Armies.

Unfortunately, while the Security Service was able to find out about COMSEC violations through these monitoring programs, there was not much it could do to put a halt to them. Letters signed by the appropriate commanding general were forwarded to the commanders of errant units, requesting an investigation of each violation and a report on measures taken. Few of the letters were ever answered. Control officers declined to follow up unanswered letters or unsatisfactory responses. It seemed impolitic to argue with senior officers about code matters when there was a war to be won.

### Lessons Learned

World War I was a watershed in the development of U.S. Army COMSEC. For the first time, COMSEC came to mean more than simply the compilation of codes and ciphers. It now involved communications monitoring, both to detect security violations and to correct weaknesses in the codes themselves. Another new COMSEC function created by the war was the creation and use of security guidelines, coupled with published warnings against possible misuse of communications. This was an area that would become of growing importance to the Army. In its final report, the Radio Intelligence Section, G2 stressed that in the future the Army would have to place more emphasis on proper COMSEC education.

In addition to expanding the definition of COMSEC, World War I produced the first joining of communications and intelligence in U.S. Army history. This alliance initially began as a result of the fact that there were not enough officers trained and experienced in cryptology. It was fostered by the knowledge that cryptosecurity could be enhanced by the scrutiny of friendly analysts and by the fact that the Radio Intelligence Section, G2 was itself dependent upon the Signal Corps in the field for the information it needed to

perform its COMSEC function.

If World War I taught the U.S. Army that COMSEC had to be redefined and its organization restructured, it also offered other lessons. The telephone was identified as the principal source of COMSEC violations. While there was no evidence that enemy cryptanalysts ever succeeded in exploiting authorized and properly handled U.S. Army codes, there were indications that improper use of the telephone did provide the enemy with valuable information. Telephone conversations monitored by Signal Corps listening stations revealed information on the AEF's order of battle and gave dates and places of planned attacks.

Another lesson learned was that it was impossible to discipline COMSEC violators from afar. The Radio Intelligence Section recommended in its final report that "security officers" be assigned down to the company level. Such security officers would act as contact points and advisors to the supported commanders.

Finally, it was discovered that some communications needed protection more than others, especially communications involving intelligence. Both the MI Division, WDGS and G2, AEF found it necessary to establish their own communications centers when it appeared that normal Army channels were insufficiently secure to meet their needs.

The lessons learned in World War I provided the beginning of the Army's education in the field. To the Army's cost, some of these lessons would have to be relearned in the future. ★

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# Intelligence and Deception Battles of



by SFC Milton Nodacker

*The second battle of El Alamein (October-November 1942) is generally regarded as the turning point in the North African campaign. It was in this battle that German and Italian forces under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel were forced to begin their withdrawal westward back across North Africa. This withdrawal was the beginning of the end of the German-Italian presence in North Africa. Without the elimination of these forces, the Allied invasion of Southern Europe would not have been possible.*

There is no denying the importance of the events which took place in the vicinity of El Alamein to the eventual Allied victory in Europe. The second battle of El Alamein, however, was not the most significant event, but rather the outcome of a series of significant events: the first battle of El Alamein (June 30 - July 6, 1942) and the battle of Alam Halfa (August 31 - September 6, 1942). Following Alam Halfa, Rommel wrote: "On the morning of September 6 we completed our withdrawal and my troops went over to the defensive. . . . With the failure of this offensive our last chance of gaining the Suez Canal had gone. We could now expect (British and American industrial superiority) would finally turn the tide against us."<sup>1</sup>

The significance of the first battle of El Alamein is that it stopped the German thrust eastward toward Cairo, the Suez Canal and the Middle East. Had the German strategy been played out in its entirety, German North African

forces would have linked up with those on the Eastern Front, completely encircling the Mediterranean. This would have effectively shielded the Southern flank of Europe from any Allied action. The Germans would also have gained access to the oil fields of Arabia with their strategic resource potential.

In the battle of Alam Halfa, the British, for the first time, achieved a decisive victory over the Germans in North Africa. This resulted in a significant loss of irreplaceable men and equipment for Rommel and a tremendous increase in British morale as the *bogeyman* of an invincible Rommel was put to rest.

The contributing factors to these British victories were many and included the major contributions of the Royal Navy and the Merchant Marine, the great infusion of replacement personnel and new units, improved combat vehicles and weapons, and the maintenance of air superiority by the Royal Air Force. Some other important factors which have been omitted from most previous accounts of these battles are the contributions of various intelligence and counterintelligence organizations and the extensive use of deception operations.

The lessons learned in these battles are numerous. The greatest of these concerns the importance of signals intelligence and security, operational security and tactical deception. Once Rommel lost some of his key sources of intelligence and had some of these sources turned against him, his invincibility disappeared as if by magic.

The importance of the large scale deception operations (Operation Ber-

tram) conducted by the British before the second battle of El Alamein cannot be overstated. Deception served the British admirably in supporting the tactical elements of surprise and economy of force.

The omission of intelligence and deception factors from previous accounts of these battles was not accidental. The British viewed their intelligence and deception operations as extremely sensitive. As the war was winding down in 1945, and on into September of that year, the United States was under intense British pressure to maintain extremely high levels of classification of cover and deception, signals intelligence and cryptanalytic activity. The barriers erected by the resulting agreements only began breaking down in 1971 and 1972. A large body of U.S. documents was finally declassified in the spring of 1975.<sup>2</sup> Most accounts of these battles were written prior to that time.

Students of World War II are now aware that the British had broken the German Enigma machine cipher system by the autumn of 1939. This program, called Ultra, was the greatest British intelligence coup of the war. Throughout the war, the British were able, using Ultra, to read most German radio communications, often before the addressee. The significance of this ability was tremendous. The British were able to anticipate a great many German activities, including the air raids during the Battle of Britain and the establishment of the V-1 and V-2 programs, as well as more routine operational intelligence.

The greatest significance of Ultra for North Africa was in the British ability to locate and sink Rommel's supply convoys from Italy. Rommel used Enigma to transmit most of his operational



# Factors in the El Alamein



plans to Germany and also, unknowingly, to the British.

## The Playing Field

The "playing field" for the battles of Alam Halfa and El Alamein was a natural choke point on Rommel's road to Alexandria and Cairo. El Alamein was not much more than a siding on the railway and motor road running along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. The most significant natural feature in defining this choke point is the Qattara Depression.

The Qattara Depression is a large area of northwestern Egypt which drops from the desert floor to 200 feet below sea level. The obstacle is approximately 150 miles in both the north-south and east-west directions. The northern side of the depression is protected by 600-foot cliffs dropping to a floor made up of salt marshes, sand dunes and quicksand. As an anchor for a defensive line, the depression is unsurpassed. The southern end of the line, protected by the depression, cannot be flanked. The northern end of the line is the Mediterranean Sea. The El Alamein area is where the margin between the depression and the sea is narrowest.

The terrain in the area is not the dune sand often associated with North Africa. The area immediately south of the Mediterranean consists of limestone rock covered by grit and stones. This layer of grit varies in thickness from inches to several feet. The shallower areas are good for vehicular traffic but make digging-in by infantry all but

impossible. Softer areas in the limestone have eroded, making it impassable by vehicles. The terrain is punctuated by high points and ridges which rise up to 300 feet above the surrounding surface. These form excellent areas for observation posts and fighting positions. This key terrain was hotly contested many times throughout the battles.

When the British forces stopped Rommel's eastward race toward Cairo, it was no accident that El Alamein was the location. Gen. Sir Claude Auchinleck, commander-in-chief, British North African Forces, had observed before the war that the El Alamein position was key to preventing an assault from the west. Preparation of defensive positions in the area had begun in 1940 as Italian Gen. Graziani's army began its eastward march. The level of activity of these defensive preparations ebbed and flowed as the immediate threat to Alexandria and Cairo varied. By the autumn of 1941, three major defended areas had been established along the El Alamein-Qattara Depression line. The largest of these was in the vicinity of El Alamein and was sited to protect the rail line, the coast road and the water supply. Major defensive positions

were also located at Dier al Qattara and Jebel Kerag, to defend the approaches to Ruweisat and Alam el Halfa respectively.

Late in 1941, observation posts and anti-tank gun bunkers were constructed and trench systems were laid out. Each defensive area included underground hospitals, storage complexes and command posts. Water was piped from underground reservoirs in the El Alamein area. Supply routes were constructed across the desert to reduce dependence on the single route of the coast road. Defenses were developed in depth behind this main line all the way back to the Nile and the western edge of its delta and to the Suez Canal. Minefields were carefully and extensively emplaced to canalize the attackers into the battlefields of the defenders' choosing.

On June 30, 1942, Rommel's badly overstretched and understrength forces encountered the first of the El Alamein defenses and were stopped. On each of the following three days, Rommel attempted to regain the momentum but was unable to advance. His remaining forces were badly mauled by British ground and air forces.

## Intelligence Coup

Events following the end of Rommel's race to Cairo were to prove of

major importance. Among the many counterattacks and thrusts conducted by British forces was the Canadian assault on the hill Tel el Eisa. While the hill itself was of military significance, the major objective was the capture of a German signal intercept station located on the hill. The station was captured virtually intact. When intelligence experts examined the captured material they found probably the most important intelligence coup of the entire North African campaign. The documents found at Tel el Eisa revealed a great deal of the "foxiness" of the "Desert Fox" was due entirely to good German wireless intelligence and poor British wireless security. The British had given away much of their operational planning in the forward areas. It was a significant discovery.<sup>3</sup>

Widespread reforms were made in British communications operations. New practices included improved call sign and cryptographic procedures, voice codes and imposition of radio silence on moving units. These were strictly enforced by monitoring units, and severe disciplinary action was imposed on offenders.

These new practices denied the Germans intelligence. More importantly, together with other information captured on Tel el Eisa, it made it easy for the British to feed deception information to the Germans. Investigation of captured documents at Tel el Eisa also revealed that the Germans had broken the American Black code used by the U.S. Embassy in Cairo to send information on British operations to Washington. From late September 1941 until August 1942, the American attaché transmitted to Washington daily reports on British strength, reinforcements, equipment, morale and plans not only in Egypt and Libya but also throughout the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East command. His reports covered commanders' abilities, reputations and tactics; the movements of convoys and warships; and the locations, equipment and serviceability of tank and air squadrons. These reports were sent daily from the Egyptian Telegraph Office, and as they were flashed to Washington every cipher group was intercepted, transcribed and passed to Rommel. David Kahn, the American historian of cryptography, wrote: "What messages they were! They provided Rommel with undoubtedly the broadest and clearest picture of enemy forces and intentions

available to any Axis commander throughout the war."<sup>4</sup> The sending of such sensitive information by Black code was, of course, stopped. The channel was kept open for possible deception use, however, by the continued sending of "minor secrets."

Further revelation of the Tel el Eisa documents disclosed that there was a German espionage operation being conducted in Cairo. Code named "Kondor," it involved two German agents and an Egyptian belly dancer.<sup>5</sup> Their source of information was a British "Maj. Smith" who was the dancer's lover. It was arranged for the agents to have access to the information in "Smith's" briefcase while the dancer had him busy in bed. Through a wild series of events worthy of an adventure novel, the Kondor mission was not only shut down but was compromised in such a manner that it could be used for deception. The compromise of Kondor was to be a key element in the deception instrumental to the Alam Halfa victory.

#### Alam Halfa

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery assumed command of the British forces in August 1942. His first priority was to initiate a period of reorganizing, re-equipping and training. Veterans who had been in action for months had received no organized training during that time. Replacement personnel and new units needed to be integrated into the operations. New equipment was being received for which training was needed. Most of all, the British forces needed new confidence in their leadership and a new offensive attitude for future operations. Divisions which had been broken up and used as brigades were reorganized as cohesive units. Army and air headquarters were collocated for closer cooperation. A reserve corps for in-depth defense was organized. While this was happening, it was necessary to maintain the defensive line at El Alamein.

Rommel's intelligence told him that British defenses were thinnest at the southern end of the line. He would turn the line there, box the British forces against the Mediterranean Sea and continue his eastward advance. His plan began with a secret move of the Afrika Korps from the northern to the southern end of the line.

Maintaining the greatest secrecy, Rommel left dummy vehicles in place

in the north as he moved the Afrika Korps south. All units moved carefully by night and in radio silence. As Rommel communicated his plans to the Luftwaffe for maximum air support and to the German High Command to obtain a maximum supply of fuel, Ultra was listening.

Montgomery moved his troops south with speed and secrecy. But knowing the plan wasn't the only thing needed. He still needed to be able to defeat this formidable force. Above all, he had to prevent the Germans from capturing the strategic Alam El Halfa Ridge which controlled the southern route to the Suez Canal.

It was known from captured German maps that Rommel's knowledge of terrain conditions in that area was poor. What if he could be made to attack through the Ragil Depression where the soft, treacherous sand would make movement difficult? *It was time to put Kondor to use.*

Through Kondor, Rommel was informed that the British intended to make a last stand for Egypt at Alam el Halfa Ridge, but that the present defense was only makeshift and waiting for reinforcements to arrive. A later Kondor message gave him details of the order of battle along the ridge. To make sure that Rommel swallowed the bait, the British devised another plan. Montgomery's chief of staff directed his cartographers to make a map of the Ragil showing that the area was "hard going," a condition favorable to panzers. Then the map had to be placed in Rommel's hands without arousing his suspicions. "Maj. Smith" had been under arrest ever since his liaison with the belly dancer had come to light. Now he was compelled to take a staff car into the desert carrying the false map. The Germans saw him coming; suddenly they heard a loud explosion and saw the scout car leap into the air. They sent out a patrol who found the major's corpse — and the map. As Churchill would later write: "This false information had its intended effect. Certainly the battle now took the precise form that Montgomery desired." Rommel used the trails marked "hard going" for his attack.<sup>6</sup>

Rommel soon encountered newly laid minefields directly in front of his main thrust. When the German engineers went in to begin clearing, the sky was lighted up by flares and filled with RAF bombers. When a path was finally

cleared through the minefield, Rommel decided to continue east, only to run into much stronger resistance than he had expected. As a result, he turned north into the Ragil and soft sands. As his crews dismounted to try to dig out their vehicles, the RAF reappeared to bomb and strafe them. Rommel ordered the remains of the Afrika Korps to retreat. The battle of Alam Halfa was over. He had lost 4,800 men, 50 tanks and 70 guns. He had also lost his extra fuel. Alerted by Ultra, the RAF and the Royal Navy had sunk three tankers as they crossed the Mediterranean from Italy.

### Operation Bertram

As Montgomery began his plans for his own offensive, deception again became a major consideration. The first element of the deception was to be the timing of the attack which Rommel knew must inevitably come. For this purpose Kondor was used again, along with the Black box conduit and other "turned" German intelligence operations. The intent was to convince the Germans that Montgomery could not open an offensive until mid-November at the earliest. In fact he intended to open it on Oct. 23.

Montgomery also wanted to conceal the location of his attack. The northern end of the El Alamein line was the only practical place to attack, and of course Rommel knew this, but he must be convinced that Montgomery would attack in the south. At the same time, he must not see the preparations for the attack in the north. The deception and cover plan was called Operation Bertram.

The details of Bertram are fascinating. In short, tanks and artillery pieces were disguised as trucks. Dummy installations were erected, the Germans were allowed to discover that they were dummies, then they were occupied with real equipment. Thousands of tons of supplies were moved and concealed without German discovery. As preparations were going on in the north, preparations for the deception attack were going on in the south. Vast dummy supply dumps were built and a dummy water pipeline was constructed — at a rate that would have it completed in late October. The plan was executed without a serious hitch. The "pipeline" was not yet completed, and since, to all appearances, the assault forces were still in the staging areas, poised for a

strike to the south, the Germans assumed that no attack was imminent. All that was visible in the north was a heavy concentration of 3-ton and 10-ton trucks. In reality, an armored corps and an infantry strike force lay hidden and waiting to attack. The only bleats of wireless communication and the only dust trails from moving vehicles occurred in the south.<sup>7</sup>

While the preparations and deception were taking place, Ultra was at work again. Through the intercepted and deciphered communications, Montgomery knew the exact state and disposition of the Afrika Korps. Through information provided by Ultra, the British campaign against Rommel's resupply sunk 30 percent of the supplies sent to him in August and September and 40 percent in October. Four days before Montgomery's attack, Ultra revealed that Rommel's forces had only a week's supply of fuel, three weeks of bread, nine days of ammunition and that one-third of his vehicles were laid up due to lack of spare parts.

### Operation Lightfoot

Montgomery's attack, Operation Lightfoot, began with a massive artillery barrage on Oct. 23, at 9:40 p.m. So effective were the deception and the campaign against his shipping that when the attack came, Rommel was in Germany for medical treatment and to try to improve his supply situation. Even as the attack in the north began, the deception was continued by what appeared to be a major attack in the south and a dummy amphibious assault which caused the Germans to divert a division to protect their seaward flank.

From the start of the Battle of El Alamein Rommel's forces were doomed. Betrayed in every major move he made by Ultra, Rommel was a general without hope. In a series of signals to Hitler — all of which were read by Ultra — he warned that he had no petrol to permit the withdrawal of two German and four Italian non-motorized divisions and that most would be taken prisoner. There were only nominal reserves of ammunition, and even the tanks could not retreat far with their present supply of fuel.<sup>8</sup>

On Nov. 4, Montgomery broke the Axis front. By Nov. 5, the German and Italian forces were in general retreat. The allied invasion of Algeria, Operation Torch, began on Nov. 8. Although there was still a lot of fighting to be

done, the end was drawing near for the Axis forces in Africa. Rommel would be recalled to Germany in March 1943, and the last organized resistance in Africa by Axis troops would end on May 12.

Throughout the battles in North Africa following Lightfoot, and indeed throughout the rest of the war, Ultra would be instrumental in revealing German intentions and sinking German supplies. Operation Bertram, the great desert deception, would become the prototype for Operation Bodyguard, the deception plan for the assault across the English Channel.

### Lessons for Today

The importance of these lessons for today's military leaders should be obvious. On today's high-tech battlefield, operational and signal security are more important than ever in denying the enemy intelligence. Deception operations are also of great significance. The Soviets are known to practice large scale deception operations, especially for the purpose of achieving surprise. NATO leaders must be able to penetrate Soviet deceptions to accurately assess their intentions. NATO's numerical inferiority also makes the effective use of deception mandatory in achieving tactical surprise and maximum effective use of available forces. ★

### Footnotes

1. B. H. Liddell Hart, Ed., *The Rommel Papers* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1953), p. 283.
2. Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 825.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
5. This incident was fictionalized by Ken Follett in his novel *The Key To Rebecca*.
6. Cave Brown, p. 113.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

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# The Military Intelligence Profession in the U.S. Army - Part II

by Capt. Nathan E. McCauley  
*As the Military Intelligence branch and function solidified in the U.S. Army over the years, several impacts associated with this process occurred. These impacts reflect the positive influence of the military intelligence profession on the Army.*

After 25 years of having a professional intelligence branch, dramatic changes have occurred. The first direct impact is the enhanced quality of soldier pursuing an intelligence-related career. According to the Military Intelligence (MI) branch chief at the Military Personnel Center, MI is now the branch of choice for officers entering the Army from the U.S. Military Academy and Reserve Officers' Training Corps.<sup>1</sup> Ad-

ditionally, warrant officers and NCOs with high potential and class rank are making the branch a better, more professional organization.

MI soldiers are no longer looked upon as having no chance for advancement or potential. During World War I, very competent and professional soldiers in the Corps of Intelligence Police could advance no further than sergeants of Infantry, according to DoD regulation. The upgrade of the deputy chief of staff for intelligence position to the rank of lieutenant general has provided the MI officer and NCO Corps additional opportunities to advance into the senior leadership of the Army. The formation of the NCO Academy at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., is also indicative of the increased stature of the intelligence community in the eyes of the Army leadership.

Intelligence soldiers are more proficient today due to a wider variety of available positions and an increased level of experience. All intelligence personnel have the opportunity to work at various echelons, from the strategic role of INSCOM to the tactical CEWI unit.<sup>2</sup> This wide variety of assignments helps create a mature, professional organization.

The Postgraduate Intelligence Program at the Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C., produces strategic intelligence specialists. The Intelligence Center and School trains soldiers in all fields of specialization. Graduates are acquiring highly skilled specialties. The tactical intelligence officer (35D) and the intelligence analyst (96B), for example, are trained to develop tactical intelligence at the corps level and below. As of October 1983, all new intelligence



officers are trained as tactical intelligence officers during their basic course, with the goal of specialization during the advanced course.<sup>3</sup> The various career management fields for enlisted soldiers stress specific skill development in the related fields. With this emphasis, the branch now produces specialists who can perform in a multidisciplinary environment.

Another major impact of the creation of the branch is the division between tactical and strategic-oriented soldiers. The branch was initially composed mainly of Reservists who were highly trained specialists. As the years have progressed, a better balance has occurred between those able to function at both the tactical and strategic levels. While the integration of all forms of intelligence is critical to the overall intelligence effort, both strategic and tactical intelligence specialists are needed to adequately acquire and process the available information.

The last major impact of the heightened professional standards of the intelligence corps is improved commander support at all levels. The success of the intelligence corps in Vietnam was questionable due to a variety of problems associated with the newly formed branch and the personnel who staffed it. Yet the very existence of the branch helped to build a foundation upon which tactical intelligence expertise could be built. Also, based on an examination of the utility of the MI units in Vietnam conducted in 1974, the U.S. Army intelligence system was "more responsive to the tactical commander's needs than in any previous war."<sup>4</sup> This assessment concludes that while the total intelligence system was less than perfect in tactical support, it was far superior to any other conflict due to advances in technology and new intelligence concepts.

The impact in strategic intelligence collection and production is based on the added expertise of today's intelligence professional who may have worked his entire career within one intelligence discipline. Today's MI soldier conducts real-world strategic intelligence collection and production missions daily. In conjunction with this collection effort, the Army Intelligence Agency controls the three major Army intelligence production centers: the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, the Missile and Space Intelligence Center and the Foreign Science and

Technology Center.<sup>5</sup> These agencies produce detailed studies and information on potential threats and endeavor to prevent our ground forces from becoming surprised on any future battlefield. The professional MI soldier, regardless of rank, significantly enhances the capabilities of these strategic intelligence agencies.

### Current Issues

Today's MI Corps faces significant challenges. New personnel entering the intelligence profession must become aware of several key issues that range from discipline specialization to the concept of an intelligence failure.

The first major issue confronting the Corps is the perennial matter of specialized versus generalized officers. Presently, MI officers are being trained to operate in a tactical environment as generalists. This system provides an excellent background for officers being assigned to tactical intelligence units. Unfortunately, others going to highly specialized jobs are relatively untrained for their positions. The solution to this quandary is to tailor specific courses to meet the needs of selected individuals. For instance, all new intelligence officers should finish the Tactical All-Source Intelligence Officer course to ensure a standardized base. Officers going to strategic assignments should complete the required specialist course prior to departing for their assignment. This will ensure that quality intelligence officers report to their first duty assignment with the required background knowledge. It also ensures that all officers have a basic knowledge of the principles of tactical intelligence.

The skills of a discipline specialist are still needed in vital intelligence jobs throughout the Army. Today's career pattern allows intelligence officers to choose various specialties within the intelligence field, to include tactical intelligence. This dual specialty program is designed to fully utilize the mid-level intelligence officer to the utmost. It allows for advanced schooling and education in specific skills so that a mid or senior-level officer might become an expert in an intelligence discipline. In this way, the balance between intelligence discipline specialists and tactical intelligence officers is maintained.

The NCO Corps is not without its problems. Mid and senior-level management positions require intelligence

specialists to assume more positions of leadership. It thus becomes the individual's responsibility to maintain and practice prior specialty skills.

An associated issue that the contemporary intelligence community must resolve is the capability to perform multidisciplinary intelligence operations. The original effort to produce a soldier capable of conducting multidisciplinary intelligence operations stemmed from the 1978 Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study.<sup>6</sup> The study found that intelligence officers needed training to become effective managers of the various resources available to them, especially at the tactical level. This problem has increased during the 1980s as another program, the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP), is exporting national system capabilities to the corps level, thus compounding the complexity of the intelligence resource management task at the tactical level.<sup>7</sup> These factors increase the need for good multidisciplinary managers as well as multidisciplinary organizations, both at the officer and NCO level.

Another factor contributing to the recognition of intelligence as a critical asset is the National Training Center (NTC). The NTC provides units the opportunity to conduct realistic combat operations in a desert environment. Complete with an organized opposing force, state-of-the-art technology to track combat losses and free play exercise, the NTC offers tactical Army units an insight into the dynamics of combat. In doing this, the NTC provides intelligence professionals a chance to practice their craft and to sell it to their commanders. Overall, the NTC is enabling the MI community to prove the worth of intelligence without actual combat. This will ultimately enable the Army to hone its tactical intelligence skills in peacetime as it never has before.

Two of the underlying reasons for the well-spring of intelligence needs are the concepts of AirLand Battle doctrine and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).<sup>8</sup> AirLand Battle doctrine calls for an increased emphasis on intelligence so that commanders can fight today's and tomorrow's battles. This means a commander must not only fight enemy forces in contact but also those preparing to enter the fray. This makes the requirement for timely, accurate information of both first and follow-on

echelon enemy forces critical.

LIC requires a significant amount of intelligence resources dedicated to the effort in order to locate the enemy. An example of the large amount of intelligence resources required for LIC operations is the number of agencies supporting the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the battle against communist insurgencies. SOUTHCOM is presently receiving intelligence support from the Central American Joint Intelligence Team, the XVIII Airborne Corps, CINCLANT and Air Force special operations forces.<sup>9</sup> This array of intelligence organizations and resources exemplifies the many types of intelligence needed to support LIC and also emphasizes a potential weakness: the lack of sufficient resources to adequately support various commands independently. Intelligence resources must grow with the intelligence profession to fully support the Army of the future.

The final issue of continuing importance is the "intelligence failure." Each intelligence professional must be able to identify what is within the realm of possibility and what is not. Brig. Gen. Ira C. Owens pointed out that some future occurrences are beyond the "limits of logic" and cannot be accurately forecasted by available intelligence without an operational crystal ball.<sup>10</sup> While the uninformed may term these events intelligence failures, they cannot be considered that way by intelligence professionals.

MI soldiers are required to use all of their experience, abilities and resources to obtain the capabilities and intentions of the enemy before they are able to carry out their plan. Not being able to accurately predict or exactly describe future enemy actions is not necessarily an intelligence failure.

The MI soldier must be aware that intelligence cannot foresee all and that intelligence is often the best place to lay the blame for a series of failures, or more accurately, inactions. As a profession, intelligence must do its best to bring about accurate decisions based on the best information possible. Failing in that, the professional must accept the consequences and continue to pursue the needed intelligence. An apt description is provided by one author, who calls intelligence failures an occupational hazard.<sup>11</sup> Intelligence needs soldiers with the vision and experience to produce good intelligence and who

understand the implications of an intelligence failure.

### Conclusion

The varied history of military intelligence from its inception as a wartime necessity to today's vital stature in the military community is a study in the coming of age of intelligence as a whole. Although today's MI community is coping with several critical issues, the improvement over 25 years is impressive. Quality intelligence professionals working in a wide variety of disciplines have dramatically improved the overall intelligence support to the U.S. Army in both the tactical and strategic areas.

The goals established in 1962 for the new intelligence branch have been met by the MI Corps. With qualified soldiers staffing major intelligence organizations and tactical intelligence positions in most combat units, MI claims an impressive reputation as a necessary organization.

The MI Corps must maintain skill proficiency to keep up with technological advances. High-technology systems form the basis for the maintaining of specialists in the intelligence field.

From Vietnam to Grenada, MI specialists have developed and proven their skills across a wide range of experiences. The NTC is also strengthening the value of MI within the rest of the Army, as will the MI Training Center. This, in turn, cultivates the increased support of unit commanders for intelligence operations and training.

Today's intelligence community is a closer knit organization than even 10 years ago. MI units have become more cohesive and responsive to the needs of tactical and strategic intelligence consumers.

### Outlook

Many challenges remain for the MI Corps. Recognizing and coping with the reality of intelligence failures, creating proficient intelligence soldiers capable of performing in tactical and specialized intelligence operations, and providing specialized intelligence to support current Army doctrine and requirements are some of the main issues.

To continue the perceived success of the intelligence corps, certain imperatives are vital to understanding the MI professional's role in today's Army. These imperatives include competence, candor, common sense and communi-

cation. The branch was created to better support tactical and strategic decision makers. Intelligence specialists must be able to grasp the requirements of the supported commander and provide that commander with the required intelligence.

Intelligence must continually prove itself to be a vital element of each command. Garnering command support for intelligence operations and training is a basic requirement for all intelligence professionals. The MI Corps must retain command support at all echelons to be effective and strive to continue its evolution into a better organization. It must be ready to respond with qualified personnel manning efficient organizations and providing multidisciplinary support to both tactical and strategic decision makers. This is the charter of today's MI Corps. ★

### Footnotes

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## Intelligence Exchange — The Critical Element in Joint Warfare Prosecution

by Col. John H. Prokopowicz

The U.S. armed forces claim that they are the best ever assembled in the country's history. They believe that they can meet any threat to our national security. A quick examination of their abilities versus those of a possible aggressor generally supports these contentions. A closer inspection, however, reveals that this is true only when they are engaged against a similar service: land versus land, sea versus sea, air versus air. Future wars will be fought in more of a combined arms mode. Because of the limitations of combat resources, increased weapon lethality and the envisioned rapid movement and deployment of forces, it becomes critical that the services consider mutual support. Both theoretical and actual examples indicate that when the different services must operate in a unified manner, the requirements for coordination are endless and effectiveness diminishes.

The services worked together successfully in World War II, Korea and Vietnam. But close examination of these operations reveals that the coordination and cooperation were mostly the result of many difficult negotiations and the willpower of strong-minded leaders. As a result, these attempts at cooperation did not last and the lessons learned did not become part of the joint operations knowledge base.

Whether in war games or an actual exercise, the absence of this cooperation hurts the outcome. For example, in a global scenario the battle on the central front might not be going well. The Allied air forces are hard pressed to establish the air superiority needed to undertake an effective follow-on forces attack. The ground forces commanders were somewhat successful in blunting the initial echelon attack, but were unable to stand firm when the unimpeded following echelons weighed into the battle. Meanwhile, the naval forces had successfully eliminated all resistance from the Red Force Navy and the Allied naval combat power was left intact.

The results of this scenario are only applicable and conclusive for this particular set of circumstances. But it parallels many others identifying the same problems. The sea campaign proceeded acceptably while the land battle did not. One wonders whether the naval forces could have assisted the ground forces more directly in the battle on the central front. Unfortunately there is virtually no system or process at the campaign level to coordinate this assistance in an expeditious manner.

The naval assets (in this case, the carrier air wings) were not even considered as an option for resolution of the central battle issue. Naval air could be the decisive ingredient in the prosecution of rear area security. An operational maneuver group breakthrough would be less costly to the firepower in the main battle area if naval air could be used to provide the firepower to the rear area ground defenders. At present, because of lack of

prior planning and incompatible resources it would take an inordinate amount of time and coordination to execute such a plan. The absence of some means of direct intelligence exchanges between the land and naval forces is the principal inhibitor for this type of assistance. Other inhibitors are training, munitions, doctrine and a lack of operational experience. The entire joint combat capability suffers because of this system absence and it will continue to do so until one is developed.

Other more localized and regional scenarios also illustrate this operational deficiency. Mutual land and sea support is only affected after a time-consuming passage of intelligence up and down command channels. While the Marines and Navy operate well together within the Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison System and the Army and Air Force operate within the Airland Battle doctrine, the Army and Navy do not effectively interact.

A recent example of the lack of an effective process to interact operationally and tactically was witnessed during the Grenada operation. The Army and Navy components could not communicate with each other at all, much less pass intelligence for possible joint battle actions. Since that time, commands have been looking to correct the situation. While impromptu measures and ad hoc systems have satisfied certain requirements their use is heavily dependent on the personalities involved.

A major part of any mutual support system has to be the intelligence exchange process which is the cornerstone for any successful operation. This system must encompass the level, the manner and the resources and understanding (doctrine) that is required to ensure coordination effectiveness. Such an undertaking encompassing the entire military structure is Herculean. Rather than wrapping one's arms around the entire issue it seems best to take on one function or subfunction at a time. Logically this must be the intelligence exchange process designed to operate at the lowest level practicable. If successful, the results of this effort should eventually enable effective formulation of the entire system.

What is required is a doctrine and commitment to establish a permanent system to resolve the issue and solve the problem. In today's climate emphasizing jointness, there exists a tremendous opportunity and potential to correct this glaring shortcoming. The joint chiefs of staff, in an oversight capacity, must take the lead in this area. Only in this way will the direction, authority and responsibility be centralized and uniform.

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# An OPSEC Crusade

by Capt. Karen Gerogolian

The hold box, the "too hard" file — we all have one. The subject matter usually varies according to the job of the moment, but there are a few items which seem to be common to everyone's "too hard" file. They are the things that are never important until something goes wrong. Operations Security (OPSEC) is one such paper program. It is difficult, hinders mission accomplishment and, if successfully done, produces intangible benefits. OPSEC does not become important to commanders until they are penalized for telegraphing their intentions.

Proponents of good OPSEC are progressing slowly. We can only encourage good OPSEC policy during peacetime by effectively thwarting poor OPSEC policy during field exercises. Then, unfortunately too often, the lesson is not learned. The enemy will quickly exploit those who ignore OPSEC during wartime. We must do everything possible to teach the value of good OPSEC before we play for keeps. The following story recounts a small victory I had while on my crusade for good OPSEC.

The 793d Military Police (MP) Battalion, Federal Republic of Germany, was conducting an Army training and evaluation program exercise. As battalion S2, I was in the tactical operations center (TOC) monitoring 615th MP Com-

pany communications. The 1st Platoon received orders to secure a bridge.

An evaluator for the bridge operation had found an OPSEC problem at the platoon's assembly area and asked me to come and investigate. Upon arrival, I realized that it was very obvious that the area had been recently occupied; the soldiers had forgotten to properly dispose of their garbage. No one in the platoon realized what could be learned from an analysis of their trash!

After counting the paper plates, I surmised that the unit was a platoon-sized element. Leftover food proved the unit was eating hot meals and indicated bakery capability and water availability. Also discarded were some Meal Ready to Eat (MRE) packages. These soldiers were eating well by field standards. Further inspection revealed some Gummi Bear bags and Schwipp Schwapp Cola Mix bottles, which pointed to possible friendly relations with the local populace.

A thorough search provided evidence of a solid logistical status. A jeep headlight box, M-16 and M-60 ammunition boxes and a hand-held mike were recovered from the trash. The soldiers were equipped with M-16s, M-60s, radios and one-quarter ton trucks. The vehicle type was confirmed by a DA Form 2404 (Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet) on a one-quarter ton trailer. I also learned the unit desig-

nation from the form. Finally, I found a portion of a squad leader's notes listing squad members and their individual weapons.

A hostile intelligence agent could have relayed the information to his compatriots on the bridge. Knowing that an MP platoon was in the area might have enabled them to prepare for and defeat the attack on the bridge, thus preventing the convoy from reaching the front. The results could have been disastrous, depending on the convoy's mission.

Later, the evaluators and the MP company commanders met in the TOC for an after action review. Everyone understood the ramifications of my findings. The squad leaders were stunned. They had not realized how much information about them could be gathered from a quick study of their trash. I had taught a valuable lesson to a handful of soldiers, one I hoped they would pass on to others.

The story is simple and it is easy to make light of the situation. It would not have been so funny if there were real bullets flying on that bridge. ★

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# Equipment Identification Training

by Chief Warrant Officer 2  
Dennis E. Renken

Our equipment identification skills are generally poor. Low training standards and unrealistic performance objectives in common task (CT) recognition training are at fault. For example, the performance objectives and training standards for the Skill Level One CT, "Recognize Friendly and Threat Armored Vehicles," list only 31 vehicles (many of which are obsolete) and omit many important vehicle types and variants. There is no requirement for identification of aircraft. It asks only that the soldier be able to recognize eight out of any 10 armored vehicles as friend or foe. It does not require that the soldier identify vehicles by name, type or purpose. The illustrations are line drawings covering only two angles.

Because equipment identification will be a critical skill for all soldiers in the next war, we must expand and improve our training program now. The Soviets have large airborne and air assault forces in addition to deep-striking, operational maneuver groups and hard-hitting, first-echelon forces. Soviet soldiers and equipment will appear anywhere on the AirLand battlefield. We are going to see more than 31 types

of enemy and friendly vehicles, including many types of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. These vehicles will be camouflaged, stacked with gear, obscured by smoke and other obscuring factors, and often in defilade or partially hidden from view. Aircraft will be flying low and fast. Under these difficult field conditions, 100 percent identification will be the only acceptable standard.

Soldiers with specialized combat tasks or with duties near the forward line of own troops may require even more highly developed identification skills. Special Forces personnel, artillery forward observers, scouts, antitank gunners and air defense soldiers need to identify equipment by name, nationality and purpose. Unit and individual training sometimes reflects this requirement, but performance standards remain low. Within the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps, the ground surveillance radar and long range surveillance soldiers obviously have strong needs for equipment identification skills.

Our first step must be to develop a realistic and adequate Skill Level One CT to include all the vehicles and aircraft our soldiers are likely to see on the battlefield. The illustrations must be improved to portray an actual repre-

sentation of the equipment.

We must develop additional equipment identification training tasks to meet the needs of specialized personnel. This includes command, control and communications equipment, surface-to-surface missiles, warhead vans, chemical equipment, electronic warfare vehicles and so on. For those who operate on or near the forward edge of the battle area, we must teach more than just major equipment items (tanks and infantry fighting vehicles) and include distinctive support equipment which reveals enemy unit identification and, sometimes, intentions. This includes artillery command and observation posts, reconnaissance vehicles and battlefield surveillance radars.

With this simple but effective program, the MI Corps can lead the way to better equipment identification skills. We can offer the Army our enthusiasm and expertise in a critical training subject and enhance our branch prestige and credibility. ★

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## 96B Skill Development

by Capt. Deborah M. Stuart

Training is the key to a combat ready unit. Soldiers must be able to perform both common tactical and MOS skills. Intelligence analysts (MOS 96B) are no exception. Analyzing is a skill they must develop over time. It cannot be learned instantly in advanced individual training.

The following is a framework which can be used by corps or division support element chiefs and intelligence officers at all levels to develop this critical skill. This training program consists of a series of questions for 96Bs to research. After each research period, an informal briefing and discussion session will share what has been learned, reinforce key information and clarify more difficult concepts.

The first set of questions concerns

geopolitical factors. It gives the soldier a background knowledge of the country or countries which his unit would face in war. In answering these questions, the soldier will enhance his knowledge about other areas of the world.

Once the soldier has learned about the country, he begins a study of the country's armed forces (set 2). The questions I have developed are general and therefore applicable to most countries or areas. It is best to give the soldier an overview of the armed forces and have him explore the details of the specific unit or type and echelon of unit that he is likely to face in battle.

The third and final set of questions requires the soldier to analyze strengths and weaknesses and changes occur-

ring in the subjects he has just researched. These questions also provide the opportunity to explore how geopolitical factors affect a country's combat readiness and combat effectiveness.

Where can the soldier find the information he needs for his research? Department of the Army Area Handbooks are good to start with, as are materials from the library. Intelligence agency studies and reports and the Field Manual 100-2 series, *The Soviet Army*, will furnish the information needed for Question Set 2. Access to daily classified message traffic can help the soldier track changes required by Question Set 3. If this access is not possible, intelligence agency reports and unclassified products such as the Defense

Intelligence Agency's *Review of the Soviet Ground Forces* are excellent alternative sources.

As they research and answer each question, your soldiers can write articles or working papers for a unit intelligence summary or give informal briefings. Once the soldiers have gathered the basic information in these question sets, they can concentrate on intelligence requirements that are more specific to their unit's needs.

These are the tangible products of the soldier's efforts. The intangible product is a soldier who is better able to analyze and communicate.

## Set I — Geopolitical Factors

1. *Topography and Climate.* Describe briefly the topography and climate of the country. Depict these two details on a map.

2. *Social and Religious Groups.* What social and religious groups populate the country? Describe their major characteristics and depict on a map where these groups live.

3. *Political Doctrine.* What type of government does the country have? Describe the major features of its political doctrine.

4. *Political Structure.* What is the political structure of the country? Describe how the government is set up and any major political divisions within the government.

5. *Political Leaders.* Who are the major political leaders of the country?

6. *Economic Structure.* What is the economic structure of the country? Describe economic administration and the types of major production. Depict on a map the main economic divisions of the country.

## Set II — The Armed Forces

### A. Composition/Disposition:

1. *Organization.* Describe the organization of the country's armed forces. Draw line and block charts down to battalion (or equivalent) level for "type" ground units and any special operations units.

2. *Locations.* Depict on a map the locations of all division-level ground units and major Air Force and Naval installations.

### B. Strength:

1. *Manpower.* How many serve in the armed forces? Give the totals for each branch of service. What type of reserve force exists? Give the number

of personnel in this category.

2. *Weapons and Equipment.* Give the nomenclature and basic characteristics (i.e. range, caliber, crew, etc.) for the ground force's major weapon and transport systems and indicate what types of units use them. Do the same for ground-support aircraft. Graphically depict each system.

### C. Tactics:

Describe the basic tactical doctrine of the ground force. Include a discussion of special operations and combined arms doctrine.

### D. Training Status:

Describe individual, unit and special training in the ground force. Include a discussion of training methods and what types of training receive the most emphasis.

### E. Logistics:

Briefly describe the transport, supply and maintenance systems within the ground force and how they would operate during combat.

### F. Miscellaneous:

1. *Personalities.* Who are the key military leaders?

2. *Uniforms and Insignia.* Briefly describe the combat uniforms and equipment of the ground force. Include any special individual equipment (i.e. chemical protective clothing, etc.) and distinctive insignia and clothing.

## Set III — Analysis

### A. The Armed Forces:

1. *Composition/Disposition.* What changes are occurring in the organization of the armed forces—particularly the ground forces? What strengths and weaknesses exist in the organization? Do the changes remedy weaknesses or create new problems?

#### 2. Strength.

a. *Weapons and Equipment* — Assess the capabilities and flaws of the major weapons and equipment documented in set 2. What are the sources of these systems (i.e. domestic or foreign-produced)? Are the systems obsolete or state-of-the-art? What is the status of nuclear weapons development and deployment?

b. *Manpower* — Discuss the status of the armed forces' manpower in terms of shortages which may exist, education and proficiency levels and levels of morale. Are there social, polit-

ical or other factors which may affect the personnel readiness of the armed forces? What is the general level of combat experience of the armed forces?

3. *Tactics.* Analyze the conventional and special operations doctrine. Discuss any changes which may be taking place and strengths and weaknesses which exist or may result from ongoing changes.

4. *Training Status.* Discuss the effectiveness of the training in the ground force. What strengths and weaknesses exist? Is there unusual or increased training activity taking place?

5. *Logistics.* Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the logistics system in terms of how they will influence combat readiness and effectiveness.

6. *Miscellaneous.* Unit History — Give a brief description of the histories of key units and discuss implications for combat effectiveness.

### B. Geopolitical Factors:

1. *Political, Economic and Social Structures.* What strengths and weaknesses exist in the political, economic and social/religious structures of the country? What changes are occurring in these structures? How do these strengths, weaknesses and changes affect the country's armed forces?

2. *Relations with the United States.* Discuss the country's relationship with the United States. Assess the terrorist threat against U.S. personnel and property. Discuss the frequency and nature of anti-U.S. strikes, riots, demonstrations and sabotage.

The leaders responsible for implementing this training program must be well prepared and extensively research their particular threat. Sources such as area handbooks and DIA assessments will provide most of the answers to these not so easy questions. Applicability of this developing data base is certainly not restricted to high intensity conflict involving the Soviet Union. The beauty of this training program is its potential application to any threat, involving any level of conflict. ★

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# OPFOR

## in the Defense

by Capt. Justin L.C. Eldridge

The National Training Center (NTC) provides U.S. units an excellent opportunity to train against a Soviet-style Opposing Force (OPFOR). The OPFOR regiment at the NTC displays a sound doctrinal understanding of Soviet tactics and, coupled with excellent terrain analysis, positions its forces in defensive positions and poses a formidable threat to any U.S. task force or brigade.

The NTC OPFOR demonstrates a wide variety of tactical options available to a Soviet regiment during combat operations. Its adherence to certain battlefield techniques when defending increases its chances for success and requires friendly units to take specific actions during movement and in contact. A U.S. task force that engages a company-size OPFOR element often claims victory when on the objective, though it may have only a few remaining vehicles. This emphasis on winning detracts from the lessons learned on how the enemy may defend in the next war and what actions must be taken to increase our chances of survival and mission success.

The task force commander, operations officer and intelligence officer must understand how the OPFOR fights and how the NTC scenario affects what the OPFOR places on the battlefield. Rotational units that don't capture the basic lessons learned are not able to advance either their understanding of

the OPFOR or of how Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops and Time Available (METT-T) affects the enemy on the battlefield.

The OPFOR regiment consists of three motorized rifle battalions composed of a U.S. infantry battalion and an armored battalion. Under regimental control are a reconnaissance company, an Electronic Warfare/Radio Electronic Combat (EW/REC) Detachment (direct support), a regimental aviation squadron (four HINDs w/AT-6), and one to three companies of dismounted infantry, acquired from active and reserve Army and Marine units. There is one engineer company augmentation per rotation and one field artillery battalion.

Each OPFOR unit has the doctrinal number of vehicles, as outlined in the field manual 100-2 series, *The Soviet Army*. The NTC operations group and force ratio considerations determine the number of vehicles placed on the battlefield. The OPFOR strives to provide enough combat power to execute a successful defense. It subsequently places that combat power by emphasizing concentration of both direct and indirect fires. The NTC stresses the need for concentration of fires. Multiple-Integrated Laser System (MILES) equipment supports this concept. The NTC's goal is for an overall three to one ratio, in favor of the blue force.

An OPFOR company will defend from a doctrinal battle position, with two platoons placed forward on the flanks and one to the rear. Primary positions face the most likely avenues of approach, and secondary positions face alternate avenues.

If the scenario requires the OPFOR to replicate a depleted battalion in the defense, they will usually defend with three motorized rifle companies. Losses sustained in command and control elements determine how a unit reconsti-

tutes. The battalion will also establish a security zone, consisting of reconnaissance elements and possibly tanks or BMPs.

The OPFOR in a regimental defense will normally place a motorized rifle company forward in the security zone with orders to avoid a *decisive* engagement. The company will withdraw if decisively engaged, most likely under the cover of artillery-delivered, chemical munitions. Regimental units will use terrain and obstacles remaining from previous rotations to their advantage. The initial impression may be that the security zone forces fight from defensive positions.

The blue force must know their location in relation to the OPFOR defensive positions. Blue force location in the defense determines who will execute a specific counterattack. The OPFOR barriers are constructed to provide an avenue of least resistance that leads blue force elements further into a fire zone. Elements are now placed outside the blue force zone of attack on the OPFOR flanks. This often causes blue force elements to make a penetration prior to turning a flank, which accurately reflects a Soviet-style belt defense.

The OPFOR defense begins with the security zone, usually 10 kilometers in front of the primary defensive positions. The 10-kilometer distance is based on artillery ranges. The observation posts and reconnaissance elements in the security zone rarely engage. Controlling these elements is difficult and engagements occur if the opportunity presents itself.

Terrain and the ability of the defending element to focus combat power forward is a major portion of mission planning. A company-size element in the defense is sometimes explained as an attrited battalion, enabling it to defend using the doctrinal frontage of a

battalion. The key is overlapping fields of fire and the creation of a "fire sack." The OPFOR defends from the low ground in critical areas. A reinforced motorized rifle company can be expected to defend an area approximately one to three kilometers wide.

A motorized rifle battalion defends an area approximately three to eight kilometers wide and four kilometers deep. The battalion prefers a reverse slope defense, an effective, doctrinal Soviet defensive position. Tanks are used to cover the mounted avenues of approach from either primary or supplementary positions. The NTC OPFOR prefers to reposition within battle positions to rapidly mass fires. Their positions are constructed for alternate courses of action. The most common tank position is normally a stepped fighting position, one especially suited to desert terrain. There are no berms. Tanks are also used in a reserve role if required by the scenario.

If blue forces use smoke, the OPFOR repositions some elements out of the smoke to ensure long range fires. The OPFOR command group will select full-hide positions for some elements, with an ability to reposition when blue forces come within range.

A battalion in the defense doctrinally counterattacks with a platoon. This does not always happen at the NTC but should be planned for in all cases. An independent tank battalion is also portrayed in a counterattack role. A penetrated flank can result in violent counterattacks, use of helicopters and delivery of chemical munitions. Counterattack forces in many cases are not used because they are the commander's last resort. They should always be expected, however, when the first defensive positions are penetrated.

One of the most effective skills employed by the OPFOR is their use of obstacles to support their positions. Engineer priority is to survivability, then counter-mobility. They employ approximately 5,000 meters of minefields and 5,000 meters of wire for one defensive mission. OPFOR units replicate the automatic mine-laying capabilities of Soviet units and surface lay the mines, significantly increasing their capabilities. When constructing obstacles, the OPFOR places a BMP or tank forward with the engineers for protection. Each obstacle is covered with artillery and direct fire. The total number of minefields used by the OPFOR varies, dic-

tated by METT-T. Obstacles are constructed with a direction of least resistance. A breach in the obstacle will render it less effective than a breach on a linear obstacle. An oblique obstacle will push everyone toward the breach, whereas a linear obstacle gives the attacking units a choice of direction.

Artillery support configurations change, based on the scenario, just as they would in differing tactical situations. Priority of fires is to the security zone, the defending battalion and finally the regimental command group. The command group calls fires to protect itself, though this rarely happens. Smoke and chemical munitions are planned, while close air support is on call from the regimental operations officer. There are no OPFOR scatterable mines or improved munitions.

Artillery fires are directed against blue forces once they enter the security zone or any time they are spotted and in range. These are only harassing in nature. They will most likely do little damage unless the blue forces stop while in the security zone. All artillery is planned and keyed on blue force movement. The majority of targets are concentrated in areas where high vehicle densities make lucrative targets. In many instances, planned artillery is directed toward low ground. The OPFOR's organic artillery equates to the capability to fire approximately 216 rounds per minute for over 60 minutes.

The OPFOR's centralized control of artillery renders their communications vulnerable to friendly jamming and deception operations. They may also experience difficulty in rapidly adjusting artillery fires if the blue force successfully deceives them of friendly intentions. Artillery planning is very comprehensive. Blue forces should expect to be targeted when within artillery range. Artillery chemical targets are planned prior to the operation and determined by the regimental commander. They are used to protect the withdrawal of the security zone elements and in their final protective fires.

Rotary wing aircraft are also a significant planning factor for both sides. Between two and four HIND helicopters employing running and hover fire are used during a mission. The attack altitude is determined by terrain as the HINDs will go only as high as necessary for target acquisition. The assistant operations officer (S3 Air) must have visual contact with his "target"

and the helicopters and is therefore employed on high ground or dominating terrain. Mission priority is to conduct reconnaissance of the attack positions. The terrain and U.S. weapons capabilities support the use of hover attacks at maximum distances for AT-6 employment. Blue forces must organize a "HIND Watch" for maneuver elements. Attrition of units is at the discretion of the controllers, based on the blue force's reactions to the air attack.

Electronic warfare is a significant combat multiplier for the OPFOR. The EW/REC detachment targets blue force fire control communications networks, with some collection against command networks. They have a limited direction finding capability and work primarily with lines of bearing. If possible, they use imitative communications deception (ICD) to cause the blue force to prematurely fire artillery. Effective ICD will thus decrease the blue force's allocated amount for the real battle. Radio procedures and awareness of OPFOR ICD techniques assume a critical role.

The NTC is an excellent training opportunity for all operating systems, especially intelligence. It shifts the focus from the S2 as a physical security and special projects officer to an intelligence officer. The S2 must possess a great deal of mental agility. The NTC OPFOR's use of a defensive belt, minimization of movement between battle positions and retaining the security zone within artillery range are all accurate reflections of Soviet tactics and battle drills. However, the OPFOR demonstrates the wide variety of options a Soviet regimental or division commander has in conducting defensive operations. Once the S2 masters the effects of METT-T on Soviet-style units at the NTC, he has more time to spend on fine-tuning the decision support template, collecting combat information to determine enemy disposition and strength and significantly contributing to the overall success of his unit. ★

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*Capt. Justin L.C. Eldridge has attended the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course and the Electronic Warfare Staff Officer Course. Previous assignments include assistant operations officer, battalion intelligence officer and chief, collection management, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. His most recent assignment was brigade intelligence officer, 1st Cavalry Division.*

# COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR/ SERGEANT MAJOR SELECTION

by Lt. Col. Patricia H. Jernigan

Promotion board results are always a good news-bad news proposition. Good news for those on the list; bad news for those who aren't. Many of those both on and off the list view the board process as capricious or mysterious, but it is neither. The selection process is formal, well established and everyone concerned should understand it.

Selection rates are invariably low; many qualified soldiers are not on a promotion list simply because there are not enough vacancies. Figure 1 shows the 1986 and 1987 command sergeant major/sergeant major (CSM/SGM) selection board results by Military Intelligence (MI) career management fields (CMF) and for the totals considered.

Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) convenes boards to consider noncommissioned officers for promotion to sergeant first class (SFC), master sergeant (MSG) and SGM; attendance at the Sergeants Major Academy (SMA) and for CSM selection. Boards meet at the U.S. Army Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind. A unique feature of the CSM/SGM board is the large number of major command CSMs who are members. Others on the board are senior officers and CSMs from other Army commands worldwide. Figure 2 shows board structure and composition.

## Panel Composition and Standards

The board members form 10 panels of three to eight persons each. Panels consider eligible soldiers based on their CMF and military occupational specialty (MOS). The size of a panel de-

pends on the number of files in the zones of consideration. The 1987 Infantry/Special Operations panel, for example, was the largest with eight members headed by a brigadier general. Two officers and two CSMs, one each from MI and Military Police (MP), constituted the MI/MP panel responsible for selections in CMFs 33, 96, 98 and 95.

The board works under guidelines provided by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQDA in a Letter of Instruction (LOI). The LOI provides key information concerning the selection process, the maximum number in each CMF to be selected and other guidance and administrative data. It also establishes the primary and secondary promotion zones and sets secondary zone guidelines. The LOI is published with the list when it is released and is available to soldiers in the field through their Personnel Service Centers.

Board members work under oath. They are charged with considering soldiers for selection without prejudice or partiality. Members are sworn to maintain the confidentiality of the board results until the list is released and may not, even after release, divulge details pertaining to individuals. Board members are also sworn not to discuss the details of internal board deliberations.

The panel initially examines the LOI to ensure that everyone understands the guidance, requirements and points of emphasis. Each panel develops a grading matrix based on the six-plus point system (figure 3). One voting member can assign a maximum score of 18 points; one point is the minimum. The grading system is applied to each

file separately. The results are compiled into an order of merit list (OML) in numerical order with the highest scoring individual first and lowest scoring individual last.

The panel chief briefs the board president to ensure standards are fair, compatible with the LOI and consistent in all panels. The matrix developed by each panel is an internal board matter and as such is not releasable. Considerations generally include manner of performance, potential, weight and physical fitness, education and disciplinary record.

To meet objectives, the panel will reconsider several files to clarify the qualified cutoff score. Files with the same score, as well as some files below that score, are voted on a second time and the OML is revised to reflect the new scores. One or more individuals below the "best qualified" line may be identified as alternates.

## File Processing

The board members read all documents and fiche entries carefully. Favorable and derogatory information is noted on the personnel data sheet so that each panel member may assess it.

The board's charter also includes screening soldiers for the Qualitative Management Program (QMP). Files are automatically screened as voting for selection proceeds. All files identified for QMP are considered by separate panels after the promotion deliberations are finished. Panel members vote only yes or no. All must vote yes for the individual to receive a DA-imposed bar to reenlistment. The board president approves final recommendations con-



## 1986/1987 CSM/SGM SELECTION STATISTICS

<u>SGM</u>	CMF 33	CMF 96	CMF 98	ARMY TOTALS
<u>PREVIOUS CONSIDERATION</u>				
NUMBER IN ZONE	0/0	29/36	5/6	1435/1513
NUMBER SELECTED	0/0	0/3	1/1	196/162
PERCENTAGE SELECTED	0/0	0/8.3	20/16.7	13.7/10.7
<u>FIRST CONSIDERATION</u>				
NUMBER IN ZONE	0/3	25/39	4/23	1127/2032
NUMBER SELECTED	0/3	1/8	1/4	290/484
PERCENTAGE SELECTED	0/100	4/20.5	25/17.4	25.7/23.8
<u>SECONDARY ZONE</u>				
NUMBER IN ZONE	7/15	57/68	46/58	2844/2514
NUMBER SELECTED	3/4	6/4	18/6	232/173
PERCENTAGE SELECTED	42.9/26.7	10.5/5.9	39.1/10.3	8.2/6.9
<u>TOTALS</u>				
NUMBER IN ZONE	7/18	111/143	55/87	5406/6059
NUMBER SELECTED	3/7	7/15	20/11	716/819
PERCENTAGE SELECTED	42.9/38.9	6.3/10.5	36.4/12.6	13.3/13.5
<u>CSM</u>				
NUMBER IN ZONE				5135/5319
NUMBER SELECTED				232/231
PERCENTAGE SELECTED				4.5/4.3

FIGURE 1

cerning QMP. Continuing substandard performance or problems involving a lack of integrity or morality are causes for nonselection and could result in referral for QMP.

An Article 15 received by a junior soldier, followed by an excellent record, is not a detriment to selection. AR 27-10, *Military Justice*, outlines the procedures for staff sergeants and above to appeal to have an Article 15 removed from their performance fiche.

### Record Enhancement


With relatively low selection rates,

seemingly small discriminators often determine selection. Soldiers and supervisors can take precautionary steps to make files more competitive. Conversely, some senior NCOs and supervisors virtually ensure nonselection through inaction or inattention. Your official photo creates the first impression. Photos in some cases are outdated, while others are of poor quality. Some soldiers' uniforms fit poorly or are wrinkled, awards are lacking and haircuts and mustaches are not within established standards.

The soldier must ensure that all infor-

mation on the Personnel Qualification Record (PQR) is current and accurate. Current height and weight from a current physical examination (as specified in regulations) should be entered. Height entered on the enlisted evaluation report (EER) should reflect that taken from the physical examination. It was incredible to note that some soldiers grew several inches over a period of years. At the same time, their weight increased and exceeded the weight standard for the previously listed height. When questions arise concerning height and weight, the board can request the

## BOARD ORGANIZATION



**BOARD PROFILE:** 51 members

Major general (president), 2 brigadier generals  
 3 colonels, 11 lieutenant colonels  
 20 command sergeants major

FIGURE 2

## VOTE SCORE CONVERSION CHART

RAW SCORE	DESCRIPTION	ABSOLUTE VALUE
6+	DEFINITE SELECT	18
5		14
4		11
3	FULLY QUALIFIED - PROMOTE	7
2	IF THERE IS ROOM	
1	DO NOT PROMOTE	5
1-	SUBSTANDARD - CONSIDER FOR QMP	2
		1

FIGURE 3

soldier's command to conduct a spot check for verification. Soldiers who are over the screen weight or look overweight are subjected to close scrutiny. Physical fitness test failure also has a very negative effect on the board.

Other questions address incorrect or incomplete military or civilian education, incomplete or erroneous assignment data, absence of award data and an incorrect physical profile. Take the opportunity to review your PQR — failure to do so connotes a lack of interest.

Letters bring relevant matters to the attention of the board president. Letters should be used only when significant information is not available otherwise. A useful letter might provide documentation on recently completed college courses.

It is absolutely imperative to have a good, consistent record of performance at a variety of jobs that show the ability to handle positions of increasing responsibility. A major factor in selection for SGM, and probably the primary factor for CSM, is a strong leadership background. Holding the position of first sergeant is the best way to acquire this experience, but other positions, such as senior operations sergeant or detachment sergeant, are comparable. Because most highly qualified MSGs have first sergeant experience, those without this experience have a difficult

obstacle to overcome. Some soldiers make a conscious effort to seek out leadership positions that, in some intelligence fields, are difficult to obtain. Senior soldiers without prior leadership jobs may be reluctant to take a chance.

Most soldiers should be able to advance beyond a high school diploma over the course of 15 or so years. The Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) is important, and its lack is a definite negative factor. Attendance at senior NCO courses should be sought and the course completed. Don't decline attendance and *don't fail to complete the course*. Equal weight is given to both resident and nonresident attendance for SMA.

### Supervisor Support

Those who supervise senior NCOs in zone for a board must take the time to submit a "complete the record EER" if appropriate. This is particularly crucial for soldiers serving for the first time as first sergeants. This gap, sometimes for a year of service, could unfortunately be the discriminator between selection and nonselection.

Most raters and indorsers give NCOs the maximum possible score on EERs. Therefore the substance of the EER, not the score, becomes the discriminator. The narrative description of the duty position should describe the sol-

dier's actual responsibilities. Rater and indorser evaluations should emphasize how the soldier accomplished those duties.

Finally, each supervisor who signs an EER has a responsibility for its accuracy and completeness. Obvious unresolved contradictions or failure to address problems that are a matter of record are noticed and reflect on all who sign the report. Many different factors go into successful competition for the limited CSM or SGM slots available. There is no way to guarantee selection, but there are many things that soldiers and supervisors can do to improve the process. Let's make the system work to the best advantage of both individuals and the Army. ★

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*Lt. Col. Patricia H. Jernigan was a member of the MI/MP panel on the 1987 CSM/SGM board. She has served with the 525th Military Intelligence Group in Vietnam; HQ USAREUR, 66th MI Group and USEUCOM, Europe and USAINTA, DIA and the Armed Forces Inaugural Committee. She is currently assigned to the USAIGA as an Inspector General. She received a bachelor's degree from Mary Washington College and a master's degree from the Univ. of Southern California. Jernigan is a graduate of the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.*

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### feedback . . . (Continued from page 5)

systems and have worked on the research and development of these systems for the past five years, here and in a previous assignment at NSA.)

DeWitt is quite correct regarding the requirement for lightweight intercept and direction-finding (DF) systems to lessen the load of the Special Forces (SF) SIGINT team member. There is not, however, a system to be fielded in 1988 that weighs 25 pounds. The lightweight Man-Portable Radio DF System (LMRDFS), designed to provide improved intercept and DF capabilities for SF and light infantry SIGINT teams, will not be fielded until sometime in 1990. LMRDFS will weigh approximately 45-55 pounds, in comparison with the current AN/PRD-10, which weighs approximately 65 pounds. The Objective MRDFS, further reduced in weight and with more advanced intercept and DF capability, will probably not be fielded until the mid-1990s.

DeWitt's comments regarding HF capabilities are very puzzling. Repeated discussions over the last five years with SF

Team Alpha personnel, 1st SOCOM force modernization officers and combat developers have always concluded with specific requirements for HF capabilities in the portable systems, not via relay from the SF operating base. Packing HF capabilities into systems small enough for SF teams to practically employ has been one of the most formidable engineering obstacles in the development of these systems. By current requirements' documents and based on input from the using units, HF is a required capability in man-portable COMINT systems.

Finally, I have never heard any SF SIGINT personnel discuss active jamming as one of their roles in denied areas. Carrying jamming equipment with enough power to prove effective would burden an already overloaded Team Alpha soldier. Turning on a jammer, even via remote control, advertises a team's presence in areas where the last thing the SF needs is attention. Knowing that SF forces are on foot, enemy rear security teams can narrow their areas of search and concentrate

their forces in a reasonable radius around the jammer. The possible benefit of a few low-powered jammers, except in some specific scenarios, does not justify the possible cost of losing part or all of a team.

DeWitt is correct in much of his article, in that SF IEW operations are still in a doctrinal void. There are many opportunities but many problems remain to be solved if we are to provide required MI support for special operations.

**Capt. Hugh Blanchard**  
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School  
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

### Dear Editor:

I agree with most of the points that Capt. Dewitt brought out in his article, "Special Forces Signals Intelligence," June 1987. However, I strongly disagree with his comment that most potential Team Alpha



personnel are oriented towards a field station environment and therefore, lack the requisite physical capabilities to perform in the Special Forces. Present Team Alpha members may fit that description, but his statement is not indicative of the tactical emphasis which has been placed on the SIGINT community for at least the past 10 years. The Special Forces should have no problems attracting quality personnel providing the selection was made from volunteers who meet rigorous screening prerequisites and have previous SIGINT experience. As an incentive, they should be afforded the opportunity to receive extensive training in the necessary combat skills.

**SSgt. Michael A. Younger**  
Co. B, 3/112th MI Bde  
Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas

#### Dear Editor:

Capt. Nathan E. McCauley's article in *Military Intelligence*, October 1987, entitled, "The Military Intelligence Profession in the U.S. Army," provided an interesting and informative perspective on military intelligence. Of special concern to me was the concept of "intelligence failure" and its application to the TET offensive of 1968. The author indicated, "The TET offensive is a prime example of the failure of intelligence to predict enemy capabilities and intentions." I submit that the 1968 TET offensive in South Vietnam was many things. A failure of intelligence it was not.

President Lyndon Johnson indicated in his book, *The Vantage Point*, that through the fall of 1967: "We were also watching a mammoth build-up of enemy troops and supplies. Our intelligence apparatus informed us conclusively that the communists were preparing for an all-out assault." This attack was designed, Johnson indicates, "so that a massive military offensive, whether or not it achieved its other goals immediately, would undermine American morale and increase the clamor for U.S. withdrawal."

Both Johnson and Don Oberdorfer, in his book *TET*, describe how Johnson, on December 21, told a closed meeting of the Australian Cabinet at Canberra of the expected "kamikaze" attacks in South Vietnam.

Further information is provided by Gen. William Westmoreland. In *A Soldier Reports*, he indicates that his J2, Brig. Gen. Davidson, briefed him on January 13, 1968, that a major enemy offensive was in the works. The only disagreement was over when. Westmoreland believed the attacks would be launched before TET, Davidson thought after TET.

Finally, Westmoreland discussed the so-

called intelligence failure. "We thus knew that a major enemy offensive was coming. General Davidson was within a week of the opening date, probably closer than an intelligence specialist can normally expect to be. Davidson's identification and locations of all major enemy units were correct; no previously unidentified unit showed up, so in that respect, the case was unlike the intelligence failure in the Battle of the Buige in World War II or intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea in 1950." (emphasis added)

The commander-in-chief's and the MACV commander's comments speak for themselves. Our role as intelligence personnel should be to reduce, to the extent possible, the uncertainty our commanders must face. We are intelligence professionals; that does not make us omniscient.

In conclusion, the coordinating draft of FM 100-6, *Large Unit Operations*, September 30, 1987, offers some final insight on this issue to young military intelligence soldiers who have never participated in actual, continuous combat operations. "No analytical method or formal mechanism can eliminate the problems of uncertainty, scope and security affecting intelligence at the operational level of war. Like all intelligence, the products of intelligence at this level are imperfect guides to action and, therefore, require the commander to take risks. Those risks, however, can be mitigated by ensuring that facts are clearly distinguished from assumptions and estimates and by ensuring that estimates are not constrained by preconceived expectations or preferences."

**William S. Wojsko**  
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School  
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

#### Dear Editor:

An article in the October 1987 issue of *Military Intelligence* contained some generalized statements, inferring factual basis, that require comment. I am referring to the article entitled "The Military Intelligence Profession in the U.S. Army" by Capt. Nathan E. McCauley.

In his article, McCauley leaves a very negative impression, possibly unintentional, of the officers and soldiers that served in the U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA). In presenting a historical outline tracing the roots of the MI branch, there was really no need to include innuendoes concerning the professionalism of this organization, based on an obvious bias against what is apparently unknown to the author. While his bias is shown in each reference to the USASA, let me comment on a couple of statements.

On page 37, in the paragraph that begins with: "The ASA is a good exam-

ple . . .," McCauley states with confidence and without any qualifiers, that ASA "was not responsive to tactical commanders." Did the author interview every tactical commander that served in Vietnam? Did he research the product and effectiveness of the direct support units that served with the tactical line units? Did he read transcripts of intelligence updates provided to the S2s? I can only comment on my personal experience in reference to his statement, and I know that the units I served in were responsive. For the sake of argument let's assume that my experience is unique for the Vietnam War. His statement is still false.

In the same paragraph, another sweeping generality is made based on the author's interview with Maj. Gen. Edward B. Atkeson. I cannot believe that this general officer stated or inferred that all ASA units in Vietnam "were slow in answering tactical queries." Again, I can only respond based on personal experience which renders this statement a falsehood as well. It is interesting to note that in his next sentence he states that "in some cases" information was passed (notice the definite absence of any indication of timeliness or accuracy), but "only to the tactical unit commanders," and not to their intelligence sections. I believe that our mission was to support the tactical commander, not his "intelligence section" — and in some cases we were his intelligence section.

In the subsequent paragraph, McCauley cites the advance warning given for the Tet Offensive, to include the date of the attack, as an example of a "failure of intelligence to predict enemy capabilities and intentions." Which Tet Offensive? What Corps area? Did the author read the actual SIGINT product that contained the warning? Did he review transcripts of the briefings? Should it be considered a "failure," because the "suicidal intentions of the Viet Cong" weren't a part of the warning? Give me a break.

The last statement that I would like to comment on is the lead sentence to the second paragraph of his section entitled "Evolution." The inference that I felt from his words was that ASA was not considered by him to be part of the Army. Every day I drive past a monument at Arlington Hall Station that was erected to remind us of the supreme sacrifice paid by U.S. Army Security Agency soldiers. These professionals died wearing the Army green and were as much an integral part of the Army as any other soldier. They considered their jobs to be just as important and vital to the overall effort, while recognizing that their actual duties and the excellence with which they did their jobs would never be granted the visibility and glory of the combat units of McCauley's real Army. I know—I served with the last two soldiers

listed on this monument, and I take offense at the inference of McCauley's statement.

It is a shame that statements such as these are given the circulation that they get through a publication such as **Military Intelligence**. I for one am tired of them. The USASA is part of our heritage as military intelligence professionals. It's time for these broad statements concerning the performance of the USASA to be challenged as to their authenticity and, where authentic, have specifics cited to allow the reader to form his own opinion.

**MSgt. G. D. Whitman**  
Arlington Hall Station  
Arlington, Va.

## MI Officer Occupational Survey

In the early Spring of 1988, a survey will be fielded to identify and validate critical tasks for the 35 branch.

The survey initiative, begun in 1987, represents the first comprehensive analysis for MI Officer Areas of Concentration since 1981. Complete task lists were developed from the data in the Intelligence Center and School files. These lists were sent to the Soldier Support Center to be developed into a field survey. Every commander and supervisor of MI officers should ensure that adequate time and attention are given to this effort. The survey will result in the selection and refinement of critical MI officer tasks by the officers in the field who must perform those tasks. The survey will also result in decisions on whether these tasks should be trained in the basic or advanced courses, in special courses or as part of unit training. This last element will be especially important to field unit commanders, since it offers them an opportunity to determine what can and should be taught in their units.

## Writer's Award Nominee

In accordance with the guidelines for the **Military Intelligence** annual Writer's Award Program published in the January-March 1986 issue, the professional bulletin's editorial staff is pleased to announce that Maj. Arthur T. Coumbe's article, "German Intelligence and Security in the Franco-German War," will be the nominee for the fourth quarter, 1987. The at-large nominee for 1987 is SFC Milton Nodacker's article, "Intelligence and Deception Factors in the Battles of El Alamein." The winner of the 1987 Writer's Award will be announced in the April 1988 issue.

## Intelligence Museum Foundation

During the activation ceremonies for the Military Intelligence Corps, the idea for creation of an Intelligence Museum was rekindled. Enthusiasm for such a venture was spontaneous and from it the Intelligence Museum Foundation emerged.

The Intelligence Museum Foundation is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to the creation and support of an Intelligence Museum. The purpose of the museum is to:

- Establish a memorial to honor the men and women who have served the Military Intelligence Corps.
- Create and support a public museum at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., to collect, preserve

and display items of historical interest pertaining to the Military Intelligence Corps.

- Acquire and preserve the records of individuals and units.
- Provide facilities for scholars, researchers, historians and students at the Intelligence Center and School.

The plans for the museum are being carefully worked out to ensure that when sufficient funds become available, the best possible facility will be constructed. In the meantime, various displays will be located in our modern academic complex at the Intelligence Center and School. Initially, a curator will be hired to catalogue and care for collected artifacts. As the museum grows, the staff will be expanded to meet our

needs.

The charter of the Museum Foundation is primarily to develop a fiscal base for the construction of the museum itself. Construction is dependent upon our ability to raise the necessary funds. Current Museum Foundation membership includes a small nucleus of active and retired military and civilians interested in the preservation of the history of our corps. However, we need a combined effort by all of the military and civilian professionals of the Military Intelligence Corps.

To obtain more information, or to volunteer your assistance, please contact the Intelligence Museum Foundation, Box 595, Sierra Vista, Ariz., 85636.

# USAICS Notes

## Field Manuals

USAICS continues to receive numerous requests for field manuals (FM) from units in the field. Many of these requests are for Department of the Army authenticated manuals which are provided through the Standard Army Publication System (STARPUBS), or as it is commonly called — pinpoint distribution. Almost always, the unit's reason for requesting the manual from the school is that the pinpoint system does not work. However, manuals used by the school are obtained through this system. In essence, pinpoint distribution works for the school because we make it work. Commanders must make the pinpoint system work for their units. They must take a personal interest in ensuring that their units receive the doctrine needed to function and do it with the same enthusiasm as when they requisition equipment, personnel and other materials needed to execute their mission. The last check of account managers at AG Baltimore revealed 495 active accounts. Only 85 units had completed a DA Form 12-11C-R, Requirements for Classified Army Doctrinal and training Publications and DA Form 11-12-R, Request for Establishment of a Publications Account, Section II — Account Classification Level, to establish requirements for a classified DA publication. Units that have not submitted these forms will not receive classified field manuals and technical circulars when they are published.

You will not receive numerous other technical circulars and field manuals unless you are on pinpoint distribution.

## A New Approach to Training Delivery

by Larry H. Hodge

In the sterile atmosphere of the classroom, military intelligence (MI) functions can acquire a mundane repetitiveness. These functions are shrouded in paperwork imperatives that often become the master of critical tasks, rather than their illuminators. Given

this environment, intelligence analysts often reach the field with a minimum of tactical awareness. The essence of their mission, their time constraints and the perishability of associated tactical information are not fully appreciated.

The situation can be corrected through an instructor's intensive effort to identify critical tasks whose rapid completion will result in mission accomplishment; the inverse is implied, but its ramifications must be stressed. Practical exercises, using state-of-the-art delivery means, can illuminate critical tasks while quantifying student capabilities. These exercises stimulate long-term retention of methods which will result in enhanced intelligence applications.

Training enhancement is not easily accomplished. Rather, it is a demanding task master. The use of state-of-the-art delivery means is not a panacea for mundane, classroom presentations. Instead, new delivery means are capable of presenting eye-catching and memory-influencing keys to aid student subject matter retention. Given valid training objectives, the new training methods will produce informed students with high levels of motivation.

The new training technology is computer based instruction (CBI). CBI is divided into two types: computer aided instruction (CAI) and interactive video-disc (IVD). CAI presents computer generated text, graphics and animation on a monitor. This process can be used as a one-on-one student learning aid or as a self-contained, learning aid system. IVD employs all of the capabilities included in CAI. In addition, IVD incorporates video and audio storage. All IVD media capabilities are contained in a laser disk and associated computer program diskettes.

The new U.S. Army IVD system is called the Electronic Information Delivery System (EIDS). EIDS is a hardware package developed by the Canadian firm Matrox. EIDS is MS-DOS compatible and is capable of accepting such authoring languages as Basic, Pascal, Fortran, ADA and C. Access to EIDS screens occurs within two seconds of the command input. Screens accept graphic overlays of video, animation and quadrant split-screen

imaging.

The use of EIDS as a lesson delivery system can be a dynamic shot in the arm to instructors pressed for time and students that need repetitive help or remedial effort. Instructors can assign particular tasks to specific students that address individual needs. EIDS lessons can present simulations and tutorials that use realistic practical exercises. These incorporate time constraints and replicate battlefield urgency.

Intelligence lessons delivered on EIDS provide every student equal access to all aspects of every module. No student will receive less data than his counterparts. This constant aspect of a stable instruction base ensures that no single recipient is dependent on the instructor's absolute recall capabilities.

If EIDS training programs are to succeed in providing MI students with the tools needed to attain operational proficiency, instructors must actively seek to ensure that CBI lessons reflect doctrine and its practical application to real-world situations. The instructor must provide CBI lesson developers the support and background materials necessary to create dynamic training.

EIDS can dramatically alter the classroom environment. Students will leave the Intelligence Center and School with a more valid understanding of field requirements. Moreover, since EIDS and CBI programs will be distributed throughout the Visual Information Division (previously known as TASC) system, soldiers will have access to training materials for refresher training. Access to Intelligence Center and School training materials will allow training officers to monitor soldier efforts rather than create individual lessons on a random basis.

If the new training technology is pursued in earnest, its value will rapidly become apparent. The multi-media core to IVD productions can be employed as a major enhancement for most classroom scenarios. Dedicated effort by instructors and CBI developers will result in more thoroughly trained and adequately prepared soldiers. The professional delivery of tasks will culminate in intelligence products that immeasurably increase commanders' abilities to succeed in the AirLand Battle.



# Tactical Counterintelligence

by John A. Dalton

Tactical counterintelligence is a doubly misleading term. To clear up the inherent confusion, we first need to contrast the historical definition of counterintelligence (CI) with its current definition. Secondly, we need to address the issue of tactical counterintelligence.

Historically, the Army, military intelligence and CI associated the term CI exclusively with countering the hostile human intelligence (HUMINT) collection effort.

Currently, we think of CI in a broader sense, and we do this because we think of the hostile intelligence collection threat in broader terms. We now define the hostile intelligence collection threat as a *multidisciplined intelligence collection threat*, because it is categorized into the imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT) and HUMINT disciplines. Each works independently to acquire intelligence within its discipline and collectively to produce an integrated intelligence picture that is complete, accurate, timely and useful to the enemy decision makers.

Based on this concept, the term CI must be expanded from its historical definition to one designed to encompass the threat under all circumstances. The mission of the newly defined CI is two-fold: Identify, assess and monitor the collection threat, and degrade the threat's ability to perform its mission. Ideally, we'd like the enemy to act or react in ways that are advantageous to us. This challenging, dual-faceted mission can only be achieved when we become active participants.

This extensive definition of CI encompasses all types of activities ranging from general security practices, including daily operations security (OPSEC) measures by Army and civilian personnel, to functions performed by specially trained intelligence personnel. This special training is designed to counter each of the collection disciplines on an individual and collective basis.

These disciplines are:

- **Counter-SIGINT.** These activities are performed by personnel trained in military occupational specialty

(MOS) 97G. Currently, there is no officer specialty in this area. Therefore, counter-SIGINT personnel are presently supervised by officers in the counter-HUMINT specialty (35E).

- **Counter-IMINT.** This activity currently has no designated specialty. Personnel trained in the IMINT discipline (35C, 962A and 96D) are sufficiently skilled to successfully assist with countering this threat, until a decision is reached as to the need to designate such a specialty.

- **Counter-HUMINT.** These activities are performed by personnel trained in MOSs 35E, 971A and 97B20/50. To assist the fully accredited CI agents, MOS 97B10 (CI assistant) has been established. While these assistants are not agents until they complete a transition course, they are fully capable of assisting agents in the execution of OPSEC, security support missions and other selected areas.

The efforts of the specialists are integrated with those of the all-source intelligence officer (35D), order of battle technician (964A), and intelligence analyst (96B), thereby building an effective team that can counter the threat.

The CI staff's mission at corps and division level is accomplished by the CI Analysis Section (CIAS), under the supervision of the G2, and the Operations Security Support Element (OSE), under the supervision of the G3. Both entities are staffed by personnel skilled in counter-SIGINT, counter-HUMINT, IMINT and intelligence analysis. The mission of each entity follows:

- **CIAS:** Identify, assess and monitor the collection threat. The section develops, revises and maintains a composite picture of the enemy's intelligence collection capabilities and its capabilities in the area of sabotage, subversion, terrorism, paramilitary and conventional military operations. It provides the results of its efforts to the OSE and other sections as directed by the G2.

- **OSE:** Degrade the ability of the threat to perform its mission. It develops, revises and maintains the command's vulnerability profile. Using this profile and the results of the CIAS efforts, it develops and recommends the command's OPSEC program, as well as other effective countermeasures.

The development of deception operations becomes the responsibility of the deception cell, a team of personnel

specially trained in deception with a background in intelligence and combat operations. This cell functions under the supervision of the G3.

Tactical counterintelligence is only applicable when used in the context of the expanded, generalized definition of CI. Unfortunately, the term is also used in counter-HUMINT. One cannot legitimately use the terms "tactical CI" or "tactical counter-HUMINT." AR 381-20, *Counterintelligence Operations*, the governing regulation for the conduct of counter-HUMINT activities, does not distinguish between the conduct of these activities at the tactical and strategic levels. It establishes the policies and procedures to perform the counter-HUMINT mission. The Intelligence Center and School trains CI students to perform the mission as identified by this regulation.

Some duties are more readily performed in tactical units. Others are more often performed in non-tactical environments, while some are performed at all echelons. The accompanying chart offers a breakdown of duties and levels.

## TACTICAL UNITS

- Preliminary screening and interrogation of prisoners of war, refugees and line crossers.

- Detection, development assessment and countering or neutralization of sabotage, subversion, paramilitary and conventional military operations in the command's area of operations.

## NON-TACTICAL UNITS

- Personnel security investigations.

- Espionage investigations.

## ALL ECHELONS:

- SAEDA.

- Terrorism and HOIS threat briefings.

There is an erroneous perception that CI is synonymous with OPSEC. This perception also stems from the misunderstanding of the term in its historic sense versus its current definition. CI uses OPSEC as a procedure to degrade or neutralize the ability of the multidisciplinary threat to perform its mission. This is fundamentally everyone's responsibility. It is discouraged, therefore, to request counter-HUMINT support to check a unit's light or noise discipline. This command problem must be addressed with unit training and command emphasis at all levels. Using specially trained personnel from any of the countering disciplines to per-

form such checks prevents them from accomplishing their primary task.

In summary, counterintelligence may be conceptualized as a multidisciplinary effort composed of counter-SIGINT, counter-IMINT and counter-HUMINT, working as a team to counter the multi-

disciplined intelligence collection threat. Usage of the term counter-HUMINT, as opposed to CI, is preferable. Counter-HUMINT should be conceived of as an integrated discipline, as opposed to tactical counter-HUMINT or strategic counter-HUMINT. And fi-

nally, counter-HUMINT is not synonymous with OPSEC. A universal understanding of the terms will ultimately result in correct application of the intended concepts by all units concerned. The end result will be effective and integrated mission accomplishment.

# Language Notes

## Foreign Language Proficiency Pay

by Capt. Celeste Gerlach

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) has authorized foreign language proficiency pay (FLPP) for both the active and reserve components. FLPP was effective on April 15, 1987, and all payments to qualified soldiers will be retroactive to the date specified in their initial award orders. Entitlement continues through the termination orders. Orders are required for the initial award of FLPP, changes in the level awarded, termination or reinstatement. Qualified soldiers will receive FLPP in addition to any other pay and allowances to which they are entitled, but the maximum monthly amount may not exceed \$100.00. Soldiers can qualify for FLPP in more than one language.

The FLPP level awarded will be determined by the difficulty category assigned to the target language and the soldier's lowest proficiency rating in listening, reading and speaking. To qualify, active component soldiers must possess skills in at least one critical foreign language, hold a military occupational specialty (MOS) authorized to receive FLPP, meet any assignment criteria established for their specialty and certify at least minimum proficiency in their target languages.

The difficulty categories are:

- Category I: Afrikaans; Danish; French; Haitian Creole; Italian; Norwegian; Portuguese; Spanish-American; Spanish-Caribbean; Spanish-Castilian; Swahili; Swedish.

- Category II: German; Hindi; Indonesian; Malayan; Romanian; Urdu.

- Category III: Albanian; Amharic; Bengali; Bulgarian; Cambodian; Czech; Finnish; Greek; Hebrew; Hungarian;

Laotian; Persian-Farsi; Polish; Pushto; Russian; Serbo-Croatian; Tagalog; Thai; Turkish; Vietnamese.

- Category IV: Japanese; Korean; Arabic - all dialects; Chinese-Cantonese; Chinese-Mandarin.

Commissioned officers must hold either a 48 (military attache) or 18 (special operations) functional area (FA) or branch code. Warrant officers must hold an MOS of 180A (special operations), 961A (attache), 971A (counterintelligence), 972A (area intelligence), 973A (interrogator), 982A (traffic analysis) or 988A (voice intercept). Enlisted personnel must hold a primary MOS in career management field (CMF) 18 (special operations), 96 (military intelligence) or 98 (electronic warfare/cryptologic operations).

Commissioned officers must be assigned to, or performing duties in, positions that require proficiency in a critical foreign language. Warrant officers holding MOSs 961A, 971A or 972A must be assigned to an authorized position that requires proficiency in a critical foreign language. Warrant officers holding MOSs 180A, 973A, 982A or 988A are eligible for FLPP regardless of their assignment. All enlisted personnel in CMF 18 or holding MOS 97E (interrogator), 98C (traffic analyst) or 98G (voice interceptor) are eligible for FLPP regardless of their assignment. All other enlisted personnel holding a primary MOS in CMF 96 or 98 must be assigned to an authorized position that requires proficiency in a critical foreign language.

Eligible active component personnel must certify their proficiency with a valid DA Form 330 with a recorded DLPT that is less than one year old. The scores may be from a DLPT version I, II or III. The recorded proficiency ratings must meet or exceed the minimum established for the award of the FLPP in the target language.

All three rating areas do not apply to all languages. Haitian Creole, Hindi

and Amharic are tested with only the Defense Language Reading Proficiency Test. Therefore, only the reading proficiency rating will be used to determine FLPP awards in these languages. Since only the telephonic verbal proficiency test is used for Afrikaans, Malayan, Urdu, Bengali and Pushto, only the speaking proficiency rating is used to determine FLPP awards in these languages. The telephonic proficiency test will also be used to determine a proficiency level greater than 3 for soldiers trained in a difficulty category I language.

FLPP awards in languages lacking a DLPT II version will be based on only the reading and listening proficiency ratings. Some languages have only a DLPT II version available. Until April 14, 1988, FLPP awards in these languages will be based on only the listening and reading proficiency ratings. Thereafter, FLPP awards in Russian, Korean, Spanish, Serbo-Croatian, German and Polish will be determined by test results from the DLPT III.

Beginning April 15, 1988, a proficiency rating in speaking is required for award of FLPP. This requirement applies in only those languages having a DLPT III version available and to all commissioned officers, warrant officers in MOSs 180A, 961A, 971A, 972A and 973A and all enlisted personnel with a primary MOS in CMFs 18 or 96. Speaking proficiency is not required for enlisted personnel in CMF 98 or for warrant officers in MOS 982A and 988A. FLPP awards to these personnel will be based on reading and listening proficiency ratings.

The FLPP program has great potential to aid the retention of critical linguistic skills in the MI community. It is also a complex administrative effort to ensure that processing of soldiers' orders takes place. Any questions can be addressed to Capt. Gerlach, Foreign Language Office, avovon 821-3012/3435.

# Language Training in SIGINT Units

by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Carl C. Isakson

Readiness is the name of the game in the Army, and for the lack of it, we face failure or death. The Army spends large amounts of money on readiness training each year, but I'm not at all sure that we're using our language training dollars in the best possible way, particularly when it comes to military occupational specialty (MOS) 98G, Electronic Warfare/Signals Intelligence Voice Interceptor.

The primary job of a 98G is to intercept and interpret enemy voice communications. This is done in tactical units, such as divisions, and also in strategic units serving national interests. The Army's population of 98Gs generally rotate between tactical and strategic assignments.

## What Do Commanders Expect?

Division commanders see their voice interceptors as a valuable asset with the potential to affect battle by advising the commander on enemy communications. Commanders levy requirements for intelligence and expect the best performance from each source of combat information. The 98G's job is to answer the commander's questions and provide all the information available.

## The Paragon

Training 98Gs is a difficult task. We expect our voice interceptors to be proficient but have no way to test that proficiency. While most Army tasks can be broken into clearly defined subtasks, foreign language tasks do not break out quite so conveniently. Language is free-flowing. You cannot predict the outcome of spontaneous dialogue. This unpredictability makes it difficult to define a 98G's job. At best, job descriptions of language tasks tend to be general. There are many things that cannot be controlled as the interceptor does his job. Rate of speech, dialect, static, cover terms, unknown vocabulary and unknown context are but a few of the things that can prevent a 98G from reporting what he actually hears. Even though these factors lie beyond the voice interceptor's control, he should not

be detracted from preparing for at least some of them.

Language training can be compared to physical training. You get out of shape if you don't practice regularly. Physical fitness is measured with the Army Physical Readiness Test. Language fitness is measured with the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) and the Integrated Test/Evaluation Program (ITEP). While the Defense Department has made notable advances with the DLPT, it is only a partial indicator of how well a 98G will perform his job. Occasionally, soldiers with low scores are very good, but those with high DLPT scores are seldom poor at their voice intercept tasks. The key word is *motivation*. Obviously, we should train our soldiers for high DLPT scores and motivate them to be good 98Gs.

The exceptional 98G would have the socio-linguistic awareness of a native speaker. He would be able to correctly reconstruct missing portions of spoken and written exchanges with the intuition of a native. He would understand humor, cultural overtones, innuendos, idioms and all vocabularies and grammar, in all contexts, regardless of obscurity. However, he would have one quality that native speakers of a foreign language seldom have. He would be a native English speaker and be able to translate anything from the foreign language into English with the same content, spirit and intent.

## Master Linguist Fitness Program

I want to convince you that the method we use to measure 98G language ability might give us a questionable reading. But, the problem can be fixed.

If the soldier listening to the enemy could not name the items common in his own life, would that shake your confidence in his ability to tell you what the other side is saying? It would shake mine. But if he could conduct daily operations in his target language and it was just like his "target" would do it, would that not bolster your faith? I recommend that you take a look at your soldier's DLPT scores and then find out exactly what those scores mean. Detailed descriptions are available in regulations governing Army linguists. See if your soldiers can do what the description says.

If we want to have a linguist master on our combat team we must train for

that. Time on task has no substitute. The natural way to learn language is a process of exposure. The process gives the linguist a huge data bank and the ability to recall it. It is not a part-time process.

The Army has a talent resource that we are not wisely using. There are a few exceptionally motivated linguists among us whose performance is truly inspired. Unfortunately, because of misplaced priorities, we sometimes under-utilize these people. As they gain experience and greater knowledge, we promote them to positions where we cannot benefit from their special talents. We no longer involve them in the task we need them to do. The MOS producing schools meet the minimum requirements to produce a 98G with a year or less in language school and a few months of specialized training beyond that. This is not enough.

## Think Low, Think High

There is no requirement to take the standard Army posture as we seek a solution. We do not need a 10-year study done by some disinterested firm. Many soldiers know what must be done; they are the biggest asset and the biggest knowledge base.

Solving the problem is a matter of useful, realistic, long-term unit training. Because soldiers move from assignment to assignment, there must be a program common to all concerned units. The common program approach makes it easy to continue where you left off if you are reassigned. Language programs should be sponsored by a proponent unit. Proponency for a language should be the responsibility of the unit possessing the greatest number of 98Gs in that language who are working a real-world language mission. Staffing of 98Gs in proponent units should be increased to offset the workload. The proponent should work closely with other units having 98Gs to develop programs appropriate to meet the commander's requirements. An appropriate level of command should act as coordinator. Combat commanders should provide much increased training time. Training should be continuous, vigorous, broad in scope and absolutely relevant to wartime tasks.

The results of such a program would be far-reaching. We would retain more soldiers and would therefore need to



train fewer new ones. We could apply increased skills to the production of much needed intelligence related data. Our commanders would have their combat multiplier.

We have the talent and the resources at hand, and the expenses are low. The benefit is **readiness**.

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*Chief Warrant Officer 2 Carl C. Isakson is currently a student at the Warrant Officer Advanced Course at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. His last unit of assignment, which culminated 16 years of service, was the 3d MI Battalion (GUARDRAIL). Upon graduation from the course, he will be assigned to U.S. Army Field Station, Korea.*

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## Attention Readers

When you receive the January 1988 issue of *Military Intelligence*, you may notice a drastic reduction in the number of copies you ordinarily receive. Unfortunately, severe budget constraints have necessitated a reduction of distribution to one copy per unit address. We regret any inconvenience this may cause. If you desire your own copy, we encourage you to request an individual subscription through the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office. (See subscription information, inside front cover.) Thank you for your support.

# Training Notes

## Technical Training in the Tactical Unit

by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Dale L. Carrington

Technical training seems to be one of the most confusing issues facing the military intelligence (MI) commander. For years, technical training has been a wound that could be bandaged but never healed. Temporary fixes were written, presented and forgotten. The training lasted only as long as a motivated trainer was assigned to the unit and received command support.

The 109th MI Battalion (CEWI) has developed technical training using new training methods, tools and research. Called the Technical Certification Program (TCP), it is designed to help soldiers achieve and maintain technical proficiency in the cryptologic specialties. During the past eight months this training program has raised language skills one half to one full skill level; this was measured by the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). It has also encouraged exchange of ideas among all ranks and provided familiarization with military occupational specialty-specific working aids and reference materials. It has also emphasized realistic hands-on training using the TROJAN system and lifted the morale of everyone involved in the program.

The training is presented in three consecutive phases. Phase I consists of skill enhancement training. The voice intercept operator (98G) receives four weeks of language refresher training, and the manual Morse intercept operator (98H) receives four weeks of Morse code and amateur radio training. The traffic analyst (98C) receives two weeks of either language reading and reference skills or Morse code training to five words per minute and two weeks of computer operations.

Phase II presents two weeks of intense, area-specific mission training. Emphasis is on enemy artillery, infantry and armor equipment and tactics. Instruction takes the form of discussion and blackboard explanation sessions. Visits to the local military museum and a live artillery fire demonstration increase the reality of the training. Lesson plans, complete with tasks, conditions, standards, pre-tests and post-tests, discussion materials and practical exercises, provide hands-on training and an excellent reference handbook on completion of the course.

Phase III takes the student into the TROJAN facility. This 10-week block begins with equipment training and development of the analysis mission. Training from this point is progressive. Mission requirements are very basic and closely supervised. Emphasis is on accuracy and completeness of actions. The intercept operator learns

to call out data as he recognizes it so the analyst can provide him with supporting data. As this becomes routine, additional requirements are placed on the students. By the fifth or sixth week, the entire mission has become familiar to the students. The instructors become program monitors. The students now perform the mission on their own for the remaining weeks of the training period.

There are some additional benefits. The materials derived from the real-world mission are used to input national-level data bases and foster development of local data bases and term analysis techniques. The students have achieved the capability to quickly provide the supported unit commanders with accurate enemy intentions, allowing them time for decision and action.

TCP graduates become the company technical training experts. They train their coworkers in the skills necessary to improve tactical operations, SQT scores and provide a solidly trained, confident soldier.

In addition to training our enlisted soldiers, portions of this program can be presented as part of officer and NCO development programs. The benefit is enhanced understanding of what soldiers are trained to do. Once supervisors become better acquainted with their soldiers' capabilities, planning meaningful training becomes easier.

# Officer Notes

## Olmsted Scholarship Program

Each year the George and Carol Olmsted Foundation awards scholarships to outstanding officers of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. The Army receives two awards for U.S. Military Academy graduates and one for an officer commissioned from another source, MILPERCEN officials said.

Olmsted scholars spend nine to 12 months at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, Calif. Then they go abroad for two years to study in fields of social and political science or international relations.

They follow the overseas study with one year at a university in the United States earning a master's degree. The year of study in the United States does not need to immediately proceed the period overseas.

Study in fields other than those mentioned must be approved by the Olmsted Foundation.

To be eligible to compete for an Olmsted scholarship, an officer must:

- Be regular Army.

- Be branch qualified.
- Have between three and seven years of commissioned service.
- Have a minimum Graduate Record Examination score of 1200 or have an undergraduate grade average of B+ or higher.
- Be in compliance with AR 600-9, *The Army Weight Control Program*.

Officers who desire to be nominated to compete for Olmsted scholarships should contact their career managers. For more details on the Olmsted Scholarship Program contact Linda Haken-son, autovon 221-3140 or commercial (202) 325-3143.

## Military Intelligence Officer Selected for Fellowship

Maj. Theodore G. Chopin, an Army military intelligence officer, has been

selected to participate in the Director, National Security Agency (NSA) Fellowship Program. Chopin will be one of the four director's fellows representing the Armed Services and career civilian employees of the NSA in 1988.

The NSA Director's Fellowship Program develops leadership potential of military and civilian members of the cryptologic community. Fellows report to and receive tasks and project assignments from the director of the NSA.

Upon completion of the fellowship, Army officers are better prepared for leadership of Army cryptologic units, management positions at the NSA and other key roles in Defense Department cryptologic efforts.

A MILPERCEN board convenes each January to select Army nominees for the NSA Director's Fellowship Program. The NSA director makes the final selection of fellows.

Army majors and lieutenant colonels with training and experience in Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (35G) who are interested in NSA fellowships should write to Commander, U.S. Army MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPF-M, 200 Stovall St., Alexandria, VA. 22332-0400.

## PROFESSIONAL READER

**Knowing One's Enemies** by Ernest R. May, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987.

This outstanding collection of essays on intelligence assessment is monumental in its scope and touches upon an aspect of intelligence that is usually not studied in depth. The editor alludes to the fact that the recent declassification of government intelligence archives around the world enabled the authors to describe the assessment process carried on in detail with important summary lessons for the professional, student or casual reader.

The chapters, as expected, are divided into those describing the agencies prior to World War I and the activities of their successors prior to World War II. The authors do an excellent job of highlighting the errors in analysis, the misunderstandings and misinterpretation of the data, facts and indicators of the opponents. All the governments,

in one form or another, ignored the following definition of assessment that might have saved them much anguish, let alone the loss of lives and treasure:

"The vital element in overall assessment is proper understanding of the military doctrine of a potential enemy or enemies, not merely in the narrow technical sense but also in the wider context of 'war doctrine' (including an expansive interpretation of conducting a war ranging from military-economic potential to morale) and facility for translating such understanding of hostile 'military doctrine' into effective operational planning . . . there can never be enough intelligence . . . and once there is enough intelligence, how is it used to provide the 'right clues,' the 'right answers!'"

The authors point out that in the pre-World War I agencies, there was excellent collection of order of battle data. However, this was combined with a grave ignorance of the economic and strategic factors of war

and a faulty examination of what items technology had created that would cause mass destruction, i.e. the submarine and machine-gun. Although the pre-World War II agencies were technologically sound, the analysts became handicapped due to the information flow that was poorly examined by the final arbiter. This book adds to what has been written of Stalin's and Hitler's misinterpretations of what was given them and Stalin's predilection for having the most important information sent to him, yet restricted from his High Command. As always, "humanity" plays a large part in assessments. The authors demonstrate the interpretation of data that reinforced prejudices such as the British Air Ministry's overinflation of Luftwaffe potential prior to World War II and the ignoring of attache reports that stressed the Luftwaffe role of air-ground support.

The most fascinating portion of the book is the examination of the different agencies and their impact upon the collection activities of their respective governments. The reader should enjoy the descriptions of Soviet pre-World War II intelligence collec-

tion that painted a 'lionized portrait' of the German soldier yielding to the prejudices of the Tsarist regime, the well-known NKVD/GRU rivalry starting in the 1920s that pitted one agency against the other, or the fact that pre-World War I France had three SIGINT agencies when the Germans had none. The descriptions of the Nazi Germany *Forschungssamt* and Canaris' reformed *Abwehr* were fascinating and a valued footnote to the Nazi intelligence collection assets of the period.

May summarizes this work with the following injunctions for those who seek to overcome the problems of assessment in future operations. He warns, "Be cautious about challenging organizational structure, pay more attention to procedures and routines as vehicles for achieving coordination . . . Count on intelligence agencies more for tactical warning and forecasts for short-term developments than for long-term projections . . . ask constantly, 'Who are they?' and, 'Who are we?'"

This book is highly recommended for all intelligence professionals and those whose interests lie in this area. It is well researched, well written and valuable for those who must make the assessments now and in the future.

**Capt. Rick Ugino**  
Rochester, N.Y.

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**Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security** by Steven R. David, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, 191 pages, \$22.50.

This unfortunate book is an almost perfect example of what is wrong with academic writing in the United States today. Young academics are under great pressure to publish and to publish "meaningful," book-length works at that. In fields such as international relations, political science and conflict studies, this situation is especially counterproductive because it forces writers of little or no practical experience, whose insights are inspired by other books, to elaborate theories that are supposed to be of practical value.

In the case of David's book, the subject is Third World coups d'etat and what we should or should not do about them. Judging by his text, David has no immediate military experience. Yet, the majority of Third World coups involve significant military participation—often on both (or multiple) sides of the conflict. Further, intervention in coups d'etat by first or second world powers often requires the application of military force. David attacks his subject with mighty ambition, but his work fails on all but the most trivial counts.

David presents an inane discussion of the looming threat of Soviet nuclear weapons in Nicaragua and a reference to sending an "armored division" to intervene in the Third

World within a week of a coup (a course he does not recommend, to his credit). While the first example is unworthy of further discussion, the second deserves some elaboration. In one sentence David wildly misuses the word "tactically" then proceeds to display an ignorance of the dramatic and controversial reorganizations within the U.S. military establishment over the past several years. The light infantry division is not a formation in David's intellectual scheme. To be fair to the author, however, if he is aware of a practical method of deploying an armored division to the distant reaches of the Third World within a week, he could make his fortune as a contract adviser for the Department of Defense.

While it is natural for a military reviewer to focus on the inept handling and depersonalization of the military in this book, David fares no better in other departments. To his credit, he admits that he has relied totally on secondary sources. To his discredit, he assumes that, on the basis of those sources, he is genuinely capable of prescribing governmental policy. Yet, when David attempts to teach us how to manipulate the mechanics of coups, he collapses into a hopeless muddle. He begins his book with the implicit message that the United States had better get on the ball and formulate an activist policy to deal with coups and coup prevention. But, by the closing pages, he has turned round on himself: "Where the United States has backed coups, any gains achieved have proven to be short-lived. Coups beget coups, they damage the reputation of the United States, and they involve Washington in the internal political problems of another state that it may well prefer to avoid. While coups hold out the possibility of providing time for needed reforms, they also can legitimize an unstable form of succession and make democracy less likely to be achieved, both of which work against American long-term interests." This last is perhaps the most coherent and sensible passage in the book which was, apparently, a voyage of discovery for David—the reader can watch his notions evolve and even change fundamentally in the course of this blessedly short work. But David's personal *hejira* does not make particularly rewarding reading—it is a voyage he needed to take alone. Finally, the book has the feel of having been written on a word processor, with small, swift fixes here and there. It does not have the feel of painstaking multiple drafts and revisions that normally characterizes worthwhile writing.

If the book has any merits at all, they are that David's actual prose is more readable than that of many of his contemporaries. He offers a crisp recounting of many of the most critical and interesting coups that have taken place in the postwar period; as a narrator of past events, he comes off professionally enough. But, as an analyst, he manages to be both repetitious and vague,

which may betray a talent better suited to Madison Avenue than to a serious endeavor on national and international policy.

If you want to read this book, for any reason, borrow it from the library.

**Capt. Ralph Peters**  
Fort Hood, Texas

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**The New Jewel Movement** by Gregory Sanford, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1985.

On October 25, 1983, the United States committed military forces to the island of Grenada to stop a disastrous situation. In preceding years, a revolutionary government had forcefully seized power and then led itself down a path to self-destruction. Gregory Sanford's book meticulously details the history of the New Jewel Movement that seized power in 1979 and came to a bloody end in 1983. Sanford uses this movement as a typical example of how communist regimes gain and hold power in Third World countries.

The New Jewel Movement began in the early 1970s as a rural movement to gain political and social reforms. From the beginning, the movement's hard-liners embraced Marxist-Leninist communist doctrine. As its two most dynamic leaders, Bernard Coard and Maurice Bishop, consolidated their power, they openly challenged the unpopular Prime Minister Eric Matthew Gairy. The book traces their rise to power and the ensuing struggle that led to Gairy's expulsion.

Sanford uses original sources from the period to illustrate the policies, aspirations and ideology of the movement's leaders. The reader can conclude from this work that the New Jewel Movement was a colossal failure from its very conception. Sanford's sources show that what began as a social and political force to liberate the population from a repressive Gairy regime resulted in the population's oppression. The revolution was immensely popular at first. The fervor and enthusiasm rapidly declined as it became obvious that people in the movement were more interested in establishing a "purely doctrinal," Leninist-style government and staying in power at all costs. Sanford condemns the movement for trying to conceal its leftist goals under the guise of advancing a true people's democracy that never materialized. Grenadians rebelled when they realized this deception.

The people easily found reasons to hate the movement. In fact, the regime readily supplied several reasons. Its economic programs failed miserably, it challenged the popular church and was entering the Soviet sphere of influence, which alarmed many Grenadians. Beset by these massive problems and the loss of public support, the movement's leader attempted a reorganiza-



tion of the government, which took the form of a power struggle between Prime Minister Bishop and Deputy Prime Minister Coard. The power struggle ended in Bishop's summary execution and the chaos that preceded the U.S. intervention.

This book presents a concise, detailed history of political force that shook Grenada from the mid-1970s into the 1980s. Sanford's argument that ideological failures caused its demise is less than convincing. The economy did worsen during the regime rule. The national debt increased, unemployment rose and industrial production plummeted. These failures can be attributed more to how the leftist doctrine was implemented than to the doctrine itself. Sanford writes, "The New Jewel Movement lacked the money, material, personnel and expertise to implement most of its grandiose schemes." The question he fails to raise is, if the New Jewel Movement had access to sufficient resources, would it have been able to survive?

Despite its ideological flaws, **The New Jewel Movement** is an excellent book for studying the political history of Grenada and the emergence of communist regimes in Third World countries.

**Capt. Michael T. Flynn**

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**Doctrine, the Alliance, and Arms Control**, edited by Robert O'Neill, Hamden, Conn.: Arcon Books, 1987, 232 pages, \$29.50.

This book is composed of professional papers and summaries of committee discussions and speeches from a recent conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The theme for this annual conference was the interaction within NATO of strategic doctrine (nuclear and conventional) and arms control. Keynote speakers included Gen. Bernard Rogers (then supreme allied commander of Europe), Ambassador Richard Burt (U.S. ambassador to West Germany), and Karsten Voigt (SPD member of the Bundestag, Federal Republic of Germany). These officials and 14 Western defense intellectuals authored the book's 17 articles.

The book synthesizes the current debate within NATO on strategic doctrine. These experts contend that NATO's doctrine of flexible response is still viable after 20 years and isn't likely to change soon, despite the occurrence of political, economic and technological change within the alliance. Not even the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or progress at the Geneva Arms Control talks is likely to render this doctrine obsolete.

Deterrence is the main objective of the NATO alliance. Should deterrence fail, flex-

ible response calls for defense through deliberate escalation, as necessary. Of course, the optimal scenario would be to achieve victory while keeping all conflict at the conventional level. We can assume that even the Soviet leaders would concur on this. However, the clear consensus among the IISS members is that NATO does not have sufficient conventional strength at this time to make a purely conventional deterrence viable. Flexible response gives the NATO authorities the option of deliberate escalation to the tactical nuclear arena. Should even that level of force fail to defeat the aggressor or cause him to negotiate for peace, then the ultimate guarantor of NATO security is the American strategic nuclear option.

There are currently many sources of friction within NATO. Financial difficulties have prevented every nation of the alliance except the United States from reaching the goal of three percent real growth in defense expenditure in each of the last few years. SDI research may divert resources from the conventional and nuclear forces. Finally, the priority of out-of-area commitments (the Persian Gulf and Central America) continues to strain the alliance.

Through all of this, and in view of the growing Soviet threat, it is difficult to determine the best solution for NATO. Flexible response may best be discarded in favor of another approach. Ultimately, the best hope for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact lies in the chance that arms control can slow down the arms race and increase stability. Several of the options were considered in this book.

The merits of 'defensive' or 'social' defense were presented. This proposal envisions shifting defense priorities to the arming of civilian reservists with 'purely defensive' systems such as anti-tank weapons and air-defense missiles. NATO would then rely upon them to defeat any aggressor through guerrilla warfare, passive and civil disobedience. This proposal was criticized for not providing the military force necessary to drive out an aggressor.

Partial and total unilateral disarmament and the abandonment of forward defense in favor of defense in depth were also debated. The conferees rejected all three proposals. The NOFUN (No First Use of Nuclear Weapons) strategy received some support but was also rejected.

The most controversial debate involved the proposal to tailor NATO forces for the disruption of a Warsaw Pact attack through offensive conventional ground strikes into communist territory. The SACEUR doctrine of Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) and the American doctrine of AirLand Battle both lend themselves to this concept. However, the conferees agreed that an offensive proposal is not politically sound and may only encourage the Soviets to favor a strategy of nuclear preemption. The delegates preferred to support the current NATO doc-

trine of forward defense. Second-echelon interdiction will be required but not necessarily through offensive ground campaigns. Emerging technology provides the best hope for deep interdiction. New systems for target acquisition, real-time intelligence fusion, deep-strike weapons and semi-smart munitions must continue to be acquired.

The proposal for NATO to develop a tactical ballistic missile defense was also considered. It would lessen the threat of Soviet nuclear preemption and thereby increase the deterrent value of the NATO nuclear arsenal. It was rejected since it could tend to alienate the United States from Europe and may not be the most economical answer to the threat.

The discussion on arms control is enlightening in view of the potential breakthrough we currently see in Geneva. Without a doubt, the greatest long-term hope for stability and peace lies in the negotiation of arms control agreements. Even if theater nuclear forces (TNF) are completely eliminated from Europe, the overall balance of military power will remain unchanged. Soviet arms control objectives are quite pragmatic: to eliminate peacetime threats so they don't have to be reckoned with in a time of war. They would do well, therefore, to reach a TNF agreement with NATO.

The IISS members agreed, after considering these proposals, that the flexible response is the best doctrine for NATO. Conventional strength enhances the viability of nuclear deterrence. NATO must strengthen both its conventional and nuclear forces, since it is dependent upon its nuclear deterrent. This leads to the most difficult challenge facing the alliance today. Somehow the national leaders must maintain public support for their defense programs, even in the absence of arms control agreements. We live with the paradox that we must arm today in order to disarm tomorrow. We must sacrifice more now in the hope of security and increased prosperity later.

The members of the IISS are distinguished defense intellectuals and senior military officers. Their arguments provide the reader with an understanding of the complex issues facing the Western alliance. These are some of the leaders who guide national and alliance policy. This book is an excellent resource for anyone interested in strategic doctrine and policy.

**Capt. Timothy L. Smith**

201st MI Bde  
Fort Lewis, Wash.

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**Korea: The War Before Vietnam** by Callum A. MacDonald, New York: The Free Press, 1986, 330 pages, \$24.95.

New literary works that discuss the Korean War are always a welcome addition to both

civilian and military libraries. The Korean War is unique since the Korean Peninsula is often viewed as a largely unresolved conflict which can potentially erupt. MacDonald's study of the Korean War provides insight into the political machinations and military strategies which formed the backdrop to what has often been referred to as the wrong war at the wrong time. Unlike many works documenting the specific Korean War military campaigns and battles, MacDonald's book focuses on the politics of the Korean War and how domestic and international politics dictated the outcome of the war.

From the onset, MacDonald portrays the Korean conflict as a political tar baby — easy to become involved in but difficult to leave. As the political tale of the war unfolds, it becomes evident that the only potential U.S. exit lay in international agreements with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Throughout the book, MacDonald traces a variety of significant events that influenced the conduct and outcome of America's first experience of limited war in modern history.

In the international arena, the author clearly explains how the formulation of U.S. policy in the Far East, as outlined in such documents as National Security Policies 48 and 68, spelled out America's goal to contain and ultimately reverse the spread of Russian power in the Far East. MacDonald expounds on how this U.S. policy ran counter to both Soviet and Chinese foreign policy goals in Northeast Asia and how these juxtaposed policies caused an expected short conflict to drag out into an unexpected 37-month, no-win situation that left the superpowers willing to end the conflict short of decisive military victory.

In the arena of U.S. domestic policies, MacDonald sheds a most interesting light on the war's impact on the 1952 presidential elections and the removal of Gen. MacArthur from the Far East Command. The author describes how the Republicans enjoyed the luxury of criticizing the Democrats and the war without assuming responsibility for its conduct. In 1952, it appeared that the Republicans were less interested in defeating communism in Asia than in beating the Democrats in the presidential race. MacArthur's removal in 1952 from the Far East Command is described as symbolizing Washington's determination to limit the Korean War and America's reluctance to fight the Korean and Chinese civil wars on their behalf.

As the reader progresses through **Korea: The War Before Vietnam**, he gains an appreciation for the political complexities of America's first taste of fighting a limited war. This appreciation for what some may call unwinnable warfare is an eye-opening experience for the soldiers fighting the war on the ground. As the superpower politicians and leaders fought the politics of limited warfare, it was the soldier on the ground

who strove to win the "limited battles" to keep himself and his buddies alive. The author successfully tells this story but does not draw any parallels between Korea and Vietnam — something implied by use of the word Vietnam in the title. Any parallels drawn between the Korean War and the Vietnam conflict must be done by the reader. Nevertheless, **Korea: The War Before Vietnam** is a superbly written geopolitical account of America's first confrontation with limited warfare in Asia.

**Capt. Len Kosakowski**  
Fort Meade, Md.

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**High Tech Espionage** by Jay Tuck,  
New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1986.

Contrary to recent news attention, the transfer of Western technology to the Soviet Union has been in effect since the republic's inception. Apparently, Western businessmen did not consider the seriousness of trade as a foreign policy tool since, "Business is business." Also, Western policymakers portrayed business as a method to build "peaceful bridges." The decline of detente, the recent integrity crisis in America, economic fluctuation and the availability of information have contributed to Soviet success and made obtaining Western technology easier.

**High Tech Espionage** is a sobering book. Taken together with the earlier works of Anthony C. Sutton, **National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union**, and Joseph Finder, **Red Carpet**, one becomes apprehensive about the predicament the West has created for itself. The military might of the Soviet Union has become formidable through

legal or illegal means of technology transfer. Tuck's study supports the view that the vast untapped potential of the Soviet market is its greatest myth, since the Soviet industrial base has been repeatedly upgraded for military purposes.

The book is highly provocative. It is divided into three parts. The first section describes how the author became interested in technology transfer and outlines the scope of the investigation. The second section is a series of case studies that reveal Soviet industrial espionage and subversion activities, as well as the networks used to obtain their goals. Many of these cases have been in the press. However, the most interesting episode is the audacious and somewhat successful attempt by Soviet agents to purchase a number of U.S. West Coast banks to obtain information on people living and working in the Silicon Valley. The final section focuses on what has been acquired and the consequences thereof. Here are presented a number of charts that show purchased and manufactured items supplied by the West which have direct military application. Most startling is the list of such items as nuclear missile heat shields, missile launch vehicle software, fire control radars for tactical aircraft, submarine navigation systems, dry dock repair facilities, as well as T-72 tank gun tubes!

The author is highly critical of the Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade. He shows their efforts to regulate trade with the Soviet Union as ineffective. The lack of funds, expertise and a united purpose have been detrimental to the West. Since the early 1980s, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has led efforts to stop the technology hemorrhage. Tuck strongly appeals for better coordination among var-



ious U.S. governmental departments and among Western countries for the common cause.

One important area not addressed in **High Tech Espionage** is the Soviet assessment of the Western industrial and manufacturing base. Gathering the data may be difficult; however, the topic is appropriate. It would be interesting to graphically depict the number and types of plants, laboratories, scientific conferences and businesses visited by Soviet delegations, engineers, scientists and technicians over the last 10 to 15 years. This may identify those areas of interest to the Soviets. It would illuminate their high-tech manufacturing goals and their ability to gather information on how quickly the Western industrial base can respond to a crisis.

The book is readable, well organized and a must for those desiring to grasp the all-encompassing breadth of the Soviet advance. **High Tech Espionage** documents the fact that, in addition to seeking military and political information, manufacturing technology and production techniques have become Soviet espionage priorities. The book is a warning to stop the West's subsidization of Soviet military and industrial growth. For those persistent in dealing at Moscow's bazaar: *caveat emptor*.

Maj. Stephen P. Hallick, Jr.  
Fort McPherson, Ga.

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**Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii** by Richard Simpkin, London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, Ltd., 1987, \$37.50.

The book's central theme is not simply an autobiography on Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevskii (February 4, 1893, to June 11, 1937) but rather his contribution to the Soviet Army's concepts of deep battle doctrine. Tukhachevskii's impact on the fighting capabilities of the Red Army bore fruit during the great defensive battles fought after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.

Tukhachevskii was born near Smolensk, Belorussia. After he graduated from high school in 1905, his family moved to Moscow, and he entered the Alexandrovskii Military College. During his stint in this school, Tukhachevskii took the first steps toward a military career as an officer in the Tsar's Army.

Tukhachevskii's official biography states that he began his military career upon his commissioning as a member of the Semenovskii guards regiment. At one time, he was reported as killed in action during a battle in World War I. In another combat engagement, he was captured by the Germans, escaped and returned to Russia. At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, he was out of military service for a short time. In early 1918, he joined the Communist Party

and the Red Army, participating in the Civil War from 1918 to 1922.

Tukhachevskii commanded the Eighth Army, then served as assistant front commander on the Southern Front in 1919. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner in August 1919. He served on the Red Army general staff in 1921 and was assigned briefly as the commandant of the Red Army's Military Academy (later renamed the Frunze Military Academy). Upon Frunze's controversial death in October 1925, Tukhachevskii became chief of the Red Army general staff.

The early chapters of Simpkin's book elaborate on the developmental theories of absolute war by Napoleon and, in chronological sequence, by Moltke (elder and younger), Schlieffen, Clausewitz, the Kaiser and Churchillian unconditional surrender. Unconditional surrender, as espoused during the Casablanca Conference in 1943 against Germany, Japan and Italy, was the most recent evolution of the absolute war theory on a worldwide scale. There could not be a discussion of absolute war theories without mentioning the impact of the industrial revolution on development of projectile-throwing weapons and its immense influence on the balance of power in Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. The book additionally discusses the influence of extensive railway and road systems and their effects on the military general staffs of Prussia, France, Germany and Russia in the development of battlefield doctrines.

Tukhachevskii believed capitalistic nations made war without adequate military planning and the necessary industrial, economic or manpower resources. He used, as an example, Germany's defeat in World War I. This was to be a quick and decisive assault by German armies but devolved into a campaign of attrition. Germany could not economically sustain a war on two fronts. That, coupled with the mobilization of her enemy's military resources, forced Germany to capitulate. Tukhachevskii also blames Russia's catastrophic defeat in World War I to corrupt, weak military and political leadership and to a lack of industrial and other war-making potential. In order to win wars, Tukhachevskii stated, the Soviet Union must have a strong industry tied to a strong economy, followed by a population that supports the objectives of future conflict. He believed that, if not, the nation would suffer military defeat because of the *unjust* nature of war.

All unjust wars are, according to Tukhachevskii, Marx, Engels and Lenin, fought by capitalists or colonists and not the Soviet Union. However, the author cites the French and American efforts in Indochina and the Soviet action in Afghanistan as examples of unjust wars that cannot be won. The author incorporates his own views and interprets some of Tukhachevskii's views on the use of guerrilla and partisan forces in the enemy's rear areas. The views of Mao Tse-tung, Ho

Chi Minh and Lenin on revolutionary warfare are presented in an early chapter. The author discusses Russia's partisan movement and its impact on German rear areas during World War II and provides German military input as well.

While deep battle concepts were being discussed by various factions of the Red Army leadership, most other armies were still practicing dated modes of warfare. Most relied on massed infantry forces to penetrate strong defenses. Tukhachevskii's tenets for deep battle emphasized using machines to break strong enemy defenses. He emphasized the need for thorough military planning at all levels of command; thorough training and political indoctrination; extensive production of tanks, artillery, mortars and wheeled vehicles; and doctrine that stressed battlefield advantages by exploiting the weight, firepower and mobility of tanks.

Just before Tukhachevskii's execution in June 1937, the Red Army published the first of many regulations on doctrine and tactics. This was called the Provisional Field Service Regulation for the Worker's and Peasant's Red Army (PU-36). PU-36 could be compared to the present U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*. This particular regulation was apparently being promulgated to prepare the Red Army for future wars using mobile warfare for large-scale defensive and offensive operations. It was also used to counter German Army advances in the use of large tank and mechanized forces. Parts of PU-36 spelled out concepts such as surprise, speed, command and control, striking the enemy in the depths of his tactical layout, encounter and defensive battles.

Many of the proponents of deep battle were arrested, tried and executed, including Tukhachevskii. Quite a few have recently been rehabilitated by the post-Stalin governments. Deep battle and deep penetration concepts practiced by the Soviet Army today, and in the late 1920s and 1930s, were developed to avoid errors committed due to the advocacy of absolute war. Tukhachevskii and other Red Army leaders believed that use of firepower, mobility, surprise and attack by shock units, applied at the right time and place, would defeat the enemy. I highly recommend this book for those interested in the thought processes of former Red Army leaders and deep battle doctrine applications to the modern battlefield.

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**Project Democracy: The Parallel Government Behind the Iran-Contra Affair** by the Executive Intelligence Review, 1987, \$250.00.

The most important thing to know about this



book is the identity of its author — the Executive Intelligence Review. Many readers looking for an overview of the Iran-Contra affair might be taken in by this outfit's important name and its slickly produced, expensive book. However, the reader quickly learns that the Executive Intelligence Review is an organization associated with political extremist Lyndon LaRouche. The reader also discovers that this book contributes nothing to the debate on the sale of arms to Iran and the diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan resistance.

LaRouche's convoluted and implausible explanation for the Iran-Contra affair is all but incomprehensible. Suffice it to say that LaRouche believes that the revelations surrounding the Iran-Contra affair buttress his belief that there exists an international conspiracy of the followers of Nikolai Bukharin to impose a regime of universal fascism. Among these supposed "conspirators" are Dr. Henry Kissinger, the Israelis, Walter Mondale and the Trilateral Commission. Although there may be devotees of conspiracies who might enjoy trying to penetrate these incredible denunciations, the serious student will not.

LaRouche's organization devotes a substantial portion of the book to an attack on the pending criminal prosecution of LaRouche and his aides. The narration provides a glowing portrayal of LaRouche as a messianic figure whose insight and analysis are the only avenues available to save Western civilization. As would be expected, the book contains a vehement attack on the U.S. attorney who is prosecuting LaRouche and his minions. In a more inexcusable vein, the book makes a series of unfounded, outrageous accusations and aspersions as to the character and professionalism of various dedicated public servants. No one "fingered" by the Executive Intelligence Review deserves the unfair treatment to which they are subjected in this self-styled expose.

Our present political system provides all viewpoints an opportunity to compete in the marketplace of ideas. A healthy democracy, such as ours, will presumably treat the Executive Intelligence Review and this \$250.00 book to what it deserves — silence and inattention.

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**Containing the Soviet Union**, edited by Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis, New York: Pergamon, 1987, 251 pages.

World War II had been won. However, the Soviet Union and the United States, once wartime allies, adopted contentious policies that ushered in over four decades of cold war. In 1947, George F. Kennan, U.S. National War College, wrote an anonymous article

titled, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in the prestigious journal, *Foreign Affairs*, that set U.S. policy. The article called for "a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." Containment has been the most consistent theme running through American foreign policy. This policy, combined with a rapid succession of presidents, international crises, domestic issues, reversals of policy or a change in capacity to implement the policy, has obscured the course of containing the Soviet Union. Deibel and Gaddis, a long recognized scholar on cold war history, edit a collection of articles that critique the U.S. containment policy.

Divided into two parts, the book gives an excellent historical perspective and then discusses the impact of public opinion, economics, alliances and nuclear strategy on containment policy. Public opinion cannot be demonstrated with substantial evidence, but its influence, especially for beliefs about the resources available, is present. At a time when general public support for international activism is declining, the leadership of this country is more focused on the means. It was initially thought that denying the Soviet Union industrial goods would slow their development and that economic leverage could be used to pursue political ends. However, domestic economic interests seemed to have superceded national security. Our inconsistencies, with actions like the lifting of grain embargoes, call into question the entire rationale of policy and greatly lessen American credibility. Our nuclear lead dwindled to a strategic nuclear balance that seems appropriate for an America that demonstrated a sense of unwillingness to "pay the price." A major problem with our past alliances for containment was joining the United States to countries with whom it did not share many interests. Tragically, in some cases, pursuit of the policy tied the United States to regimes that defied principles upon which this country was founded, such as the right to self-determination.

In the second part which deals with the future of the containment policy, the major conclusion is that the containment of Soviet expansion will remain the proper strategy for the United States, and it will be necessary strategy far into the future. For the conscientious professional who seeks clarity in American foreign policy with the Soviet Union and who wants to understand the multitude of factors that bear on the deliberations of our policy within a democratic society, **Containing the Soviet Union** is an excellent primer. The reader's time will be well spent.

**1st Col. Richard N. Armstrong**  
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## Recommended Reading for Intelligence Personnel

To be effective in the modern world, technical intelligence personnel must be thoroughly trained in their particular specialty area and must also understand the interrelationship of one system to another, as well as how they relate to the battlefield. In addition, they must be aware of the military-industrial complex which produces weapons, the political-military aspects of world conflict, and the political-military national economy. They must also understand the capability and limitations of the national intelligence system in which they operate. At the higher levels of technical intelligence, one must also understand the basic aspects of scientific research, design engineering and industrial productivity. The following is a selected reading list for the intelligence professional.

**Berlin Alert**, (Truman Smith) Robert Hessen, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, Calif.

**Crusade in Europe**, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Da Capo Press, Inc., New York, 1947.

**Spearhead in the West: The Third Armored Division, 1941-1945**, Battery Press, Nashville, Tenn., 1980.

**Up Front with U.S.: Day by Day in the Life of a Combat Infantryman**, Walter L. Brown, Military Specialists, Tarpon Springs, Fla.

**The Last Hundred Days**, John Toland, Random House, New York, 1966.

**Flying Bomber**, Peter G. Cooksley, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1979.

**German Assault Rifles 1935-1945**, Peter Senich, Paladin Press, Boulder, Colo., 1987.

**Photo Reconnaissance**, Andrew Brooks, Ian Allen, Ltd., London, 1975.

**The Enigma War**, Jozef Garlinski and Tadeusz Lisicki, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1980.

**Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment**, Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City Co., New York, 1981.

**Donovan, America's Master Spy**, Richard Dunlop, Rand McNally and Co., Chicago, Ill., 1982.

**OSS to Green Beret**, Aaron Bank, Presidio Press, Novato, Calif., 1986.

**The Secret World War II**, Francis Russell ed., Time Life Books, Alexandria, Va., 1982.

**Pusan Perimeter**, Edwin P. Hoyt, Stein and Day, New York, 1984.

**Korea: The First War We Lost**, Bevin Alexander, Hippocrene Books, New York, 1986.

**The American Occupation of Japan**, Schaller, Oxford Univ. Press, 1985.

**The AK47 Story**, Dr. Clinton Ezell, Stackpole Books, 1986.

**National Intelligence**, Joe Zlotnick, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1964.

**A Soldier Reports**, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Dell Publishing Co., New York, 1980.

**Green Berets at War**, Shelby Stanton, Presidio Press, Novato, Calif., 1985.

**Pentagon Paper**, Sheenan and E.W. Kenworthy, Times Books, New York, 1971.

**Infantry in Vietnam**, Garland, Battery Press, Nashville, Tenn., 1982.

**25 Year War**, Bruce Palmer, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1984.

**Role of Military Intelligence in Vietnam 1965-1967**, McChristian, Government Printing Office.

**The Tunnels of Chu Chi**, Mangold and Penycate, Random House, Westminster, Md., 1985.

**Vietnam Weapons**, 1986.

**Anatomy of a Division**, Stanton, Presidio Press, Novato, Calif., 1987.

**History of the Mideast Wars**, 1984.

**Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army**, Isby, Jane's Publishing Co., Ltd., London, 1981.

**Inside the Soviet Army**, Suvorov, MacMillan Publishing Co., Riverside, N.J., 1982.

**The Threat**, Cockburn, Random House, Westminster, Md., 1983.

**More Bucks, Less Bang: How the Pentagon Buys**.

**Ineffective Weapons**, Rasor, Fund for Constitutional Government, 1983.

**Anti Tank**, Simpkin, Brassey's Defense Publishers, London, 1982.

**Human Factors in Mechanized Warfare**, Simpkin, Brassey's Defense Publishers, London, 1983.

**Spy-Tech**, Yost, Facts on File Publishers, 1985.

**The Military Intelligence Community**, Hopple and Watson, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1986.

**Lt. Col. William L. Howard**  
Largo, Fla.

## Academic Support Overview

Academic support measures the quality of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School's threat instruction. The threat manager and his academic support analyst correct threat deficiencies.

The U.S. Army's threat doctrine emanates from a wide variety of sources:

- The Army Intelligence Agency (AIA) and its three threat production components: the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, Foreign Science and Technology Center and Missile and Space Intelligence Center.

- The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). It has responsibility for human intelligence collection through its subordinate MI groups here and abroad. Both AIA and INSCOM coordinate with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency for much of their intelligence collection requirements.

- The DIA. This agency is responsible for the foreign military and military-related intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Com-

mands, other defense components and, as appropriate, non-defense agencies. This is done through internal production or through tasking other defense components and coordination with other intelligence agencies. It coordinates all Department of Defense intelligence collection requirements for departmental needs, manages and operates the Defense Attache System and provides foreign intelligence and counterintelligence staff support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The national Army intelligence agencies are also responsible for formulating the Army's threat architecture. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible for using the threat architecture developed by these diverse intelligence agencies for teaching threat throughout the TRADOC schools system.

TRADOC Regulation 381-1, *Military Intelligence: Threat Management*, authorizes the appointment of a threat manager as the authority for threat matters in its schools. At the Intelligence Center and School, the Threat Office is part of the Directorate of Combat Developments. The threat manager, through his academic support analyst and staff, has overall responsibility for:

- Integrating threat into programs

of instruction and lesson plans.

- Identifying, reviewing and validating lesson plans.
- Reviewing threat material in the Army-wide Doctrinal and Training Literature Program.
- Monitoring and determining the accuracy of threat presentations being made in the classrooms.
- Providing approved threat documents to course managers and instructors.

The academic support analyst attempts to measure the currency and accuracy of threat instruction and materials in the Intelligence Center and School through a multidimensional approach. With staff support, the analyst coordinates with elements of the training departments for review, validation and approval of lesson plans, programs of instruction and nonresident training materials, and monitors classrooms to enhance the validation and approval of threat instruction.

It is easy to discount the concept of academic support because most personnel connect its functions more to a staff and faculty environment. However, academic support is inextricably tied to TRADOC threat management policy and to the quality of threat being taught in the Intelligence Center and School.

# An Open Letter to Army Military Intelligence

by Brig. Gen. James R. Clapper Jr.

*Having been a reader and supporter of Military Intelligence, I wanted to take the opportunity to share with the U.S. Army M.I. Corps some perspectives I have on the state of your profession. If you've looked at the by-line and read this far, you're probably wondering something like "Where's this Air Force guy coming from, talking about Army M.I.?"*

*Let me explain. Last summer, I completed one of the most professionally rewarding assignments in my career (which spans almost a quarter of a century, virtually all of it spent in intelligence). I served for two years in a "multi-hat" position as the U.S. Forces, Korea, Director of Intelligence (J2), ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, Deputy C2, and, in many ways, de facto Eighth U.S. Army G2.*

*Although these are organizationally Joint/Combined positions, the focus and emphasis in Korea is pervasively (and properly) ground-force oriented — both from the standpoint of the primary adversary threat, as well as the friendly forces. (This, I must hasten to add, is in no way intended to demean the substantial roles played by the Navy, Marine Corps and, of course, my own service in the defense of the Republic of Korea.)*

*The result of this experience was to become quickly and deeply immersed in the Army M.I. approach to intelligence — to really learn and live the ground threat at the "nitty-gritty," tactical level, as I never had before. Fortunately, I had two outstanding M.I. senior colonels as my deputies. They were patient, painstaking mentors who taught me the philosophy and mechanics of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), the logic of which is impeccable. It is a concept applicable to all campaigns — ground, air or maritime. It is a philosophy I've adopted as my own, which I'm applying in my current position as USCINCPAC J2. I learned first hand the critical importance the flow of focused, anticipatory intelligence plays in the AirLand Battle context. I worked in an organizational milieu in which intelligence seemingly "drove" the entire staff. This, I found — working for a CINC as dynamic and demanding as Gen. William J. Livsey — was a "good news/bad news" prop-*



osition. I enjoyed the challenge, but sometimes I felt as though I had more business from the boss than I could stand!

In the course of my "Army" tour, I developed a great appreciation and respect for Army M.I. Nowhere is there a greater institutional commitment to the enlightened practice of intelligence than in the Army. This is particularly true in Korea, where, not surprisingly, I found an inherent interest in the threat. My observations of the senior Army leadership I encountered, however, led me to extrapolate this observation as valid Army-wide.

Yours is the only service with a three-star DCSINT; you regularly promote M.I. colonels to brigadier general. You have a Center of Intelligence excellence and doctrinal thinking at your Intelligence Center and School. And, you are growing an extremely capable, professional NCO and officer cadre who are versatile, professional and broad-gauged. I never miss an opportunity to exhort a young Army officer to the tremendous career opportunities — the progressively demanding staff jobs and command positions to aspire to.

I'd particularly like to comment on your emphasis on doctrine. This emphasis, I became convinced, is well placed — the more I came to understand and immerse myself in it. The fact that you have given some thought to a roadmap which lays out how intelligence activities should function — whether tactical or strategic, below, at or above corps — is a tremendous institutional strength. It enabled me, for example — as a relative transient in your business — to derive solutions to some ostensibly complex organizational issues in the Korean "intelligence confederation."

Such a statement may seem — particularly to those of you who have served there — as something of a contradiction, since there are seemingly many exceptions to "standard" Army doctrine occasioned by the unique command arrangements existent in Korea. A little deeper examination reveals, though, that these "exceptions" are really derived from, and consistent with, broad Army intelligence doctrine. Once understood, these common sense tenets can be applied again and again — regardless of whether the issue is organizational, procedural or programmatic.

I would conclude this "open letter" by saying to you all that it was a privilege for me to have been one of your number — even if temporarily. I will always feel a part of Army M.I.; the experience has left an indelible mark on me.

James R. Clapper Jr.  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Director for Intelligence

## **Air Force Intelligence Conference on Soviet Military Affairs**

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (AF/IN) is sponsoring a conference entitled "The Soviet Union—Towards the 21st Century: Political-Military Affairs in the Gorbachev Era." The conference will be held 19-22 October 1988 at the Sheraton-National Hotel in Arlington, Va.

This conference will be a follow-up to the AF/IN-sponsored conference held in Reston, Va. in October 1980. Nearly 1,000 individuals participated in the 1980 discussions which covered a wide variety of topics. A comprehensive volume, **The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead**, was published in 1985, and a volume is planned for the upcoming conference.

The focus of the 1988 conference will be the Soviet political-military leadership, its domestic and foreign agendas as they pertain to security issues and political-military issues likely to confront the USSR through the end of the century.

A stipend will be paid to panel chairmen and discussants. Papers should be previously unpublished and reflect original research. Submissions should conform to either Modern Language Association or Turabian formats for research papers. Authors are requested to use the U.S. Government Standard (Board of Geographic Names) for transliterating Cyrillic into Roman. Further information is available by contacting the conference organizers. The following panel topics for the conference are provided:

- Civil-Military Relations under Gorbachev
- Trends in Soviet Strategic Forces
- Trends in Soviet Tactical Forces
- Soviet Command and Control Capabilities
- The Soviet Weapons Acquisition Process
- Soviet Military Space Programs
- Soviet Military Leadership
- Trends in Soviet Defense Spending
- The Soviet Union and Arms Control
- The Armed Forces of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact States
- Soviet Capabilities for Global Power Projection
- Soviet Policy Toward the Third World
- Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe
- The Military Implications of Soviet Disinformation Programs
- The Soviet Threat Assessment Process
- New Technologies and Soviet Intelligence Capabilities
- The KGB, Party Discipline and Social Dissent

Papers and proposals should be submitted to:

**Conference on Soviet Military Affairs  
Strategic Studies Division  
AFIS/INIS  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20330-5110  
Telephone: (Comm.) 202-695-7497**

# 124th Military Intelligence Battalion



*Oriental blue and silver gray are the colors associated with the Military Intelligence branch. The checker background represents a chessboard and symbolizes the use of intelligence information in formulating military strategy and countermeasures. The griffin symbolizes vigilance and penetration of the unknown as suggested by the black area. The three disks on the griffin's collar allude to the three battle engagements in which contingents of the unit have participated.*

The 124th Military Intelligence Battalion was constituted on June 1, 1981, in the regular Army. The battalion's origin dates back to the summer of 1944. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, A and B Companies (formerly the 24th Military Intelligence Company) have distinct histories.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company was initially constituted August 5, 1944, as the 3323d Signal Information and Monitoring Company. It was activated in August 1944 at Camp Gruber, Okla., and inactivated in August 1945 at Heidelberg, Germany. The company participated in World War II campaigns in Central Europe. It was redesignated in September 1947 as the 310th Radio Security Detachment and allotted to the Organized Reserves. The detachment underwent numerous changes over the following years. In July 1951 the detachment was redesignated as the 853d Communication Reconnaissance

Detachment and allotted in December 1951 to the regular Army. It was activated in January 1952 at Fort Devens, Mass., and inactivated in March 1956 at Heidelberg, Germany. On March 16, 1979, the detachment was redesignated as the 853d Army Security Agency (ASA) Company and activated at Fort Stewart, Ga.

The 24th Military Intelligence Company was constituted July 12, 1944, in the U.S. Army as the 24th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment. It was activated in August 1944 at Hollandia, New Guinea, and inactivated in February 1946 at Tokyo, Japan. On October 6, 1950, the detachment was activated in Korea and allotted to the regular Army in February 1954. It was inactivated in October 1957 in Japan. The detachment was redesignated on June 5, 1958, as the 24th Military Intelligence Detachment. It was activated in July 1958 at Augsburg, Germany, and inactivated in April 1970 at Fort

Riley, Kan. The detachment was again activated at Fort Stewart, Ga., in February 1976 and reorganized and redesignated in September 1978 as the 24th Military Intelligence Company. It was assigned to the 24th Infantry Division. Company B saw action during World War II in New Guinea, Leyte, Luzon and the Southern Philippines. The detachment's distinguished service in the Philippine campaign resulted in an award of the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation. Distinguished service in the Korean War brought the detachment two Meritorious Unit Commendations.

The 853d ASA Company and the 24th Military Intelligence Company merged in June 1981, along with the activation of Company C, to form the 124th Military Intelligence Battalion. It is currently assigned to the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Ga.



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